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ABSTRACT 
In an eviction matter, the court is required to consider all relevant circumstances and grant an 
order that is just and equitable. An important relevant circumstance to be considered is 
whether the unlawful occupiers have alternative accommodation. Courts are reluctant to grant 
eviction orders that would leave the unlawful occupiers homeless. In matters where unlawful 
occupiers are unable to secure their own alternative accommodation, courts often look to the 
state to provide alternative accommodation. Courts have ordered the state to provide 
alternative accommodation to the unlawful occupiers in certain cases as a condition of the 
eviction order (an alternative accommodation order). This thesis seeks to determine when an 
alternative accommodation order as a condition to the eviction of unlawful occupiers in terms 
of the Prevention of Illegal Eviction From and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998 
(PIE) would comply with the court’s constitutional mandate.  
Two criteria are determined against which to test whether alternative accommodation orders 
comply with the court’s constitutional mandate. First, the court’s constitutional mandate 
requires that its orders adhere to the existing legal framework. Second, the court’s 
constitutional mandate requires that its orders respect the functions of the branches of 
government. 
An alternative accommodation order would only adhere to the legal framework if there is a 
valid ground for placing this duty on the state. The possible grounds for holding the state 
liable relate to its constitutional duty to respect, protect, promote and fulfil human rights. One 
possible ground relates to the state’s duty to fulfil the unlawful occupiers’ right of access to 
adequate housing by implementing reasonable short-term housing programmes. Hence, 
whether the state has a duty to accommodate the unlawful occupiers within its short-term 
housing programme is a relevant circumstance to be considered by the court. A finding that 
the state has a duty to accommodate the unlawful occupiers, immediately, is likely to lead to 
an eviction with an order against the state to provide alternative accommodation, regardless 
of the other circumstances.  
If the state does not have a duty to accommodate the unlawful occupiers immediately in 
terms of its duty to fulfil human rights, its liability to provide alternative accommodation 
might still be found on its duty to respect and protect human rights. This is because, under 
some circumstances, the granting of an eviction order that results in homelessness might 
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violate the rights of the unlawful occupiers, whereas a denial of the eviction or a delay in the 
granting or execution of an eviction order1 might violate the rights of the landowner. Placing 
the duty on the state to prevent or mitigate the violation by compensating either of the parties 
could be justified due to the state’s duty to respect and protect human rights. As an alternative 
to compensation, a court could order the state to provide alternative accommodation to the 
unlawful occupiers.  
These two possible grounds for alternative accommodation orders are analysed to determine 
when alternative accommodation orders based on these grounds would adhere to the existing 
legal framework and respect the functions of the branches of government. These grounds are 
likely to have the same outcome. For both grounds, certain factors weigh heavily against an 
alternative accommodation order: blameworthiness on the part of the unlawful occupiers, a 
lack of blameworthiness on the part of the state, a finding that the state’s limited resources 
should rather be spent on others who are needier or more deserving. In the conclusion of the 
thesis, recommendations are made regarding two problem areas in granting alternative 
accommodation orders in eviction matters – the availability of state resources and the burden 
of proof. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 Due to a postponement of the matter, a late eviction date, a postponement of the eviction date or a suspension 
of the eviction order. 
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This thesis considers the law up until 30 June 2017  
9 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
DECLARATION...................................................................................................................... 3 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .................................................................................................... 4 
ABSTRACT .............................................................................................................................. 6 
TABLE OF CONTENTS ........................................................................................................ 8 
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION .................................................................................. 15 
1 Problem statement and research question .................................................................... 15 
2 Background .................................................................................................................. 18 
2.1 Unlawful occupation due to the post-Apartheid housing crisis ............................. 19 
2.2 Constitutional response to post-Apartheid unlawful occupation ........................... 23 
3 Criteria for answering research question...................................................................... 27 
3.1 The court’s constitutional mandate........................................................................ 27 
3.1.1 The rule of law ............................................................................................... 27 
3.1.2 Separation of powers...................................................................................... 30 
3.1.3 Co-operative government............................................................................... 33 
3.1.4 Subsidiarity .................................................................................................... 34 
3.2 Criteria derived from principles ............................................................................ 39 
3.2.1 Adherence to the existing legal framework ................................................... 39 
3.2.2 Respect for the functions of government ....................................................... 41 
4 Methodology ................................................................................................................ 43 
5 Argument outline ......................................................................................................... 44 
5.1 Part One: Adherence to the existing legal framework ........................................... 44 
5.2 Part Two: Respect for the functions of government .............................................. 45 
5.3 Part Three: Concluding remarks and recommendations ........................................ 45 
 
 
 
10 
 
PART ONE: ADHERENCE TO THE EXISTING LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
CHAPTER TWO: GROUNDS FOR ALTERNATIVE ACCOMMODATION ORDERS
.................................................................................................................................................. 48 
1 Introduction .................................................................................................................. 48 
2 Lessons from decisions that preceded alternative accommodation orders .................. 49 
2.1 The state’s housing duty includes a duty to assist persons living in emergency 
housing situations .................................................................................................. 49 
2.2 The availability of alternative accommodation can affect whether an eviction is 
just and equitable .................................................................................................. 52 
2.3 A lack of alternative accommodation can result in the infringement of other 
human rights .......................................................................................................... 54 
3 Decisions that resulted in alternative accommodation orders ...................................... 59 
3.1 City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Blue Moonlight Properties 39 
(Pty) Ltd ................................................................................................................ 60 
3.1.1 Reasoning in Blue Moonlight ........................................................................ 63 
3.1.2 Subsequent Supreme Court of Appeal decisions ........................................... 71 
3.2 Occupiers of Skurweplaas 353 JR v PPC Aggregate Quarries (Pty) Ltd .............. 81 
3.3 Precedent value of the cases .................................................................................. 86 
3.4 Possible grounds for alternative accommodation orders ....................................... 88 
4 Conclusion ................................................................................................................... 90 
CHAPTER THREE: THE STATE’S DUTY TO FULFIL HUMAN RIGHTS ............... 91 
1 Introduction .................................................................................................................. 91 
2 The legal framework .................................................................................................... 92 
2.1 Constitutional provisions ....................................................................................... 92 
2.2 Legislation ............................................................................................................. 93 
2.3 Policy ..................................................................................................................... 94 
2.4 The role of international law instruments .............................................................. 96 
3 Duty on the state........................................................................................................... 98 
11 
 
4 Beneficiaries of short-term programme ..................................................................... 100 
5 Standards under short-term emergency programme .................................................. 107 
5.1 Suitable emergency accommodation standards ................................................... 108 
5.2 Definition of temporary accommodation ............................................................ 112 
6 Progressive fulfilment of measures within the state’s available resources ................ 114 
6.1 No immediate realisation of short-term housing needs ....................................... 115 
6.2 No prioritisation of short-term housing needs ..................................................... 118 
6.3 No challenge to the fact of lacking resources ...................................................... 120 
7 Conclusion ................................................................................................................. 124 
CHAPTER FOUR: THE STATE’S DUTY TO RESPECT AND PROTECT HUMAN 
RIGHTS ................................................................................................................................ 127 
1 Introduction ................................................................................................................ 127 
2 The legal framework .................................................................................................. 128 
2.1 Constitutional provisions ..................................................................................... 128 
2.2 Legislation ........................................................................................................... 129 
2.3 Role of international law ..................................................................................... 129 
3 Consideration of relevant circumstances ................................................................... 131 
3.1 Identity of applicant ............................................................................................. 131 
3.2 Size of group ........................................................................................................ 135 
3.3 Danger of living conditions ................................................................................. 137 
3.4 Purpose of eviction .............................................................................................. 138 
3.5 Duration of occupation ........................................................................................ 141 
3.6 Blameworthiness of the occupiers ....................................................................... 143 
3.7 Vulnerability of occupiers ................................................................................... 146 
4 Just and equitable orders ............................................................................................ 147 
4.1 Definition of the measure in the context of evictions .......................................... 148 
4.2 Application of the measure in the context of evictions ....................................... 150 
12 
 
4.3 Use of the measure to attach equalising conditions to eviction orders ................ 154 
5 Remedy for the limitation of rights ............................................................................ 155 
5.1 Limitation of rights .............................................................................................. 156 
5.1.1 Limitation of the right to property in terms of section 25(1) of the 
Constitution .................................................................................................. 157 
5.1.2 Limitation of the negative right of access to adequate housing in terms of 
section 26(1) of the Constitution.................................................................. 160 
5.1.3 Limitation of other rights ............................................................................. 166 
5.2 Appropriateness of an alternative accommodation orders as remedy ................. 169 
5.3 Liability of the state ............................................................................................. 173 
6 Conclusion ................................................................................................................. 180 
 
PART TWO: RESPECT FOR THE FUNCTIONS OF GOVERNMENT 
CHAPTER FIVE: RESPECT FOR THE FUNCTIONS OF THE LEGISLATIVE AND 
EXECUTIVE BRANCHES OF GOVERNMENT ........................................................... 183 
1 Introduction ................................................................................................................ 183 
2 Separate powers of government ................................................................................. 184 
2.1 The legislative authority ...................................................................................... 185 
2.2 The executive authority ....................................................................................... 187 
2.3 The judicial authority ........................................................................................... 191 
3 Alternative accommodation orders and the separation of powers ............................. 193 
3.1 Arguments that alternative accommodation orders violate the separation of 
powers doctrine ................................................................................................... 195 
3.1.1 Technical capacity to decide on polycentric issues ..................................... 196 
3.1.2 The counter-majoritarian dilemma .............................................................. 198 
3.1.3 Far-reaching budgetary implications ........................................................... 201 
3.2 Alternative accommodation orders that adhere to the separation of powers 
doctrine................................................................................................................ 203 
4 Alternative accommodation orders and co-operative government ............................ 204 
13 
 
4.1 General duty to co-operate .................................................................................. 205 
4.2 Special role of municipalities .............................................................................. 206 
4.3 Special duties of executive councils toward municipalities ................................ 207 
4.4 Housing and the duty to co-operate ..................................................................... 208 
4.5 Alternative accommodation orders that adhere to co-operative government ...... 211 
5 Conclusion ................................................................................................................. 213 
CHAPTER SIX: ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE ..................................................... 215 
1 Introduction ................................................................................................................ 215 
2 Distributive justice ..................................................................................................... 216 
3 Corrective justice ....................................................................................................... 223 
4 Most appropriate form of justice ................................................................................ 227 
4.1 Establishment of the most appropriate form of justice ........................................ 228 
4.1.1 Constitutional Court jurisprudence .............................................................. 228 
4.1.2 Nature of eviction matters ............................................................................ 230 
4.2 Application of distributive justice in granting alternative accommodation orders
 ............................................................................................................................. 233 
4.2.1 Identification of the group ........................................................................... 233 
4.2.2 Application of the principles ........................................................................ 241 
4.2.3 Difficulties in applying distributive justice in granting alternative 
accommodation orders ................................................................................. 243 
5 Conclusion ................................................................................................................. 246 
 
PART 3: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUDING REMARKS AND RECOMMENDATIONS .... 249 
1 Introduction ................................................................................................................ 249 
2 Similar outcome of the grounds ................................................................................. 251 
2.1 Reasons for similar outcome ............................................................................... 251 
2.1.1 Blameworthiness of the unlawful occupiers ................................................ 252 
2.1.2 Blameworthiness of the state ....................................................................... 254 
14 
 
2.1.3 Limited resources and the rights of others ................................................... 256 
2.2 Recommendations regarding the choice of grounds............................................ 260 
3 Recommendations regarding key issues .................................................................... 262 
3.1 Availability of resources ...................................................................................... 262 
3.1.1 Lack of alternative accommodation ............................................................. 263 
3.1.2 Involvement of other spheres ....................................................................... 269 
3.1.3 Standards of emergency housing ................................................................. 271 
3.1.4 Other remedies ............................................................................................. 272 
3.2 Burden of proof ................................................................................................... 280 
3.2.1 Proof of lack of alternative accommodation ................................................ 281 
3.2.2 Proof of available resources and fulfilment of the state’s duties ................. 282 
4 Conclusion ................................................................................................................. 285 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................................................................................................ 289 
 
  
15 
 
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
1 Problem statement and research question 
Emfuleni Local Municipality v Builders Advancement Services CC2 involved an application 
for a quite ordinary eviction3 order.4 A large number of people were being evicted from state-
owned land by the municipality.5 There was nothing particularly peculiar about the 
application, nor was there anything unusual to or different from the eviction applications 
nowadays heard frequently by South African courts.6 Willis J’s had to give judgment on the 
matter. He stated: 7 
“I am bewildered and confused as to how a court is expected to deal appropriately with 
applications for eviction. … [W]e need clarity. We also need much wisdom. We need 
practical, but nevertheless fair and just answers to some highly vexing issues.” 
In the end, Willis J declined to decide on the eviction matter before him. He postponed the 
matter sine die, requesting the Judge President to appoint a full bench to hear the matter.8  
Four years later, Human Settlements Minister Sisulu also alluded to the bewilderment and 
confusion reigning in eviction law. After an eviction by the South African National Road 
                                                 
2
 Emfuleni Local Municipality v Builders Advancement Services CC (2009/51258) [2010] ZAGPJHC 27 
(hereinafter “Emfuleni”). 
3
 S 1 of the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998 defines 
“evict” as “to deprive a person of occupation of a building or structure, or the land on which such building or 
structure is erected, against his or her will and ‘eviction’ has a corresponding meaning”. 
4
 An eviction can be defined as “the permanent or temporary removal against their will of individuals, families 
and/or communities from the homes and/or land which they occupy”. This definition can be found in United 
Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Forced Evictions (Art 11.1 of the Covenant, UN 
Doc E/1998/22) General Comment No 7 , as referenced in I Currie & J De Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 6 
ed (2013) 587. 
5
 Emfuleni para 3. 
6
 In 2016, eviction applications were enrolled over 600 times for the Western Cape High Court alone and often 
the high court is not the court of first instance in eviction matters. For the Western Cape High Court rolls see 
Southern African Legal Information Institute Court Roll: Western Cape High Court (Cape Town) (2016) 
http://www.saflii.org/za/other/ZAWCHCRolls/2016/ 05-01-2017. Chilemba reports on the large number of 
evictions in 2014 alone. For example, it was reported that there are between 10 and 20 evictions in the inner city 
of Johannesburg every month. See, E Chilemba "State of evictions report" (2014) Community Law Centre 1 64. 
See also, Sosibo K at Mail & Guardian City of Jo'burg Blamed For Not Providing Homes for Evictees (2014) 
http://mg.co.za/article/2014-06-12-city-of-joburg-blamed-for-not-providing-accommodation-for-evictees 13-01-
2017. 
7
 Emfuleni para 31. 
8
 Emfuleni para 1. 
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Agency Limited (Sanral) left hundreds of people homeless,9 she called on landowners to halt 
eviction proceedings “until there is a clear understanding of the laws”.10 Similar to Willis J, 
she referred the matter to a group of her peers, a ministerial board of enquiry.11 
What, one may ask, would cause bewilderment and confusion in the upper ranks of South 
Africa’s legal profession and government?12 What are the “highly vexing issues” that move a 
seasoned judge to refuse judgment in an eviction matter? What is it in the current law that the 
responsible Minister does not understand? These high-profile demands for clarity seem to 
relate to the understanding of some of the practical issues that arise from eviction 
proceedings.  
In particular, the demands for clarity seem to relate to matters involving “unlawful 
occupiers”.  In this thesis, the term “unlawful occupier” is used as defined in s1(xi) of PIE: “a 
person who occupies land without the express or tacit consent of the owner or person in 
charge, or without any other right in law to occupy such land, excluding a person who is an 
occupier in terms of the Extension of Security of Tenure Act, 1997 (Act. No. 62 of 1997), 
and excluding a person whose informal right to land, but for the provisions of this Act, would 
be protected by the provisions of the Interim Protection of Informal Land Rights Act, 1996 
(Act No. 31 of 1996)”. The focus is on persons who occupy land without consent from the 
owner or person in charge, despite possibly having had consent at an earlier stage. The study 
is also limited to unlawful occupiers, who have made the land their home. It is generally 
understood that PIE only applies to such unlawful occupiers since the aim of PIE is to 
implement section 26(3) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (the 
Constitution). 13 
                                                 
9
 For more on this case, see Chilemba (2014) CLC 16-18. 
10
 Ensor L at Business Day Live Eviction Delays Sought While Laws Are Tightened (2014) 
http://www.bdlive.co.za/national/2014/06/17/eviction-delays-sought-while-laws-are-tightened 24-07-2014. 
11
 See, Vecchiatto P & Phakathi B at MSN Ministers to Probe Sanral's Cape Evictions (2014) 
http://news.howzit.msn.com/ministers-to-probe-sanrals-cape-evictions 24-07-2014. 
12
 The term “government” in the Constitution refers to the executive, legislative and judicial branches of the 
state. See, s 40(1) of the Constitution. In this thesis, the term government is used to describe the executive 
authority unless the context indicates otherwise. 
13
 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. See, Barnett v Minister of Land Affairs 2007 (6) SA 313 
(SCA) para 37. For more on the definition of unlawful occupier, see J Pienaar Land Reform (2014) 688-699; J 
Pienaar ""Unlawful occupier" in perspective: history, legislation and case law" in Mostert H and De Waal M 
(eds) Essays in Honour of CG van der Merwe (2011) 309 309-327. 
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Moreover, the matters concern orders requiring the state14 to provide such unlawful occupiers 
with alternative accommodation (hereinafter referred to as “alternative accommodation 
orders”).15 Willis J questioned the appropriateness of such orders, whereas Minister Sisulu 
questioned how a court could sanction an eviction without ensuring that alternative 
accommodation is available to the unlawful occupiers.16  
The problem of clarity, it seems, relates to the very different expectations that different 
organs of state place upon the eviction process, and their very different understandings of the 
law flowing from such differing expectations. Willis J could not find authority for an eviction 
order to be accompanied by an obligation to provide alternative housing; Minister Sisulu 
believed that the law requires the provision of alternative accommodation in eviction 
matters.17  
Neither the ministerial board nor the full bench provided sufficient clarity on the matter.18 
Writing for the full bench, Van Oosten J’s answer is dissatisfying, to say the least: 19  
“I do not think it is either appropriate or desirable for a full court to provide the clarity and 
guidance in the general terms sought by Willis J.” 
Van Oosten J reasoned that, since the facts of each case vary, it is impossible to provide the 
kind of guidance sought.20 Impartial as this may be, it does not solve the very real problems 
experienced on the lower levels of the judiciary and in the highest echelons of the executive. 
Whether from a full bench, a ministerial board or the legislature, clarity is needed.  
This thesis is concerned with seeking clarity about a single aspect of a larger problem. It asks 
when an alternative accommodation order as a condition to the eviction of unlawful occupiers 
in terms of the Prevention of Illegal Eviction From and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 
of 1998 (PIE) would comply with the court’s constitutional mandate.  
                                                 
14
 In this thesis, the term “state” refers to the executive authority, unless the context indicates otherwise. 
15
 Emfuleni para 28. 
16
 See Vecchiatto P & Phakathi B at MSN Ministers to Probe Sanral's Cape Evictions (2014).  
17
 Interestingly she seems to think that where an owner had failed to institute eviction proceedings within six 
months it is required to provide temporary accommodation. This seems to place an unfounded heavy burden on 
private citizens. See, Vecchiatto P & Phakathi B at MSN Ministers to Probe Sanral's Cape Evictions (2014). 
18
 The report on the enquiry was published in 2014, but it did not provide clear guidance regarding alternative 
accommodation orders. See, Department of Human Settlements The Lwandle Eviction Ministerial Enquiry 
(2014). 
19
 Emfuleni Local Municipality v Builders Advancement Services CC A5047/110 [2012] ZAGPJHC 39 para 7. 
20
 Emfuleni Local Municipality v Builders Advancement Services CC para 7. 
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The study is not limited to an exploration of when courts can require the provision of 
alternative accommodation and when (if ever) it can order evictions that would lead to 
homelessness. A more problematic situation is one in which a court is reluctant to order an 
eviction that would result in homelessness. To this end, the study aims to determine when, in 
those circumstances, the powers of the court allow it to solve the dilemma by placing the duty 
to prevent the homelessness on the state, in other words, by granting an alternative 
accommodation order. 
As explained, an alternative accommodation order involves the court requiring the state to 
provide unlawful occupiers with alternative accommodation as a condition of their eviction. 
In addition, it can also be considered a constitutional remedy21 for the unconstitutional 
limitation of a right.22  
2 Background 
Apartheid and its consequences played a big part in the approach to unlawful occupation in 
South Africa. At the end of Apartheid, a large housing backlog existed that only increased 
during the Constitutional Era.23 This increase was in part due to racial segregation during 
Apartheid.24 Moreover, the inhumane measures used to evict occupiers during Apartheid25 
                                                 
21
 S 38 of the Constitution. 
22
 See Chapter 4. 
23
 Tomlinson MR at Politicsweb Why Can't We Clear the Housing Backlog? (2015) 
http://www.politicsweb.co.za/news-and-analysis/why-cant-we-clear-the-housing-backlog--irr 05-08-2016; 
Wilkinson K at Africa Check Factsheet: The Housing Situation in South Africa (2014) 
https://africacheck.org/factsheets/factsheet-the-housing-situation-in-south-africa/ 06-08-2016; Creamer Media's 
Engineering News Housing backlog at 2.1m, says Minister Sisulu (2016) 
http://www.engineeringnews.co.za/article/housing-backlog-at-21m-says-minister-sisulu-2016-04-22 05-08-
2016. Tomlinson MR at Politicsweb Why Can't We Clear the Housing Backlog? (2015); Wilkinson K at Africa 
Check Factsheet: The Housing Situation in South Africa (2014); Creamer Media's Engineering News Housing 
backlog at 2.1m, says Minister Sisulu (2016). 
24
 The black rural areas were not “economically viable” so black people migrated to the city after Apartheid 
regardless of whether they had secured accommodation there, see  663. 663. See also,  80; Financial and Fiscal 
Commission Exploring Alternative Finance and Policy Options For Effective and Sustainable Delivery of 
Housing in South Africa (2013) 10; Socio-Economic Rights Institute of South Africa A resource guide to 
housing in South Africa 1994-2010: Legislation, policy, programmes and practice (2011) 34; Creamer Media's 
Engineering News Housing backlog at 2.1m, says Minister Sisulu (2016);Creamer Media's Engineering News 
Housing backlog at 2.1m, says Minister Sisulu (2016).  
25
 Such as Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act 52 of 1951. See Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 
2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) para 8-10. 
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called for more humane and compassionate measures to be prescribed by the post-Apartheid 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.26  
These factors – one, that many unlawful occupiers were desperate and faced homelessness 
through no fault of their own and, two, that the constitution requires constitutional 
requirements that evictions to be humane – contributed toward the court’s developing stance 
in eviction matters and its eventual granting alternative accommodation orders. Interestingly, 
the backlog also suggests an inability on the part of the state to comply with such orders. This 
section explores the factors in more detail. 
2.1 Unlawful occupation due to the post-Apartheid housing crisis 
At the end of Apartheid, in 1994, South Africa had a housing backlog of 1.5 million 
households.27 The backlog was expected to increase by 200 000 per annum, as the population 
grew and new families formed.28 To clear the backlog, the state adopted a housing policy, the 
White Paper on Housing.29 In terms of this policy, the goal was to deliver 350 000 housing 
units every year.30 Accordingly, based on the backlog and expected increase, the backlog 
should have been cleared by 2006. It was not. 
Since 1994, 2.5 million houses and 1.2 million serviced sites have allegedly been delivered.31 
Funding allocation to housing has grown faster than any other item on the budget, increasing 
by more than just inflation.32 Housing and services account for 11.4% of the state’s annual 
                                                 
26
 (hereinafter “the Constitution”), PE Municipality para 37. 
27
 Tomlinson MR at Politicsweb Why Can't We Clear the Housing Backlog? (2015). See also, Wilkinson K at 
Africa Check Factsheet: The Housing Situation in South Africa (2014).  
28
 Tomlinson MR at Politicsweb Why Can't We Clear the Housing Backlog? (2015). 
29
 As well as the National Housing Subsidy Scheme, see Community Law Centre & Socio-Economic Rights 
Institute of South Africa 'Jumping the queue', waiting lists and other myths: Perceptions and practice around 
housing demand and allocation in South Africa (2013) 6, 14. See also, Financial and Fiscal Commission 
Exploring Alternative Finance and Policy Options (2013) 14; H Mostert "Landlessness, housing and the rule of 
law" in Mostert HDW, MJ (ed) Essays in Honour of CG van der Merwe (2011)  82. 
30
 Tomlinson MR at Politicsweb Why Can't We Clear the Housing Backlog? (2015). Tomlinson MR at 
Politicsweb Why Can't We Clear the Housing Backlog? (2015). 
31
 Tomlinson MR at Politicsweb Why Can't We Clear the Housing Backlog? (2015); Mostert "Landlessness, 
Housing and the Rule of Law" in Essays  85. The Socio-economic Rights Institute argues that this number might 
be wrong. By 2009, only 1.44 million transfers had been registered, which amounts to 55% of the total houses 
that were alleged delivered. Community Law Centre & Socio-Economic Rights Institute of South Africa 
Jumping the Queue (2013) 23.  
32
 See, Tomlinson MR at Politicsweb Why Can't We Clear the Housing Backlog? (2015). See also, Socio-
Economic Rights Institute of South Africa A Resource Guide to Housing (2011) 33; Muller J at Financial Mail 
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expenditure.33 In the 2016 budget, R 182.6 billion was allocated to housing. This allocation 
was surpassed only by basic education.34 
Despite the government’s obvious commitment to the provision of housing, and despite the 
attention paid to housing in the budget, the housing backlog is currently estimated at 
2.1 million households, 600 000 more than in 1994.35 The number of informal settlements36 in 
South Africa has increased from 300 in 1994 to 2 225 in 2015.37 In the Western Cape and 
Gauteng, over 50% of households in informal settlements have been on the waiting list38 for 
housing for over five years.39 
The apparent failure by the state relates to two primary factors: an increased demand for 
housing and a decline in housing delivery.40 The increase in demand for housing was caused 
by several factors,41 one being the migration to the cities.42 This migration was primarily 
undertaken by black persons who, during Apartheid, were only allowed to live in the cities 
                                                                                                                                                        
Human Settlements: Housing Backlog Widens (2016) 
http://www.financialmail.co.za/specialreports/budget2016/2016/02/25/human-settlements-housing-backlog-
widens 06-08-2016. 
33
 Tomlinson MR at Politicsweb Why Can't We Clear the Housing Backlog? (2015). 
34
 Muller J at Financial Mail Human Settlements: Housing Backlog Widens (2016). 
35
 This estimate was given by Minister Sisulu, see Creamer Media's Engineering News Housing backlog at 
2.1m, says Minister Sisulu (2016). This number is based on the state’s waiting list, see Tomlinson MR at 
Politicsweb Why Can't We Clear the Housing Backlog? (2015). In 2013 an estimated 9.7% of persons in South 
Africa were living in informal dwellings and 7.6% in backyard dwellings. That is more than 17% of the 
population.  24. See also, Community Law Centre & Socio-Economic Rights Institute of South Africa Jumping 
the Queue (2013) 6; Socio-Economic Rights Institute of South Africa A Resource Guide to Housing (2011) 34; 
K Pillay "Implementation of Grootboom: Implications for the enforcement of socio-economic rights" (2002) 6 
Law Democracy and Development 255 1. 
36
 An informal settlement is defined by Stats SA as “an unplanned settlement on land which has not been 
surveyed or proclaimed as residential, consisting mainly of informal dwellings (shacks).” See Community Law 
Centre & Socio-Economic Rights Institute of South Africa Jumping the Queue (2013) 4. 
37
 Tomlinson MR at Politicsweb Why Can't We Clear the Housing Backlog? (2015). In 2013 the number of 
households living in informal settlements was 1.2 million, with 945 000 living in backyards. Financial and 
Fiscal Commission Exploring Alternative Finance and Policy Options (2013) 26; Creamer Media's Engineering 
News Housing backlog at 2.1m, says Minister Sisulu (2016). 
38
 Ebrahim defines a waiting list as “a register used to record information of households in need of housing 
assistance. It is usually arranged from the oldest registration to the most recent one.” See, S Ebrahim "The right 
to housing: challenges associated with the 'waiting list system' Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality v Various 
Occupiers, Eden Park Extension 5 2014 3 SA 23 (SCA)" (2015) 30 Southern African Public Law 112 114. 
39
 Community Law Centre & Socio-Economic Rights Institute of South Africa Jumping the Queue (2013) 27. 
40
 See discussion below. 
41
 On this, see Mostert "Landlessness, Housing and the Rule of Law" in Essays  79. 
42
 See Betta Eiendomme v Ekple-Epoh 2000 (4) SA 468 (W) 1079H-J. 
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under limited circumstances.43 They were often evicted by so-called “influx control” 
legislation.44 Once the influx control rules were abolished, many black persons moved to the 
city, seeking employment.45 Often, they moved from rural areas, where they had housing, to 
occupy inadequate housing in backyards and informal settlements.46 This contributed to the 
increased housing demand.47 Further reasons for the increased demand are an unforeseen high 
population growth and an increase in unemployment and poverty.48  
The second reason for the state’s failure to clear the backlog relates to the decrease in 
delivery rate over the years.49 In the first few years after the implementation of the policy, 
around 200 000 units were delivered annually.50 This peaked in 1998 at around 235 000 units. 
Since then, housing delivery decreased steadily. Now around 100 000 to 150 000 units are 
completed per year.51 The decrease in housing delivery relates to the increase in the quality of 
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 Mostert "Landlessness, Housing and the Rule of Law" in Essays  80; S Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 
Adjudication Under a Transformative Constitution (2010) 268; Pienaar "Unlawful Occupier in Perspective" in  
311. 
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 L Chenwi "Putting flesh on the skeleton: South African judicial enforcement of the right to adequate housing 
of those subject to evictions" (2008) 8 Harvard Law Review 105 113; Mostert "Landlessness, Housing and the 
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of 1950 and Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act. 
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 Mostert "Landlessness, Housing and the Rule of Law" in Essays  80; Financial and Fiscal Commission 
Exploring Alternative Finance and Policy Options (2013) 10; Socio-Economic Rights Institute of South Africa 
A Resource Guide to Housing (2011) 34; Creamer Media's Engineering News Housing backlog at 2.1m, says 
Minister Sisulu (2016). The black rural areas were not “economically viable”, see, Pienaar Land Reform  663.  
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 See, Betta Eiendomme v Ekple-Epoh 1079I-J; Mostert "Landlessness, Housing and the Rule of Law" in 
Essays  80; Pienaar Land Reform  659-660. 
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 This migration from rural areas, away from housing, to inadequate housing in the cities was apparently not 
foreseen by the state, which only accounted for an increase in the backlog as a result of new family formation. 
48
 Socio-Economic Rights Institute of South Africa A Resource Guide to Housing (2011) 34. The figure of 
200 000 new families per year was accurate. The population, especially those who require housing, is growing 
at a rate of around 280 000 per annum. See, Financial and Fiscal Commission Exploring Alternative Finance 
and Policy Options (2013) 23. Other reasons for the increased demand in housing include households breaking 
up so that each smaller unit can apply for housing, an overstated housing demand and the global financial crisis 
of 2008. See, Tomlinson MR at Politicsweb Why Can't We Clear the Housing Backlog? (2015); Socio-
Economic Rights Institute of South Africa A Resource Guide to Housing (2011) 34. 
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 See, Tomlinson MR at Politicsweb Why Can't We Clear the Housing Backlog? (2015). See also, Financial 
and Fiscal Commission Exploring Alternative Finance and Policy Options (2013) 9; Community Law Centre & 
Socio-Economic Rights Institute of South Africa Jumping the Queue (2013) 23; Socio-Economic Rights 
Institute of South Africa A Resource Guide to Housing (2011) 30. 
50
 Tomlinson MR at Politicsweb Why Can't We Clear the Housing Backlog? (2015); Financial and Fiscal 
Commission Exploring Alternative Finance and Policy Options (2013) 14. 
51
 Tomlinson MR at Politicsweb Why Can't We Clear the Housing Backlog? (2015).  In 2010, Minister Sisulu 
announced a plan to upgrade 400 000 units in informal settlements and provide 80 000 rental units by 2014. By 
2012 only 91 558 serviced sites had been created and only 11 334 rental houses had been made available. See, 
Community Law Centre & Socio-Economic Rights Institute of South Africa Jumping the Queue (2013) 15, 23-
24. 
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housing delivered.52 As a result of political and community pressure,53 national minimum 
norms and standards of housing were adopted.54 For the same reason, the housing subsidy 
increased from R12 500 in 1994 to R160 500 in 2014.55 Even if inflation is taken into 
account, the subsidy amount in 2014 is almost four times that of the subsidy amount in 
1994.56 The increase in the quality of the housing slowed down housing delivery and meant 
that less land was available for delivery to others since the bigger units required more land.57  
A further reason for the decrease in housing delivery can be ascribed to poor performance by 
the state. Often, the state’s management of its housing programme is seen as ineffective.58 
This can be due to a skills shortage,59 poor intergovernmental relations60 and underspending.61 
Moreover, corruption,62 maladministration63 and politics around housing allocation are said to 
hinder policy implementation.64  
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 See, Tomlinson MR at Politicsweb Why Can't We Clear the Housing Backlog? (2015); Financial and Fiscal 
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Economic Rights Institute of South Africa Jumping the Queue (2013) 6. 
54
 In terms of a new plan adopted in 2004, Department of Human Settlements "Breaking New Ground" A 
Comprehensive Plan for the Development of Sustainable Human Settlements (2004). See, Department of Human 
Settlements Simplified Guide to the National Housing Code (2009) 9; See also, Financial and Fiscal 
Commission Exploring Alternative Finance and Policy Options (2013) 14-15.  
55
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60
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Economic Rights Institute of South Africa A Resource Guide to Housing (2011) 10.  
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 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights  194; Financial and Fiscal Commission Exploring Alternative Finance 
and Policy Options (2013) 15; Socio-Economic Rights Institute of South Africa A Resource Guide to Housing 
(2011) 10.  
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The effect of the increasing housing backlog is that many people in South Africa do not have 
a place to live lawfully. As a result, they occupy land unlawfully.65 This leads to evictions.66  
2.2 Constitutional response to post-Apartheid unlawful occupation 
The Constitution ensures humane evictions by providing, in section 26(3), that persons may 
only be evicted from their homes in terms of a court order after all relevant circumstances are 
considered. Any eviction order in terms of section 26(3) must be just and equitable.67 
Moreover, section 25(6) of the Constitution provides that persons, with legally insecure 
tenure due to previous racially discriminatory laws or practices, are entitled to legally secure 
tenure or comparable redress, to the extent afforded by legislation.  
To give effect to section 26(3) of the Constitution, and potentially also to section 25(6) of the 
Constitution,68 the Prevention of Illegal Evictions from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 
19 of 1998 (PIE) was enacted.69 PIE seeks to balance the rights of landowners and unlawful 
occupiers, that is, the landowner’s constitutional right to property70 and the unlawful 
occupiers’ constitutional right of access to adequate housing.71 To an extent, PIE provides 
tenure security by specifying strict requirements and procedures, to be followed before an 
eviction order can be granted and tenure terminated.72  
                                                                                                                                                        
are manipulated and housing is allocated to supporters of councillors or persons who pay bribes. See also, 
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Mostert H and De Waal M (eds) 309 310-315. 
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 See, Betta Eiendomme v Ekple-Epoh 1087B-C. See also, Chenwi (2008) Harv L Rev 107; Pienaar Land 
Reform  660. 
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 S 172(1)(b) of the Constitution. 
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 A Van der Walt & G Pienaar Introduction to the Law of Property 7 ed (2016) 371, 373. 
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 The Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act. 
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 S 25(1) of the Constitution. 
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 S 26(1) of the Constitution. 
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 Van der Walt & Pienaar Introduction  371. Van der Walt & Pienaar Introduction  371. 
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An eviction in terms of PIE consists of several phases.73 Firstly, the eviction must be applied 
for (the application phase). PIE authorises both the landowner and the state to seek an 
eviction order from the court.74 This phase includes certain requirements regarding the notice 
to the unlawful occupiers and the relevant municipality.75 The second phase involves the 
adjudication of the matter (the adjudication phase). The court must decide whether an 
eviction would be just and equitable, considering the relevant circumstances.76 It also has the 
power to postpone the matter as it sees fit. If the court finds that an eviction would be just and 
equitable, it must decide on a just and equitable date for execution of the eviction order,77 as 
well as any reasonable conditions that must be attached the eviction order.78 The third phase 
constitutes the execution of the eviction order (the execution phase). The sheriff of the court 
carries out the eviction on the date specified in the eviction order.79 Another potential phase 
includes further court proceedings (the return phase). This phase occurs if one of the parties is 
dissatisfied with the decision or, possibly due to new evidence, alleges that it will be unable 
to adhere to the eviction order or its conditions. If for example, the state alleges that it cannot 
provide alternative accommodation by the eviction date, it might request the court to 
postpone the eviction date or suspend the eviction order until it is able to perform.80  
This thesis focuses on the adjudication phase of the eviction process. An alternative 
accommodation order is a condition that the court sets for the eviction. The court considers 
all the relevant circumstances and decides that an eviction would be just and equitable, 
subject to the provision of alternative accommodation to the unlawful occupiers by the state. 
To some extent, the return phase is also relevant. Many of the cases discussed involve 
appeals against orders in eviction matters,81 applications for the postponement of the eviction 
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 For more on phases and a different division of the phases in an eviction matter, see T Kotze Effective Relief 
Regarding Residential Property Following the Failure to Execute an Eviction Order LLM University of 
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date82 or the suspension of the eviction order.83 In deciding whether an eviction date should be 
postponed or an order suspended, a court must again consider whether granting such a 
request would be just and equitable, exactly as it had to in the adjudication phase. This is 
because the effect of delaying the eviction during this stage is similar to postponing the 
matter or requiring a later eviction date during the adjudication phase. 
PIE lists certain relevant circumstance to be considered by the court to determine whether an 
eviction would be just and equitable. One such relevant circumstance is whether the state can 
provide the evictees with alternative accommodation.84 This consideration is not unique to 
post-Apartheid legislation as it also featured in pre-constitutional eviction legislation.85 Pie 
requires only that the availability of alternative accommodation must be considered before an 
eviction order can be granted, not for alternative accommodation to be available before an 
eviction order can be granted.86 Yet, from a survey of the available case law, it seems that 
courts deem the availability of alternative accommodation to be the most important relevant 
circumstance to be considered in ordering an eviction and are reluctant to grant an eviction 
order that would leave the unlawful occupiers homeless.87 A finding that no alternative 
                                                                                                                                                        
(Pty) Ltd 2012 (6) SA 294 (SCA); City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Hlophe [2015] 2 All SA 
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accommodation and the rights and needs of vulnerable people" (2014) 30 South African Journal on Human 
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accommodation is available has resulted in an order that the state is to provide alternative 
accommodation to the unlawful occupiers.88  
The provision of alternative accommodation by the state relates to the state’s constitutional 
housing duty in terms of section 26(2) of the Constitution.89 This section requires the state to 
ensure the realisation of the right of access to adequate housing (section 26(1) of the 
Constitution), progressively, within its available resources.90 To give effect to section 26(2) of 
the Constitution, the National Housing Act 107 of 1997 was enacted,91 together with the 
National Housing Code.92 The National Housing Code is a policy that contains the state’s 
housing programmes,93 including the Emergency Housing Programme (EHP),94 a programme 
for the provision of temporary housing in emergency housing situations.95  
The increasing housing backlog and persons living in desperate circumstances have the effect 
that the state often reports that it does not have the available resources to assist the evictees.96 
Nevertheless, these reports have not prevented the court from making alternative 
accommodation orders.97 Against this background, this thesis considers when an alternative 
accommodation order as a condition to the eviction of unlawful occupiers in terms of PIE 
would comply with the court’s constitutional mandate.  
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3 Criteria for answering research question 
To determine when an alternative accommodation order as a condition to the eviction of 
unlawful occupiers, in terms of PIE, would comply with the court’s constitutional mandate, 
criteria must be identified against which to test such orders. The criteria must relate to the 
court’s constitutional mandate. While several criteria might be considered,98 the limited scope 
of this thesis necessitates a delimitation of these criteria. The thesis focuses on the powers 
and the functions of the court and on how these powers and functions are limited by certain 
constitutional principles. Two criteria are used in this thesis to determine when an alternative 
accommodation order would comply with the court’s constitutional mandate. The first is that 
the order must adhere to the existing legal framework. Second, the order must respect the 
functions of government.  
3.1 The court’s constitutional mandate 
The criteria used in this thesis are derived from certain principles underlying the Constitution 
and informing constitutional litigation – the rule of law, the separation of powers, co-
operative government and subsidiarity.99 These principles shape the court’s constitutional 
mandate. These constitutional principles are briefly explained below. Thereafter, the relation 
between the criteria and these principles is illustrated. 
3.1.1 The rule of law 
South Africa subscribes to the rule of law.100 Like most constitutional concepts, the rule of 
law is notoriously difficult to define.101 The purpose of the rule of law is to constrain 
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government power and ensure that human rights are protected.102 The rule of law stipulates 
that both the state and citizenry be subject to the laws of the country.103 Where a country 
subscribes to a supreme constitution, as South Africa does, it means that the state (including 
the court) and its citizens are subject to the Constitution and that any action in conflict 
therewith is invalid.104  
There are different views of the rule of law.105 The main views relate to whether the rule of 
law must be interpreted as substantively106 or whether it must be interpreted merely as a 
procedural or a formal protection.107 It is submitted that South Africa subscribes to the rule of 
law as a formal, substantive and procedural protection.108 
As a formal protection, the rule of law requires that all state actions be authorised by law and 
not contravene the law.109 In South Africa, the powers of the state to perform actions are 
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primarily derived from and limited by the Constitution.110 This means that an alternative 
accommodation order would only comply with the court’s constitutional mandate if the 
Constitution authorises placing the duty to provide alternative accommodation on the state.  
In addition, as a formal protection, the rule of law requires that the law adhere to certain 
norms to ensure that compliance with the law is possible.111 The law must be prospective, 
known to the public, general, clear, stable and certain.112 It must also be applied consistently 
and equally.113 This means that courts should be consistent and clear in their application of the 
law in eviction matters. Courts must clearly identify the grounds upon which they grant 
alternative accommodation orders. This will allow an examination regarding whether such 
orders are authorised by law. 
As a substantive protection, the rule of law requires government actions to promote and 
respect human rights.114 This conception of the rule of law is not universally accepted.115 
Nevertheless, the fact that section 7(2) of the Constitution requires the state to respect,116 
protect,117 promote118 and fulfil119 human rights indicates that South Africa subscribes to the 
rule of law as a substantive protection. 
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As procedural protection, the rule of law requires procedural safeguards to ensure that the law 
is applied fairly and properly.120 It allows people the opportunity to challenge the state’s 
administration.121 The law must be publicly administered by independent courts and there 
must be access to courts.122 South Africa subscribes to this idea of the rule of law, as is 
evident from the Constitution. The Constitution entrenches the right of access to courts.123 It 
allows persons to approach the court if their rights are violated.124 Moreover, courts are 
empowered to declare any law or conduct that is inconsistent with the Constitution, invalid.125 
In this thesis, this aspect of the rule of law does not receive much attention. This is because 
the analysis is limited to matters before the court and, hence, matters where people do have 
the opportunity to challenge the state’s administration.  
Where relevant, the effect of limitations on others in similar positions to challenge the state’s 
administration is discussed. When courts grant alternative accommodation orders they must 
take into account that they are only dealing with a small percentage of persons in South 
Africa and that several others in a similar position to those before the court might lack the 
opportunity to approach the court. As a result, their orders must include, rather than exclude, 
such persons. 
3.1.2 Separation of powers 
The principle of the separation of powers underlies the Constitution, although it is not 
expressly mentioned therein.126
 
The Interim Constitution required that the final Constitution 
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adheres to the principle of the separation of powers.127 Despite not being expressly entrenched 
in the final Constitution, its inclusion is clear from the separate branches of government128 
required by Chapter 4 to Chapter 8 of the Constitution.129 Furthermore, the first certification 
judgment confirmed the inclusion of the separation of powers within the final Constitution.130 
Subsequent case law established that the separation of powers doctrine might be relied on 
directly in court.131 
At an elementary level, separation of powers means that the state is separated into three 
different branches – the legislative branch, the executive branch and the judicial branch.132 
Each branch has its own functions and powers.133 The legislative branch is responsible for 
making laws.134 The executive branch is responsible for active government by implementing 
laws, as well as adopting and implementing policies.135 The judicial branch comprises of the 
courts and is responsible for administering justice through interpreting and applying the law 
to resolve disputes.136  
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A primary purpose of the separation of powers doctrine is to ensure that the power of 
government is not concentrated in one entity.137 By diffusing governmental power and 
requiring each branch to hold the other in check, abuse of governmental powers is limited.138 
Each branch is accountable toward the others and can be compelled by the other branches to 
perform its duties.139 As with the rule of law, there is a substantive quality to the separation of 
powers doctrine. Requiring a separation of government power contributes to the respect, 
protection, promotion and fulfilment of human rights.140 For example, a court can hold the 
executive authority accountable for providing housing, thereby ensuring that the right of 
access to adequate housing is fulfilled. This is because the aim of separation of powers should 
be to improve the accountability of the branches of government and their commitment to the 
realisation of constitutional rights.141 An alternative accommodation order can be considered a 
means by which the court ensures that another branch of government fulfils its duties. 
However, there is a fine line between requiring a branch to fulfil its duties and dictating to the 
branch how it should fulfil its duty to such an extent that the power of that branch is relocated 
to the court.142  
Another purpose of the separation of powers is for the state to function more efficiently.143 
Each branch has very specific functions and can concentrate on fulfilling these functions 
competently. Effectively, each branch is able to specialise and gain expertise to fulfil their 
specific functions.144 This confirms the importance of ensuring that other branches comply 
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with their duties, while not taking over their functions since each branch should be best 
equipped to fulfil the duties allocated to it.145 
3.1.3 Co-operative government 
Not only is government separated into three branches, the executive and the legislative 
branches are also separated into national, provincial and municipal spheres.146 Each sphere 
has its own powers and functions.147 Provincial and municipal spheres are further separated 
into territorial areas.148 The territorial areas for provincial spheres are in accord with the 
provincial boundaries.149 The territorial area of each provincial sphere is subdivided into the 
territorial areas of each municipal sphere, called “municipalities”.150 Requiring the separation 
of government into smaller areas allows the government to better know and address the 
specific demands and needs within its jurisdiction.151 Moreover, separation of government 
power into specific physical areas guarantees that government revenue is spent in every area 
of the country.152 
Unlike the branches of government, the different spheres of government within a branch are 
not to function in a vacuum.153 Section 40(1) of the Constitution provides that the spheres are 
distinct, interdependent and interrelated.154 Spheres must each fulfil their own functions but 
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must work toward the same goal.155 This is where the principle of co-operative government 
comes into play.156 There must be both vertical co-operation between the spheres and 
horizontal co-operation within the spheres of government.157  
Despite being assigned specific powers, the different spheres of government within a branch 
must assist and support each other in performing their functions.158 They must inform and 
consult each other on matters of common interest and coordinate their actions.159 One sphere 
cannot undermine the functioning of another sphere.160  
When granting alternative accommodation orders a court must take cognisance of the fact 
that each sphere of government has different powers. It should not place a duty on one sphere 
that falls within the powers of another. A court must also take into account the fact that the 
different spheres of government are required to co-operate with one another and assist each 
other. Hence, where more than one sphere is responsible for the same matter a court should 
not focus on only one of these spheres. Yet, from a survey of the available cases, it appears 
that courts do tend to focus only on specific spheres of government for the fulfilment of 
alternative accommodation orders.161 If this is the case, such orders might violate the principle 
of co-operative government. 
3.1.4 Subsidiarity 
The principle of subsidiarity is not expressly found in the Constitution. Nevertheless, 
subsidiarity can be found within other constitutional principles and courts have 
acknowledged it as part of South African law.162  
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Subsidiarity requires that, where legislation was enacted to give effect to constitutional rights, 
disputes regarding this right should be adjudicated by applying the relevant piece of 
legislation. Under such circumstances, direct reliance should only be placed on the 
constitutional right if the constitutionality of the legislation is challenged.163  
For example, PIE is considered to give effect to several constitutional rights, including the 
right to property, 164 the right of access to adequate housing165 and the right to be evicted only 
in terms of a court order, after all the relevant circumstances have been considered.166 If a 
landowner argues that the unlawful occupation of its land violates its right to property, the 
dispute must be based on PIE and not directly on section 25(1) of the Constitution.167 It is 
only where the landowner argues that PIE allows for an unconstitutional limitation of its 
rights168 that section 25(1) should be directly relied upon.169 
Furthermore, where it is found that a legislative provision does not comply with a 
constitutional right, an order that strikes out the legislative provision should be a last resort.170 
As far as possible, a court should engage in a purposive interpretation171 or amendment of the 
legislation to align it with the Constitution.172 For example, if PIE is found to place an 
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unconstitutional limitation on the landowner’s right to property, PIE should ideally be 
interpreted or amended to avoid such a limitation.173  
As stated, the principle of subsidiarity is not expressly found in the Constitution. The term 
“subsidiarity” in the context of South African constitutional law was first used by Du Plessis 
to describe the approach of the Constitutional Court in the minority decision of S v 
Mhlungu.174 In this case, the minority deemed it a general principle that, where possible, a 
court should decide an issue using civil or criminal law, instead of applying the Constitution 
directly.175 Subsequent to this statement, the Constitutional Court acknowledged this general 
principle as part of South African law.176 For example in South African National Defence 
Union v Minister of Defence,
177
 the Constitutional Court found that a litigant could not assert 
his right to participate in collective bargaining on section 23(5) of the Constitution,
178
 but 
should rely on the legislation enacted to enforce the right. If the litigant believes that the 
legislation is unconstitutional, it should challenge the constitutionality of the legislation.
179
 
A compelling argument can be made for founding this principle on the rule of law and the 
separation of powers.180 In terms of the rule of law, the government and the persons within 
South Africa are subject to the laws of the country.181 To enable these entities to comply with 
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it, the law must adhere to certain norms, including that the law must be certain and applied 
equally.182 The principle of subsidiarity enables the law to adhere to these norms.  
The norm of certainty is promoted through the application of the principle of subsidiarity 
since it prevents the creation of parallel systems of law. Where both a piece of legislation and 
a constitutional right apply to a specific matter, subsidiarity determines which source of law 
must be relied on directly. Without rules regarding which laws to apply directly, an aggrieved 
party can effectively choose which legal rule must apply.183 This creates parallel systems of 
law since the rules within the different sources of law will be applied and interpreted 
independently. Hence, two separate, potentially quite different, sets of rules might develop 
that would apply to one matter at the same time. This creates uncertainty as to the source of 
law that should apply and the outcome of the matter. In this regard, the principle of 
subsidiarity promotes the one-system-of-law principle adopted by the Constitutional Court, 
which regards all laws in the country as part of a single system, with the Constitution 
“shaping and giving force” to the other laws.184 
Furthermore, if a party is of the opinion that the legislation, giving effect to a constitutional 
right, does not provide an effective remedy and, hence, relies directly on the constitutional 
right to grant a remedy, the remedy would only benefit the individual before the court. Equal 
application of the law requires that the legislation must be amended so that everyone, whose 
rights are similarly infringed, can find relief.185 For example, if an unlawful occupier claims 
that PIE does not provide sufficient protection of his right of access to adequate housing, a 
remedy should ideally be read into PIE and not be granted on an ad hoc basis. In that way, 
not only does the occupier before the court find relief, but also other unlawful occupiers in 
similar positions. Developing unconstitutional laws to be in line with the Constitution, instead 
of bypassing such law and relying directly on the constitutional provision, also promotes the 
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supremacy of the Constitution. In a country that subscribes to a supreme constitution, laws 
that are not in line with the Constitution cannot remain in force.186 
Criticism against the principle of subsidiarity includes that it allows the court to ignore the 
Constitution in favour of other legislative provisions.187 However, in terms of the rule of law 
and constitutional supremacy, all legislation and common law must be interpreted and 
developed in line with the Constitution.188 This means that, even when a legislative provision 
is applied instead of a constitutional right, the interpretation and application of that law must 
be informed by the Constitution. In eviction matters, for example, the court must apply the 
provisions of PIE, instead of sections 25 and 26 of the Constitution. Nevertheless, its 
interpretation and application of PIE must be in line with these constitutional rights. Hence, 
subsidiarity does not allow a court to ignore the applicable constitutional provisions. It simply 
provides a starting point for adjudicating matters involving constitutional rights.189  
In addition to giving effect to the rule of law, subsidiarity promotes the separation of powers 
doctrine. It requires the court to respect the functions of the branch of government tasked 
with making laws, to the extent that these laws are in line with the Constitution.190 In doing 
so, it balances the separation of powers doctrine and the rule of law.191 Klare criticises this 
aspect of the principle of subsidiarity in that it relies on an idealistic idea of separation of 
powers, in which the legislature aims to serve the people and the judiciary does not.192 The 
legislature is given the power to define and delimit constitutional rights.193 A 
counterargument is that adherence to the principle of subsidiarity does not prevent courts 
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from deviating from the legislature’s decisions.194 It could still find that the legislation 
enacted by the legislature violates the Constitution. In doing so, it brings the existing law in 
line with the Constitution so that the whole population is served and not only the parties 
before the court. 
3.2 Criteria derived from principles 
Two criteria can be derived from the above principles. One, the court must adhere to the 
existing legal framework. Two, the court must respect the functions of government when 
granting alternative accommodation orders. These criteria and their relation to the 
constitutional principles are explained below. 
3.2.1 Adherence to the existing legal framework 
The term “legal framework” in this thesis includes the constitutional provisions relating to a 
specific matter, the legislation enacted to give effect to these provisions, applicable common 
law rules, binding policies and binding precedent that interpret and apply these laws and 
instruments. International instruments are not considered extensively, although brief mention 
is made where relevant.195 An assumption of this thesis is that courts must adhere to the 
existing legal framework applicable to the matter at hand. This assumption is based on the 
rule of law and the principle of subsidiarity. The rule of law requires the court to grant orders 
that are in line with the relevant laws.196 The principle of subsidiarity dictates which laws 
must be applied where more than one is applicable.197  
An order requiring the state to provide alternative accommodation to unlawful occupiers 
facing eviction would adhere to the existing legal framework if the framework authorises the 
state to comply with the order. In other words, an alternative accommodation order can be 
granted if justification for placing such a duty on the state can be found in the legal 
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framework. This relates to the rule of law as a formal protection.198 In determining whether 
the granting of an alternative accommodation order is authorised, a court must apply the 
legislative provision or policy that gives effect to the relevant constitutional provision. A 
court should not apply the constitutional provision directly unless the constitutionality of the 
constitutional provision is challenged. This relates to the principle of subsidiarity.199 
Moreover, in applying the legal framework, the rule of law as a substantive and procedural 
protection requires that a court must take cognisance of the fact that others are not before the 
court and their rights should not be prejudiced by its order.200 
The inclusion of “binding policy” in the existing legal framework, which a court order must 
adhere to, is controversial. Binding policy, also called “executive policy”,201 refers to policy 
authorised by binding legislation. The executive authority adopts such policy to implement 
the legislation.202 While some do not consider binding policy law,203 case law suggests that 
policies that are given binding effect by legislation must be adhered to by those who are 
bound by it.204  
In fact, the Constitutional Court, in Nokotyana v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality,205 
found that it would apply the state’s housing policy,206 instead of relying directly on the 
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Constitution and the right of access to adequate housing.207 It justified this approach by 
referencing the principle of subsidiarity.208 Bilchitz observes that this case extended the 
principle of subsidiarity to include policy.209 He argues that there is no clear justification for 
this extension.210  
Justification for this extension can be based on the rule of law. For one, if the specific 
government entity is bound by the policy in terms of legislation, a court cannot order that 
entity to act outside its powers unless such policy or legislation is unconstitutional. Second, if 
a court is of the opinion that a policy does not comply with the Constitution, it should not 
simply disregard the policy for purposes of its decision since that would create uncertainty 
and unequal application of the law. Those before the court would not be subjected to the 
policy, thus, the policy would continue to be applied to those outside the court. There would 
be uncertainty regarding the extent to which the policy is to apply. Parallel systems of law 
would be created. Hence, to ensure certainty and equal application of the law, the relevant 
policy must be applied instead of the constitutional principle. If the policy is found to be 
unconstitutional, it must be amended accordingly. 
Further justification for extending the principle of subsidiarity to binding policy can be found 
in the separation of powers doctrine, which requires the court to respect the functions of the 
other branches of government. This includes the power of the executive authority to adopt 
and implement policy. It should only interfere if such policy contravenes the Constitution. 
3.2.2 Respect for the functions of government 
The second criterion that can be deduced from the principles discussed above is that, in 
granting an alternative accommodation order, a court must respect the functions of 
government. A court respects the functions of government when, one, it acknowledges the 
separate functions of other branches of government and, two, it fulfils its own functions 
properly. Acknowledging the separate functions of other branches of government involves 
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respecting the fact that other branches of government have different functions and that the 
court should not interfere with these functions. In other words, the court must respect the 
constitutional principle of the separation of powers.211  
In addition, acknowledging the separate functions of other branches of government relates to 
the notion of co-operative government. It requires respecting that, within those other 
branches, different entities have different functions and powers. In the context of alternative 
accommodation orders, this means that a court should not order one entity to perform the 
duties of another. Moreover, a court must also take into account the fact that the different 
spheres of government are required to co-operate with one another and assist each other. 
Hence, where more than one sphere is responsible for the same matter, a court should not 
place the duty to comply with an alternative accommodation order on only one of the spheres.  
Another aspect of the requirement that the court must respect the functions of government is 
that it must fulfil its own functions properly. Its primary function is the administration of 
justice.212 The dictionary defines justice as fairness and reasonableness.213 While this seems 
simple, the fact that there are several forms and theories of justice suggests some 
complication.214  
Forms of justice relate to the different contexts within which it must be served.215 For 
example, justice in the distribution of resources is different from justice in the allotment of 
punishment.216 Theories of justice concern the content of these forms of justice and the 
theoretical basis underlying each form.217 Depending on the form and the theory applied, 
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different court orders might be considered “just”.218 Hence, under some forms and theories of 
justice, alternative accommodation orders might be considered just, whereas under other 
forms and theories they might not. 
To determine when alternative accommodation orders are just, the appropriate form of justice 
must be identified. Once the appropriate form is identified, it is possible to determine under 
what circumstances alternative accommodation orders are just. Moreover, the content of a 
just alternative accommodation order can be established. 
4 Methodology 
The research in this thesis is based on a desktop study. This includes document analysis, 
which is a qualitative research method that consists of reviewing and evaluating existing 
material.219 The materials used to answer the research question include case law, legislation 
and legal policy. An analytical methodology is employed to evaluate these primary legal 
sources critically.220  
In Part One, early Constitutional Court decisions are explored to determine how the court’s 
approach developed and led to its first alternative accommodation orders. Thereafter, the 
subsequent Constitutional Court and Supreme Court of Appeal decision, in which alternative 
accommodation orders were granted, are analysed to determine the grounds for alternative 
accommodation orders. 
Once these grounds are determined, Part One explores when an order based on these grounds 
would adhere to the legal framework. This involves considering the requirements stipulated 
in the relevant constitutional provisions, legislation and policies. The interpretation and 
application of these requirements, by the courts, are also considered. In addition, the role of 
international law instruments is discussed. Secondary sources, such as scholarly articles and 
reports, are relied on in support of the conclusions reached. 
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In Part Two, the thesis considers when alternative accommodation orders would respect the 
functions of the other branches of government. This involves considering the effect of the 
separation of powers doctrine, as well as the principle of co-operative government. To define 
and explain these concepts, the relevant constitutional and interim constitutional provisions 
are consulted, as well as secondary sources such as scholarly articles and books. In 
investigating when an alternative accommodation order would comply with the separation of 
powers doctrine and the principle of co-operative government, reference is made to case law, 
as well as scholarly articles and books.  
Part Two also considers when alternative accommodation orders would comply with the 
court’s duty to administer justice. In determining the meaning of justice, secondary sources, 
especially works on philosophy, are consulted. These sources, in conjunction with case law, 
are also used in explaining when alternative accommodation orders would be just.   
Part Three concludes the thesis. The recommendations and concluding remarks are primarily 
based on the analysis in Parts 1 and 2 of the thesis and cross-reference is made to the relevant 
sections. Some primary sources, such as legislation and case law, as well as secondary 
sources, such as scholarly articles, are referred to where necessary.  
 
5 Argument outline 
This thesis is separated into three parts. Part 1 encompasses Chapter 2 to Chapter 4. It deals 
with the first criteria for alternative accommodation orders. That is, that an alternative 
accommodation order must adhere to the existing legal framework. Part 2 encompasses 
chapters 5 and 6 and deals with the second criteria for alternative accommodation orders. 
That is, that an alternative accommodation order must respect the functions of government. 
Part 3 comprises only of Chapter 7 and concludes the thesis. 
5.1 Part One: Adherence to the existing legal framework 
The purpose of Chapter 2 is to identify the possible constitutional grounds upon which courts 
have founded alternative accommodation orders in the past. Only once these grounds are 
established can it be determined whether the orders adhere to the existing legal framework. 
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To identify the possible constitutional grounds, the first Constitutional Court eviction-and-
housing jurisprudence is examined. Not only are the decisions, in which alternative 
accommodation orders were granted, discussed, but also the cases preceding these decisions. 
This is because the subsequent cases, in which alternative accommodation orders were 
granted, were influenced by these earlier decisions. 
Chapters 3 and 4 analyse the possible grounds for alternative accommodation orders, 
identified in Chapter 2, to determine when they would adhere to the existing legal framework. 
This is done by explaining and analysing the relevant constitutional provisions, legislation, 
common law, binding policy and precedent. The limitations placed on the court’s ability to 
grant alternative accommodation orders by the existing legal framework are identified.  
5.2 Part Two: Respect for the functions of government 
Chapter 5 examines when alternative accommodation orders show appropriate respect for the 
functions of the other branches of government. This entails a discussion of the different 
functions and powers of each branch of government. Once these powers are established the 
effect of the separation of powers on eviction matters is explored. Furthermore, the role of 
co-operative government in determining the court’s ability to grant an alternative 
accommodation order is discussed.  
The aim of Chapter 6 is to determine when alternative accommodation orders are just. The 
primary function of the court is to administer justice. Its orders must seek to achieve just 
outcomes. To determine whether an alternative accommodation order is just, the appropriate 
form of justice must first be identified. Thereafter, the chapter establishes under what 
circumstances alternative accommodation orders will be just. 
5.3 Part Three: Concluding remarks and recommendations 
Chapter 7 summarises the findings of the thesis and provides concluding remarks and 
recommendations. One of the aims of this chapter is to clarify when an alternative 
accommodation order as a condition to the eviction of unlawful occupiers in terms of PIE 
would comply with the court’s constitutional mandate Hence, when would alternative 
accommodation orders adhere to the law, respect the functions of government and pursue 
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justice? Some recommendations are also made regarding the key issues identified in the 
granting of alternative accommodation orders.  
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PART ONE: ADHERENCE TO THE EXISTING LEGAL 
FRAMEWORK 
This part considers when alternative accommodation orders would comply with the first 
criterion – adherence to the existing legal framework. An order requiring the state to provide 
alternative accommodation to unlawful occupiers facing eviction would adhere to the existing 
legal framework if the framework authorises the state to comply with the order and enables 
the court to place such a duty on the state. In other words, an alternative accommodation 
order can be granted if justification for placing such a duty on the state can be found in the 
legal framework. In determining whether the granting of an alternative accommodation order 
is authorised, a court must apply the legislative provision or policy that gives effect to the 
relevant constitutional provision. A court should not apply the constitutional provision 
directly unless the constitutionality of the constitutional provision is challenged. Moreover, in 
applying the legal framework, a court must take cognisance of the fact that others are not 
before the court and their rights should not be prejudiced by its order. 
To be able to test alternative accommodation orders against this criterion the possible 
constitutional grounds for alternative accommodation orders are identified. Once these 
grounds are established they are each tested against the existing legal framework to determine 
when they would adhere to this framework. Chapter 2 identifies the possible constitutional 
grounds for alternative accommodation orders, where after Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 tests 
these grounds against the relevant legal frameworks.  
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CHAPTER TWO: GROUNDS FOR ALTERNATIVE 
ACCOMMODATION ORDERS 
1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to identify the possible grounds upon which alternative 
accommodation orders are granted. Unfortunately, courts have granted alternative 
accommodation orders without specifying the ground for the order.221 Whether alternative 
accommodation orders adhere to the existing legal framework can only be determined once 
the grounds for the orders are clear. Hence, the grounds identified in this chapter are not 
suggestions for ways to seek of seeking alternative accommodation orders. Instead, in trying 
to identify the possible grounds for alternative accommodation orders, the chapter seeks to 
understand the court’s existing jurisprudence and to determine on which grounds alternative 
accommodation orders have been granted in the past.  
To identify the possible grounds for alternative accommodation orders, the grounds, upon 
which the first two alternative accommodation orders by the Constitutional Court were 
granted, are examined. These decisions are City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality 
v Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd222 (hereinafter “Blue Moonlight”) and Occupiers of 
Skurweplaas 353 JR v PPC Aggregate Quarries (Pty) Ltd223 (hereinafter “Skurweplaas”).  
While these were the first decisions in which the Constitutional Court granted alternative 
accommodation orders, they were not the first decisions in which this court grappled with the 
issue. The first alternative accommodation order by the Constitutional Court was made in 
2012;224 the first case requesting such was heard eleven years earlier.225 This decision 
Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom226 (hereinafter “Grootboom”), 
including other Constitutional Court decisions preceding the first alternative accommodation 
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order,227 is critical for understanding the subsequent alternative accommodation orders. The 
following section briefly discusses the influence of these cases. In the subsequent section, the 
first two cases, in which alternative accommodation orders were granted by the 
Constitutional Court, are explored to identify the grounds upon which the orders were made. 
2 Lessons from decisions that preceded alternative 
accommodation orders 
Three Constitutional Court judgments greatly influenced the subsequent decisions to grant 
alternative accommodation orders. These judgments are Grootboom, Port Elizabeth 
Municipality v Various Occupiers228 (hereinafter “PE Municipality”) and President of the 
Republic of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd229 (hereinafter “Modderklip”). 
These cases involved situations where unlawful occupiers either faced homelessness because 
of a possible eviction order or were already homeless because of an executed eviction order.  
From these cases, three lessons can be learned, which clearly affected the court’s reasoning in 
decisions that resulted in alternative accommodation. These lessons are that the state’s 
housing duty includes a duty to assist persons living in emergency housing situations;230 that 
the availability of alternative accommodation can affect whether an eviction is just and 
equitable; and that a lack of alternative accommodation can result in the infringement of other 
human rights. This section explores the lessons learnt from the early Constitutional Court 
decisions. 
2.1 The state’s housing duty includes a duty to assist persons 
living in emergency housing situations  
The first lesson, learnt from Grootboom, the first of these early Constitutional Court 
decisions, is that the state’s housing duty includes a duty to assist persons living in 
emergency housing situations. Prior to this decision, the state aimed to comply with its 
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housing duty, in terms of section 26(2) of the Constitution,231 by implementing a housing 
programme that maximised its available resources.232 It focused on providing medium and 
long-term housing solutions.233 No special attention was paid to those persons who were most 
in need, who had no homes – those living in emergency housing situations.234 
In Grootboom, a large group of people moved from a state-owned informal settlement, called 
Wallacedene, onto private land without the consent of the landowner.235 The living conditions 
in Wallacedene were given as justification for the unlawful occupation. There was no service 
delivery,236 the area was partially waterlogged, lay close to a highway and was 
overcrowded.237 In response to their unlawful occupation, the landowner obtained an eviction 
order against the unlawful occupiers in the Magistrates’ Court.238 The eviction was executed 
prematurely. It also involved the burning of the occupiers’ building materials and 
possessions.239 This resulted in them moving onto the Wallacedene sports field. Since their 
building materials had been burnt, they did not have much with which to construct new 
shelters.240 
The group approached the Constitutional Court on the basis that, in failing to accommodate 
them after the eviction, the state failed to fulfil its housing duty in terms of section 26(2) of 
the Constitution.241 Consequently, they sought relief in the form of having basic shelter 
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provided to them by the state, which they could occupy until they could find permanent 
housing.242 The group argued that to fulfil its housing duty the state must ensure at least 
minimum core realisation of their right of access to adequate housing.243 In other words, the 
state must provide at least basic housing to all, regardless of the internal limitation within 
section 26(2).244 This internal limitation refers to the provision that the state only needs to 
fulfil its housing duty progressively and only to the extent that its available resources allow. 
The court found against such an obligation.245  
Instead, it found that sections 26(1) and (2) must be read together and that the state’s 
fulfilment of its housing duty must be measured against the standard of reasonableness 
provided for in section 26(2) itself.246 It proceeded to test the state’s conduct against this 
standard of reasonableness. The court found that reasonable legislative and other measures 
include a reasonable housing programme that caters for long, medium and short-term housing 
needs.247 Although the state’s medium and long-term national housing programme was 
reasonable, its overall programme was unreasonable to the extent that it did not acknowledge 
the state’s duty to assist people in desperate need.248 It made a declaratory order, which 
required the state to implement a short-term housing programme that ensures temporary 
shelter, within its available resources, for “people who have …no roof over their heads, for 
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people who are living in intolerable conditions and for people who are in crisis because of 
natural disasters …or because their homes are under threat of demolition.”249  
This order played a crucial role in the ensuing alternative accommodation orders. It provided 
justification for finding that the state’s housing duty requires it to provide alternative 
accommodation to evictees facing homelessness. 
2.2 The availability of alternative accommodation can affect 
whether an eviction is just and equitable 
The second lesson, taught by the early Constitutional Court decisions, is that the availability 
of alternative accommodation can affect whether an eviction is just and equitable. In 
Grootboom, the extent to which the eviction order was just and equitable was not at issue. 
This is because Grootboom did not involve an appeal against the initial eviction order, but a 
demand for housing based solely on the state’s housing duty.250 PE Municipality was the first 
actual eviction matter heard by the Constitutional Court. Hence, it provided the first 
opportunity for the court to deliberate the effect of a lack of alternative accommodation on 
the just and equitableness of an eviction order.  
In PE Municipality, the municipality sought the eviction of around 68 unlawful occupiers.251 
They had erected informal dwellings on private land within the jurisdiction of the 
municipality and had been occupying the land for between two and eight years.252 Similar to 
Grootboom,253 many of the unlawful occupiers had previously been evicted from other land.254 
The eviction application was made in response to a petition signed by 1600 people living in 
the neighbourhood, as well as the landowners.255 Unlike in Grootboom,256 the unlawful 
occupiers were not on the municipality’s waiting list for housing, since they had not applied 
                                                 
249
 Grootboom 52, 68, 96, 99. 
250
 See discussion of Grootboom in Chapter 2:2.1. 
251
 PE Municipality para 1. 
252
 PE Municipality para 2. 
253
 See discussion of Grootboom in Chapter 2:2.1. 
254
 PE Municipality para 2. 
255
 PE Municipality para 1, 49. 
256
 See discussion of Grootboom in Chapter 2:2.1. 
53 
 
to be on the list.257 Despite this, the unlawful occupiers contended that they were only willing 
to move off the land if the municipality provided them with alternative accommodation.258  
In response, the state offered them alternative land in the township of Walmer.259 The 
unlawful occupiers rejected this offer on the basis that the township was crime-ridden and 
overcrowded. Furthermore, since the state had not proved that it owned the land on which the 
township was established, they would not have tenure security if they settled there.260 
Accommodation offered in Greenbushes261 was also rejected, as it was too far away from their 
schools and employment.262  
Despite these objections, the High Court granted the eviction order.263 On appeal, the 
Supreme Court of Appeal set aside the eviction order on the basis that no alternative 
accommodation was available to the unlawful occupiers. It rejected Walmer Estate as 
potential alternative accommodation since the state did not prove that it owned the land.264 
This order was appealed against to the Constitutional Court.265  
One of the main contentions of the state was that it did not have a constitutional duty to 
provide alternative accommodation to evictees.266 Despite the fact that this argument clearly 
calls on the court to discuss the housing duty of the state in eviction matters, the court’s 
decision did not focus on section 26(2) of the Constitution. It simply stated that there is “no 
unqualified constitutional duty” on municipalities to prevent all evictions where no 
alternative accommodation is available.267 It continued by saying that whether such a duty 
exists in a specific situation will depend on the availability of resources and the housing 
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needs of others.268 However, the court did not proceed to examine whether such a duty on the 
state existed in the matter before it.  
Instead, it considered as a relevant circumstance in terms of section 26(3) of the Constitution 
the fact that no alternative accommodation was available.269 In this regard, the court stated, 
“[c]ourts should generally be reluctant… to grant an eviction order against relatively settled 
occupiers unless a reasonable alternative was available”.270 This statement is often quoted in 
eviction matters and has been cited in support of the granting of alternative accommodation 
orders.271 These cases create the idea that the statement could be used to justify an alternative 
accommodation order to “make” the eviction of relatively settled unlawful occupiers just and 
equitable.272 It is not certain whether the court had such a result in mind when it made the 
statement.  
What is certain is that, in PE Municipality itself, the statement was not used as justification 
for an alternative accommodation order. Rather, it supported a finding that, under the 
circumstances, an eviction order would not be just and equitable and should be denied.273 Not 
only were the occupiers a relatively settled, small group of genuinely homeless persons, but 
the court also found that there was no proof that the landowners needed the land.274 Still, this 
finding of the court opened the door for arguments in later cases that the court should grant 
an alternative accommodation order to ensure a just and equitable eviction.275 
2.3 A lack of alternative accommodation can result in the 
infringement of other human rights 
The third lesson, taught by the early Constitutional Court decisions, is that a lack of 
alternative accommodation can result in the infringement of human rights other than the 
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positive right to receive access to housing from the state.276 This lesson emerges from the 
Modderklip decision. As with the unlawful occupiers in Grootboom and PE Municipality,277 
the people in Modderklip were previously evicted from land; in this case, land owned by the 
municipality.278 Since they had nowhere to go, they moved onto a privately owned farm, 
Modderklip Boerdery.279 The municipality instructed the landowner to institute eviction 
proceedings, in terms of section 6(4) of the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful 
Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998 (PIE).280 Yet, the landowner refused to institute eviction 
proceeding, contending that it was the state’s duty to evict the unlawful occupiers and 
requesting the state to comply with this duty.281 The municipality did not respond to this 
request.282  
Within 6 months the settlement grew from 400 to 18 000 unlawful occupiers.283 Realising that 
no relief would come from the state, the owner sought an eviction order from the High Court 
in terms of section 4 of PIE.284 That the eviction was sought within six months of unlawful 
occupation is significant, since it removes the obligation on the court to consider whether 
alternative accommodation is available.285 PIE only requires the court to consider the 
availability of alternative accommodation if the unlawful occupation had endured for more 
than six months.286 This supports the finding, in PE Municipality, that the availability of 
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alternative accommodation plays an important role if the unlawful occupiers are relatively 
settled.287 
Despite being granted an eviction order,288 the landowner was unable to execute the order.289 
The number of occupiers had grown to 40 000 and the cost that the owner would have to 
carry to execute the order was R1.8mil.290 In response, the owner obtained an order from the 
High Court requiring the state to execute the eviction order.291 An appeal against this order, as 
well as the eviction order, was heard by the Supreme Court of Appeal.292 The decisions of the 
High Court and the Supreme Court of Appeal were similar.293 This discussion focusses on the 
findings of the Supreme Court of Appeal. 
The main finding was that the state breached several of its constitutional duties towards both 
the landowner and unlawful occupiers.294 In failing to implement reasonable short-term 
measures to fulfil the housing needs of those living in emergency housing situations and to 
provide alternative accommodation to the unlawful occupiers, the state breached its duty to 
fulfil the rights entrenched in section 26(1) of the Constitution.295 Moreover, by not providing 
the unlawful occupiers with alternative accommodation, the state prevented the landowner 
from executing the eviction order.296 This is because the unlawful occupiers did not have 
alternative accommodation and would simply reoccupy the property once evicted, thereby 
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negating the effect of the eviction.297 This, in turn, amounted to a breach of the state’s duty to 
protect the landowner against the horizontal infringement of its right to property in terms of 
section 25(1) of the Constitution.298 Furthermore, this failure on the part of the state also 
violated its duty to protect the right to equality of the landowner, in terms of section 9(1) of 
the Constitution. 299 This is because it resulted in the landowner having to carry the housing 
burden that the state should carry, a burden that is not equally placed on other citizens.300  
The Supreme Court of Appeal found that the unlawful occupiers should not be evicted until 
alternative accommodation is available.301 In the meantime, the Department of Agricultural 
and Land Affairs was to pay the owner constitutional damages to be calculated in terms of 
section 12(1) of the then Expropriation Act 63 of 1975.302  
The state appealed to the Constitutional Court. This court found it unnecessary to deal with 
the issue of whether section 25(1) has horizontal application and whether the state violated 
the landowner’s right in terms of section 25(1) or the unlawful occupiers’ rights in terms of 
section 26 of the Constitution.303 The refusal to deal with these sections indicates a strong 
caution on the side of the Constitutional Court to comment on the positive duties of the 
state.304 This relates to the separation of powers doctrine.305 Instead of following the High 
Court and Supreme Court of Appeal’s reasoning, the Constitutional Court founded its 
decision on the rule of law306 and section 34 of the Constitution, the right of access to 
courts.307 It found that the rule of law places a duty on the state to ensure that citizens can 
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enjoy the rights enshrined in the bill of rights.308 In respect of the right of access to courts, this 
means that the state must ensure that citizens are able to resolve the disputes between them.309 
Under the circumstances in Modderklip, ensuring that the landowner can resolve the dispute 
entailed facilitating the execution of eviction orders.310 In facilitating the execution of eviction 
orders, the state must also ensure that the execution does not disrupt the social order.311  
While the state does have mechanisms in place for the execution of eviction orders, these 
were insufficient under the circumstances of the case due to the scale of the unlawful 
occupation.312 Not only was it too expensive for the landowner to pay the sheriff to execute 
the order, the risk was that the unlawful occupiers would simply reoccupy the property since 
they had nowhere to go.313 The court ruled that such situations could not be tolerated. The 
high cost of the eviction might compel landowners to take the law into their own hands.314 
Moreover, placing such a large number of people on the street might cause social unrest.315 
With the eviction of smaller groups, this would not be a problem, because the existing 
mechanisms would suffice.316 Thus, the state must ensure the execution of court orders in a 
way that prevents social chaos.317 The Constitutional Court found that the state acted 
unreasonably by not ensuring the orderly execution of the eviction order.318 In not providing 
the landowner with effective relief by either expropriating the property or by providing 
alternative accommodation to the unlawful occupiers, the state violated section 34 of the 
Constitution.319  
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As relief, the court confirmed the Supreme Court of Appeal order for the state to pay 
constitutional damages and for the unlawful occupiers to remain in occupation until 
alternative accommodation is made available to them by the state.320 In ordering the state to 
pay constitutional damages based on the amount it would cost to expropriate the land, instead 
of actually ordering an expropriation, the court technically avoided separation of powers 
issues.321 This is because it avoided dictating to the state how it should fulfil its functions. 
Nonetheless, the effect of the order is similar. The unlawful occupiers were allowed to remain 
on the property and the owner was compensated in the form of constitutional damages.  
Moreover, on the part of the unlawful occupiers, there is no real difference between this 
outcome and one where the state is ordered to provide alternative accommodation.322 The 
unlawful occupiers were not evicted without alternative accommodation. Yet, by not relying 
on section 26(2) of the Constitution, the court avoided the very technical investigation into 
whether the state fulfilled its duty and whether non-fulfilment of its duty can justify an 
alternative accommodation order.  
Not only does this case show that a lack of alternative accommodation can result in the 
violation of rights like the right of access to courts, it also shows that constitutional damages 
can remedy such a violation. Furthermore, the case suggests that an alternative 
accommodation order could also be a remedy for such a violation. 
3 Decisions that resulted in alternative accommodation orders 
The lessons taught by the early Constitutional Court decisions clearly influenced the 
decisions that resulted in alternative accommodation orders. In this section, the first two 
Constitutional Court decisions, in which alternative accommodation orders were granted, are 
discussed.323 The discussion is limited to cases decided in terms of PIE,324 in which the 
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relevant municipality refused to provide alternative accommodation325 because it argued that 
it was either not obliged or not able to do so. These cases are Blue Moonlight and 
Skurweplaas.326  
As part of the Blue Moonlight discussion, two Supreme Court of Appeal decisions are briefly 
explained, namely City of Johannesburg v Changing Tides 74 (Pty) Ltd327 (hereinafter 
“Changing Tides”) and City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Hlophe328 
(hereinafter “Hlophe”). These two cases have similar facts to Blue Moonlight. They are 
explored to show how the findings in Blue Moonlight have been applied in subsequent 
decisions.  
3.1 City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Blue 
Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd 
Blue Moonlight involved an eviction from “bad buildings” in inner-city Johannesburg.329 In 
the 1990s, there was a decline of the inner city.330 After the influx controls were removed, 
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black people moved to the inner cities to find employment.331 Many of them rented flats from 
private landowners. As demand increased, the rent followed suit. Several tenants were unable 
to pay their rent, despite subletting. Since rent was not paid, rates for services delivery by the 
municipality could not be covered. The lack of funds, as well as the increase in demand, 
meant that the municipality found it difficult to deliver services. Without an income and with 
increasing arrear rates, landowners abandoned their properties.332 Slumlords took over 
abandoned buildings and unlawfully charged rent.333 Properties were dilapidated and services 
delivery was discontinued.334 This caused a health and safety risk for the occupiers.335 These 
dilapidated and unsafe buildings were referred to as “bad buildings”.336 Around 67 000 people 
were living in bad buildings.337 
In response to the deterioration of the inner city, the municipality adopted the Inner City 
Regeneration Strategy.338 This involved a plan to acquire ownership of these bad buildings.339 
Properties were sold to private developers for the regeneration of the inner city. As an 
incentive, the municipality took it upon itself to evict the occupiers and offered arrear rates 
and tax write-offs to the developers who bought the properties.340  
Initially, occupiers were evicted without assistance from the state, regardless of their ability 
to secure their own alternative accommodation. Only after around 10 000 people had already 
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been evicted without alternative accommodation was this addressed by the Constitutional 
Court,341 in Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Berea Township and 197 Main Street Johannesburg 
v City of Johannesburg342 (hereinafter “Olivia Road”).343  
The Supreme Court of Appeal had found that the state has a duty to assist the evictees under 
the national Emergency Housing Programme (EHP).344 This programme was adopted in 
response to the finding, in Grootboom, that the state should adopt a housing programme that 
caters for emergency housing situations, such as evictions that would lead to homelessness.345 
On appeal from the Supreme Court of Appeal, the Constitutional Court ordered the 
municipality to engage with the unlawful occupiers to resolve the disputes between them.346 
The engagement order was based on the decisions in Grootboom and in PE Municipality that 
municipalities are expected to engage with unlawful occupiers and that a court can order such 
engagement.347  
During the engagement, the parties reached a settlement agreement.348 The agreement 
included a plan to make the buildings, occupied by those before the court, safe and 
habitable.349 Pending the renovation of the building, the municipality agreed to house the 
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occupiers in other buildings.350 The court confirmed the agreement. It found that the 
municipality had fulfilled its duty by responding reasonably to the engagement process.351  
Subsequent to this decision, the municipality changed its strategy for regeneration. It 
accepted its duty toward the occupiers that it evicted from bad buildings. Due to resource 
constraints, it identified bad buildings and, based on the risk to the lives of the occupiers, the 
municipality progressively removed the occupiers and provided them with temporary 
alternative accommodation.352 Where the buildings were privately owned, it requested the 
owner to address the health and safety concerns.353 Blue Moonlight involved one such 
request.354  
3.1.1 Reasoning in Blue Moonlight 
Blue Moonlight involved the eviction of 86 unlawful occupiers from commercially zoned bad 
buildings in inner-city Johannesburg.355 The property consisted of office space, a factory 
building and garages.356 The unlawful occupiers were poor and some of them belonged to 
vulnerable groups.357 As a result, it was argued and accepted that they would be unable to 
secure their own alternative accommodation.358 All of them had occupied the property for 
more than six months; many have stayed there for years.359 Although unlawful at the time of 
the hearing, their occupation was once lawful. They lawfully rented the property until it was 
purchased by Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd (the landowner) in 2004, who wished to 
                                                 
350
 Olivia Road para 26. 
351
 Olivia Road para 26. 
352
 See, for example, discussion on Blue Moonlight and Changing Tides in Chapter 2:3.1.1 and 3.1.2.1 
respectively. 
353
 See, for example, discussion on Blue Moonlight and Changing Tides in Chapter 2:3.1.1 and 3.1.2.1 
respectively. 
354
 See discussion on Blue Moonlight in Chapter 2:3.1.1 below. 
355
 Blue Moonlight para 1. 
356
 Blue Moonlight para 1. 
357
 Blue Moonlight para 6. In terms of this thesis vulnerability refers to someone who falls within one of the 
categories identified in s 4(6) and (7) of PIE. These are children, elderly and disabled persons and women 
headed households. In Blue Moonlight, five of the unlawful occupiers were children, one was disabled, two 
pensioners and several were woman heading households. The average income per household was R940 per 
month.  For an in depth discussion on vulnerability of unlawful occupiers in eviction matters, see Muller (2014) 
SAJHR. 
358
 Blue Moonlight para 6. 
359
 Blue Moonlight para 7. 
64 
 
redevelop it.360 The unlawful occupiers argued that their previous rent had been very low and 
that they would be unable to rent accommodation elsewhere.361  
As with the other bad buildings in the inner city, the property had deteriorated to such an 
extent that it posed health and safety risks to the occupiers.362 Subsequent to Olivia Road, 
instead of trying to evict the occupiers itself, the municipality requested the landowner to 
address the health and safety issues.363 In response, the landowner posted a notice to vacate, 
cancelling any existing leases.364 It proceeded to apply for the eviction of the unlawful 
occupiers in terms of PIE.365 This was opposed by the occupiers on the basis that an eviction 
would leave them homeless.366 They argued the municipality should provide them with 
alternative accommodation.367 The unlawful occupiers also successfully applied to join the 
municipality to the matter.368 Joinder was required since the municipality had an interest in 
the outcome of the case, as relief was sought against them.369 
The municipality reported that it was unable to provide alternative accommodation for the 
unlawful occupiers.370 It had a programme in which unsafe buildings were identified and, 
based on the risk to the lives of the occupiers, the municipality progressively removed the 
occupiers and provided them with temporary alternative accommodation.371 This programme 
did not cater for the provision of alternative accommodation for people living in other 
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emergency housing situations, such as those facing evictions sought by private landowners.372 
Justification for this differentiation was that they could not foresee and budget for such 
emergency housing situations. Accordingly, the municipality addressed such situations by 
applying to the provincial government for funding in terms of the EHP, which makes 
provision for municipalities to seek assistance from the provincial government.373  
In response, the unlawful occupiers argued that the municipality's housing programme was 
unconstitutional. By reserving municipal funds for evictions sought by the municipality, it 
discriminated against those who require alternative accommodation because of a private 
eviction.374  
The Constitutional Court found that in considering all the relevant circumstances to 
determine whether an eviction order would be just and equitable two conflicting 
considerations are prevalent – the landowner’s right to the property and the unlawful 
occupiers’ potential homelessness.375 This conflict relates directly to the imperatives of 
fundamental rights protection and creates a tension between sections 25(1) and 26(1) of the 
Constitution.376  
The Constitutional Court confirmed that the landowner has a fundamental right against 
unlawful deprivations in terms of section 25(1) of the Constitution. It further confirmed the 
finding in the Supreme Court of Appeal decision of President of the Republic of South Africa 
and Others v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd377 that unlawful occupation of land amounts to a 
deprivation of property.378 Such a deprivation will only be lawful if it is not arbitrary and 
authorised by a law of general application.379 PIE is a law of general application.380 The court 
found that the landowner knew it was purchasing property that had been unlawfully occupied 
by poor persons for a long time. It must have known that it would have to wait to get vacant 
                                                 
372
 Blue Moonlight para 70. 
373
 City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd (Appellant's 
Heads of Argument) 2012 (2) SA 104 (CC) para 44.  
374
 Blue Moonlight para 14. 
375
 Blue Moonlight para 34. 
376
 Blue Moonlight paras 17, 18. This imperative is found in s 7(2) of the Constitution that requires the state to 
respect, protect, promote and fulfil human rights. 
377
 2004 (6) SA 40 (SCA). 
378
 See the discussion of Modderklip SCA in Chapter 2:2.3. 
379
 As per s 25(1) of the Constitution. 
380
 See Chapter 4:5.1.1. 
66 
 
occupation of the property; therefore, a temporary deprivation would not be arbitrary. 
Nevertheless, a private owner could not be deprived of its property indefinitely, since that 
would amount to an arbitrary deprivation or a de facto unlawful expropriation.381 Hence, an 
eviction order must be granted, to prevent arbitrary deprivation, but there can be some delay 
in the execution of the order.382 
The issue remained when and under what circumstances the inevitable eviction would be just 
and equitable.383 To determine this, the court turned to the other side of the balance, the fact 
that the unlawful occupiers faced homelessness. In this regard, it found that the circumstance 
that would make an eviction order just and equitable was the provision of alternative 
accommodation by the municipality.384 This approach relates to PE Municipality and the 
second lesson taught by the previous Constitutional Court cases. This lesson teaches that the 
availability of alternative accommodation can affect whether an eviction is just and equitable. 
The third lesson, that a lack of alternative accommodation might result in the violation of 
human rights, is also relevant. This is because the court suggests that a denial of the eviction, 
which might occur if no alternative accommodation is available, would violate the right of 
the landowner.  
Moreover, evident from this discussion is the fact that the court does not balance the two 
primary relevant circumstances, namely, the owner’s right to property and the occupiers’ 
potential homelessness. Based on the owner’s right to property, it finds that there must be an 
eviction and then tries to find a way to make it just and equitable.385 This seems to be in 
conflict with section 4(7) of PIE, which reads, “a court may grant an eviction order if it is of 
the opinion that it is just and equitable to do so, after considering all the relevant 
circumstances”. Here the court looks at one circumstance to decide it must grant an eviction 
order and then considers what the content of the order must be to make the eviction just and 
equitable.  
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To determine whether the state had a duty to provide alternative accommodation, the court 
considered the state’s housing duty in terms of section 26(2) of the Constitution.386 The state 
argued that it was unable to provide alternative accommodation to the unlawful occupiers and 
it was, at any rate, not obliged to accommodate them within its short-term housing 
programme.387 This was, firstly, because it was a private eviction and it was only obliged to 
cater for evictions sought by the state within its short-term housing programme.388 Second, it 
had already applied to the provincial government for funding in terms of the EHP and this 
request was denied. It had, therefore fulfilled its role under the EHP.389 Its role was to 
implement emergency housing plans, but not to provide the resources for such 
implementation. The resources were to be provided by the provincial government.390 
Accordingly, the provincial government had failed the unlawful occupiers, not the 
municipality. Hence, the provincial government should be joined to the proceedings and held 
accountable.391 
In respect of the first contention, the court disagreed with the municipality that its short-term 
housing programme need not cater for persons evicted at the instance of private landowners. 
Instead, the court found the municipality’s short-term housing programme unconstitutional to 
the extent that it did not cater for persons evicted by private landowners. Failure to cater for 
this category of persons amounted to an unfair discrimination in terms of section 9 of the 
Constitution.392  
As for the second contention, the court found that the municipality had the primary duty, in 
terms of the EHP, to fund emergency housing.393 It must budget for such situations.394 The 
provincial government should be involved only if, despite budgeting, it does not have 
sufficient funds.395 The court, therefore, rejected the state’s assertion that it did not have a 
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duty to use its own resources to implement the EHP.396 This relates to the first lesson taught 
by the previous Constitutional Court decisions. The state’s housing duty includes a duty to 
assist persons living in emergency housing situations, which includes persons facing eviction 
by private landowners. 
The next issue addressed by the court was whether the municipality, in fact, had the available 
resources to provide the unlawful occupiers with alternative accommodation.397 It was 
necessary to answer this question since the state’s housing duty in section 26(2) is limited to 
the extent that it has available resources. Moreover, it would be pointless to grant an order 
that could not be implemented. It was argued by the amicus curiae that the municipality was 
running a budget surplus.398 In response, the municipality argued that the surplus was only a 
budgetary projection and was inaccurate. It was actually operating on a budget deficit.399 The 
Constitutional Court rejected this argument. It criticised the municipality for not proving that 
it was operating on a budget deficit.400 In fact, the municipality did not supply any proof that 
it was unable to provide the unlawful occupiers with temporary alternative accommodation.401 
Furthermore, in its contention that it lacked the available resources, the municipality 
primarily spoke about its housing budget and did not specify whether it had the available 
resources within its general budget.402 
What is peculiar about these findings is that they were based on incomplete information, 
despite the court’s emphasis in PE Municipality on the importance of ensuring that all 
relevant information is laid before the court.403 While the court identified the missing 
information, it made no creative managerial effort to ensure that it had the missing 
information before making a decision.404 The court seems to place the burden of proof 
                                                 
396
 Blue Moonlight para 22, 48, 51, 96. 
397
 Blue Moonlight para 67. 
398
 Blue Moonlight para 71. 
399
 Blue Moonlight para 73. 
400
 Blue Moonlight para 73. 
401
 Blue Moonlight para 71. 
402
 Blue Moonlight para 74. 
403
 See discussion of PE Municipality in Chapter 2:2.2. 
404
 See discussion of PE Municipality in Chapter 2:2.2. 
69 
 
regarding its ability to provide alternative accommodation on the municipality. In the absence 
of such proof, it presumed that the state had the available resources.405  
It is also strange that the court wanted to hear evidence on the municipality’s general budget, 
since scrutinising its entire budget would require a technical analysis in which a multitude of 
different interests must be balanced. Such a scrutiny raises separation of powers concerns.406  
What is more, the court highlighted the blameworthiness of the state.407 It stressed that the 
municipality had known about the pending eviction for three years, but still had not budgeted 
for it.408 A counterargument could be that the municipality was under the impression that it 
did not have a duty towards the unlawful occupiers.409 The court also contended that the 
unlawful occupiers should not be prejudiced because the municipality had unconstitutionally 
excluded them from its budget.410 It is unclear how the fact that the municipality is 
blameworthy features in an investigation regarding whether, in fact, the municipality has 
available resources. Rather, these allegations, regarding the blameworthiness of the 
municipality, make the consequent alternative accommodation order seem like a bid to 
punish the municipality.411 
Unfortunately, the court failed to engage with the question of the municipality’s available 
resources in a meaningful way. Rather, after making the contentions mentioned above, it 
abruptly ended the discussion.412 As justification, it stated that its duty is merely to decide 
whether the Supreme Court of Appeal’s findings were incorrect and whether it should be set 
aside. To this, it “cannot answer yes” since the municipality has not shown that it is unable to 
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provide alternative accommodation.413 It then ordered the municipality to provide the 
unlawful occupiers with temporary alternative accommodation as close as possible to the 
property within four months.414 The court linked the alternative accommodation order with 
the date of eviction, stating that the eviction is only to occur after alternative accommodation 
had been provided.415  
It would be interesting to know what the court would have done, had it found that the state 
does not have the resources to provide alternative accommodation. Such a finding would 
obviously have frustrated the court’s endeavour of making the eviction order just and 
equitable. This might explain why it was so adamant to decide that the state has a duty to 
provide alternative accommodation to the unlawful occupiers, without all of the relevant 
information before it. 
In conclusion, the decision to order the state to provide alternative accommodation was 
founded on its duty to provide emergency accommodation in terms of section 26(2) of the 
Constitution.416 Instead of weighing this factor in the balance, the court seemed to consider it 
its duty to make the eviction just and equitable in terms of section 26(3) of the Constitution.417 
It found that an eviction had to be granted since the land was privately owned and a denial of 
the eviction would violate the landowner’s right in terms of section 25(1) of the 
Constitution.418 The duty to provide alternative accommodation was placed on the 
municipality alone.419 However, the municipality would only be required to provide such 
accommodation if it has the resources.420 The municipality must budget for emergency 
housing situations to ensure it has resources available.421 It is uncertain what the effect would 
have been had the court found that the municipality did not have sufficient resources 
available. 
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3.1.2 Subsequent Supreme Court of Appeal decisions 
Subsequent to Blue Moonlight, the Supreme Court of Appeal heard two other matters 
regarding evictions from bad buildings in the inner city of Johannesburg. These cases are 
Changing Tides and Hlophe. In both of these matters, alternative accommodation orders were 
granted. The remainder of this section considers to what extent these decisions followed the 
reasoning of Blue Moonlight. 
3.1.2.1 City of Johannesburg v Changing T ides 74 (Pty) Ltd 
Changing Tides involved the occupation of an old warehouse by over 97 people.422 Similar to 
Blue Moonlight, the building was not safe for human habitation and the municipality gave the 
landowner, Changing Tides, notice to address the health and safety concerns.423 In response to 
the municipality’s notice, the landowner applied for an eviction order in 2011.424  
The High Court followed the decision of Blue Moonlight. It granted the eviction order, 
together with an order that the state must provide every occupier with temporary emergency 
accommodation.425 The municipality appealed against the latter part of the High Court’s 
decision to the Supreme Court of Appeal.426 The occupiers opposed this appeal.427 
Interpreting Blue Moonlight, the Supreme Court of Appeal found that coming to a just and 
equitable order involves a two-step process. First, the court must decide whether to grant an 
eviction order at all.428 An eviction order must be granted if all of the procedural requirements 
were met, no valid defence exists and the eviction will be just and equitable.429 The outcome 
of this step demands that an eviction be just and equitable if sought by a private landowner 
                                                 
422
 Changing Tides para 2-3. 
423
 Changing Tides para 2. In terms of the City of Johannesburg Emergency Services Bylaws, as well as the 
NBRBSA. S 12(4) of the NBRBSA provides:  
“If the local authority in question deems it necessary for the safety of any person, it may by notice in writing, served by 
post or delivered- 
(a) order the owner of any building to remove, within the period specified in such notice, all persons occupying or 
working or being for any other purpose in such building therefrom, and to take care that any person not authorized 
by such local authority does not enter such building;” 
424
 Changing Tides para 4. 
425
 Changing Tides para 4. 
426
 Changing Tides para 5.  
427
 Changing Tides para 5. 
428
 S 4(7) of PIE. 
429
 Changing Tides para 11. 
72 
 
unless the landowner has no need for the land.430 The finding that the outcome might be 
different if the landowner does not need the land seems to be an attempt to justify its 
deviation from the conclusion in PE Municipality, in which an eviction from private land was 
denied.431 Interestingly, in this case, as in PE Municipality,432 it was not the landowner’s 
decision to evict the unlawful occupiers. The landowners in Changing Tides applied for the 
eviction at the instance of the state.433 In contrast, the municipality, in PE Municipality, 
applied for the eviction at the instance of the landowner.434  
The second step requires the court to decide what conditions must be attached to the eviction 
order to ensure a just and equitable outcome.435 This step deals with the rights of the unlawful 
occupiers and the fact that a condition that the municipality must provide them with 
alternative accommodation might ensure that the eviction is just and equitable. Hence, as in 
Blue Moonlight, the court first considered the rights of the private landowner in determining 
whether to grant an eviction. Second, it considered the rights of the unlawful occupiers in 
“making” the order just and equitable.436 The Supreme Court of Appeal, in Changing Tides, 
justified this second step in terms of PIE.437 Section 4(12) of PIE allows the court to make an 
eviction order subject to any conditions that it deems reasonable.438  
Since the eviction would leave the unlawful occupiers homeless, the alternative 
accommodation order can be considered a condition to “make” the eviction just and 
equitable.439 The Supreme Court of Appeal justified placing this duty on the municipality in 
terms of the state’s housing duty in section 26(2) of the Constitution.440 In response, 
subsequent to Blue Moonlight, the municipality accepted that it has a “duty to assist people 
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who face homelessness upon eviction, through no fault of their own and which they can do 
nothing about”.441 However, it contended that this duty was limited to complying with the 
EHP.442 Accordingly, it required the unlawful occupiers to approach its centres that deal with 
emergency housing and to apply for emergency housing.443 The effect of this would be that 
that the applications of the occupiers would be dealt with on the same basis as any other 
person living in emergency housing situations. Furthermore, accommodation will be provided 
as and when the available resources of the municipality allow. 
The court rejected this approach since it would result in a delay of the eviction if the eviction 
were to be made conditional upon the provision of alternative accommodation.444 It stressed 
that the building was a “death trap” and that the occupiers could not stay there until the 
municipality has decided whether they qualify for emergency housing in terms of its 
emergency housing programme.445 Although it accepted that the municipality has a right to 
decide who qualifies for emergency accommodation, it should not do so at the risk of the 
health and safety of the occupiers who do qualify.446 The municipality should, first, provide 
all of the occupiers with alternative accommodation and then “weed” them out afterwards.447  
The effect of this approach is that the unlawful occupiers are prioritised above others living in 
emergency housing situations.448 Moreover, it disregards whether the municipality has the 
available resources to provide the alternative accommodation within the given timeframe.449 
In fact, the court did not address the available resources of the municipality at all. 
There are two possible explanations for the court’s disregard of the state’s available 
resources. For one, the municipality accepted its duty to provide alternative accommodation, 
which suggests that it has the available resources.450 However, it only accepted that it has a 
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duty toward the unlawful occupiers in terms of its emergency housing programme.451 Had it 
been allowed to act according to this programme, it would have accommodated only those 
who qualified and only to the extent that its resources allowed. This means that it might only 
have provided alternative accommodation on a much later date.  
Second, in Blue Moonlight the court found that this same municipality had the available 
resources because of an alleged budget surplus.452 The occupiers alleged that the surplus was 
predicted to increase in the following years.453 Unfortunately, the court, in Changing Tides, 
did not address in its decision to what extent it relied on the alleged surplus and whether the 
surplus would be sufficient for the provision of alternative accommodation. 
Despite the apparent urgency of the matter, the court prescribed quite a lengthy procedure 
prior to the execution of the eviction order. First, it afforded the legal representatives of the 
unlawful occupiers a month to draft a list of all of the occupiers who would require 
alternative accommodation once evicted.454 Second, after receiving the list, the municipality 
had a month to report on the accommodation it would provide.455 A third month was awarded 
to the unlawful occupiers to consider the report, where after the municipality had another two 
weeks to respond to any comments from the unlawful occupiers.456 This added up to three and 
a half months of delay. The matter was then to be set down for hearing in the High Court, for 
a decision on a just and equitable date for eviction.457 Alternative accommodation was to be 
provided by the municipality two weeks prior to eviction.458 Eventually, the eviction was only 
executed eight months after the Supreme Court of Appeal decision was handed down.459 Such 
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a significant delay questions the urgency of the eviction. Throughout the municipality 
insisted that it did not have available buildings in which to house the unlawful occupiers. 460 
The court, in this case, evidently followed the decision of Blue Moonlight closely. It followed 
the same procedure of, first, deciding that the rights of the landowner necessitated an eviction 
order and then granting an alternative accommodation order to make the eviction order just 
and equitable toward the unlawful occupiers. Despite responding to the decision in Blue 
Moonlight and including evictees from private land within its emergency housing 
programme, the court still did not allow the municipality to implement this programme to 
assist the unlawful occupiers. Justification provided for this approach was that the building 
was unsafe. However, the subsequent eight-month delay does not support this assertion. 
Moreover, the court disregarded the state’s contention that it could not provide alternative 
accommodation. Unlike in Blue Moonlight, the court did not even address this issue in the 
judgment.  
3.1.2.2 City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipali ty v Hlophe  
Hlophe involved another eviction application by the private property developer Changing 
Tides. Again, it had acquired ownership of a bad building for development in inner-city 
Johannesburg.461 The property was unlawfully occupied by between 180 and 250 persons.462 
In the initial unreported High Court decision, the municipality agreed to provide the unlawful 
occupiers with alternative accommodation in terms of its emergency housing programme.463 
However, the provision would be limited to those occupiers who qualified for assistance 
based on the rules of its emergency housing programme.464 The High Court accepted this and 
afforded the municipality two months within which to identify those who qualify for 
assistance and report to the court on its findings.465 The municipality failed to comply with 
this order.466 
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The landowner re-enrolled the matter and supplied a list of those persons who would require 
alternative accommodation once evicted.467 The municipality requested a postponement of the 
matter to examine the list to determine whether the persons on the list qualified under its 
housing programme.468 The court denied this request.469 Instead, it ordered the municipality to 
provide the unlawful occupiers on the list with alternative accommodation that is secure 
against further evictions.470 This order deviated from Changing Tides, where the court 
allowed the municipality to “weed out” the persons who do not qualify for emergency 
housing in terms of its programme.471 However, this seems to be due to the municipality’s 
failure to take the opportunity to examine which occupants qualify under its programme. 
Moreover, neither Blue Moonlight nor Changing Tides required the alternative housing to be 
secure against eviction. The notion of tenure security for alternative accommodation was 
created in PE Municipality, where the alternative land was not accepted as alternative 
accommodation since the state did not prove that it owned the land and could ensure 
undisturbed occupation.472  
In determining a date of eviction, the municipality agreed to an eviction date within about six 
months,473 on condition that it would only accommodate those occupiers who qualified for 
assistance in terms of its emergency housing programme.474 It also requested a later date for 
the execution of the order, but this request was denied.475  
At the end of the six months, the municipality applied for a suspension of the alternative 
accommodation order on the ground that was unable to provide accommodation in time. It 
contended that it could not fast-track the provision of accommodation without the assistance 
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of other spheres of government.476 This argument seems to relate to the principle of co-
operative government.477 Moreover, the municipality asserted that, if the court finds that an 
eviction without alternative accommodation would not be just and equitable, it should 
suspend the eviction order until the municipality is able to provide such.478 This application 
for suspension was granted and the municipality was required to report within three months 
on the accommodation to be provided.479 The buildings that were to be used should be 
identified, as well as the terms of accommodation, such as any rent to be paid.480  
 By the deadline, no alternative accommodation had been provided.481 The municipality 
reported that it was previously ordered to house those evicted in Changing Tides, in the 
buildings it planned to use to house persons evicted in this matter.482 Hence, the 
municipality’s argument was based on its lack of available resources. It argued that no 
suitable buildings were available, but that it was planning to build suitable buildings and 
renovate existing buildings.483 Furthermore, the effect of the decision in Blue Moonlight was 
that it had a duty to assist all persons evicted by private landowners within its emergency 
housing programme.484 This further limited its available resources and affected the date on 
which alternative accommodation could be provided since the needs of those to be evicted 
from other buildings should be taken into account.485 Accordingly, it requested the eviction 
order to be suspended for another nine months.486  
In response, the unlawful occupiers applied to the High Court to hold individual members of 
municipality personally liable for complying with the court order: the Executive Mayor, the 
City Manager and the Director of Housing.487 The owner also contended that it was not 
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willing to accept another suspension, despite that fact that the requested suspension was due 
to its success in a previous matter.488  
In its decision, the High Court discussed the blameworthiness of the municipality.489 It did not 
consider the impact of the Blue Moonlight decision, namely that the municipality now has a 
heavier burden to carry and many competing interests to balance.490 Rather, the court focused 
on the fact that the municipality had known since the Blue Moonlight decision about its duty 
to accommodate persons evicted by private landowners within its emergency housing 
programme.491 The municipality, therefore, had time to prepare for the provision of alternative 
accommodation to the unlawful occupiers.492  
In response to the municipality’s report on its inability to provide alternative accommodation, 
the court stated that municipality “was not asked to share its various problems with the 
court.”493 This is a peculiar response to the municipality’s report on its available resources 
since it disregards the internal limitation to its duty as provided for in section 26(2) of the 
Constitution. However, this disregard might be because the court was of the view that the 
municipality had resources available. The occupiers relied on a predicted R 4.126 billion 
surplus, in the municipality’s medium-term budget for 2012/2013, to argue that the 
municipality had the required resources.494 Yet, even if this surplus were available,495 this 
amount still had to be used to address the housing emergencies of all those living in 
emergency housing situations within the municipality’s jurisdiction.496 Moreover, available 
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funding does not equate available accommodation, since it takes time to acquire suitable 
buildings and to ensure that they are habitable.497  
In this respect, however, the court was not satisfied with the steps already taken by the 
municipality.498 While the court did acknowledge that there are arguments against using tax 
revenue to house even non-South Africans499 and that an alternative accommodation might 
amount to queue jumping,500 it refused to take these considerations into account on the basis 
that it is bound by the Constitutional Court.501  
In its order, the High Court required the municipality to report extensively on the steps it had 
taken and would still take to provide those occupying bad buildings in the inner city, 
including the unlawful occupiers in the current matter, with alternative accommodation.502 
The members of the municipality cited in the application were to sign the report. They were 
personally to ensure that this report was submitted and that temporary alternative 
accommodation was provided to the unlawful occupiers.503 Failure to do so would mean that 
they would be guilty of contempt of court and possibly also liable for constitutional 
damages.504  
This decision was appealed against to the Supreme Court of Appeal by the municipality and 
the cited officials. The premise of the appeal was that the officials could not be held liable in 
their personal capacities for submitting the report and for ensuring that the unlawful 
occupiers were provided with alternative accommodation.505 This argument was rejected by 
the court on the basis that the order simply required the officials to perform their duties.506 
Holding officials liable for the performance of their duties promotes the accountability of 
government.507 The court did not take into account the fact that the performance of these 
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duties was constitutionally limited to the extent that the municipality possessed the required 
resources.508 
In respect of what the officials can be held liable for, the court found that the municipality 
could not be ordered to report in the manner required by the High Court.509 Hence, the 
officials could not be held liable for ensuring that such a report is submitted. The court’s 
dismissal of the order to report was based on the fact that it amounted to the court dictating 
how the municipality could or should comply with its constitutional obligations.510 This 
violated the separation of powers doctrine.511 This finding is interesting, considering that the 
same court in Changing Tides found that the municipality should use specific buildings to 
house the unlawful occupiers and this was not regarded a violation of the separation of 
powers doctrine.512 
In respect of holding the officials liable to ensure the provision of alternative accommodation, 
in theory the court seemed to find that it would be possible. Yet, it was not necessary to order 
such in this instance. By the time that the matter was decided, the municipality had offered 
accommodation to the unlawful occupiers before the court by September 2015.513 Despite this 
offer, alternative accommodation was only provided in January 2016 following contempt of 
court proceedings against the mayor.514 
The decision was evidently based primarily on precedent and the court’s dissatisfaction with 
the progress of the municipality. This dissatisfaction seems to originate in Blue Moonlight 
and increase in Changing Tides. However, the court did not investigate whether this slow 
progress can be justified by the internal limitations of section 26(2) of the Constitution. 
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Instead, it found that municipal officials could be held accountable in their personal 
capacities, clearly showing its frustration with them.515  
3.2 Occupiers of Skurweplaas 353 JR v PPC Aggregate Quarries 
(Pty) Ltd 
Contrary to the three cases discussed in the previous section, the case discussed here relates 
to an eviction due to the erection and occupation of informal structures on vacant, privately 
owned land. Skurweplaas involved a farm, called Mooiplaats, which had been subdivided 
into four parts.516 Two of the parts, called “Skurweplaas” and “portion 15” respectively, were 
owned by PPC Aggregate Quarries (PPC). It used the land to mine dolomite.517 The third part, 
portion 25, was owned by Golden Thread Ltd (Golden Thread)518 and the fourth was owned 
by the municipality. The municipality had expropriated the land to be used as an informal 
settlement, called Itireleng.519 
The informal settlement grew and became overcrowded.520 As a result, a number of the 
occupiers of Itireleng moved onto portion 15 without the consent of PPC, the landowner. In 
response, PPC obtained an eviction order against the unlawful occupiers. Upon execution of 
the eviction order, the evictees invaded both portion 25 (owned by Golden Thread) and 
Skurweplaas (owned by PPC). More people kept moving onto the property from elsewhere.521  
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PPC’s initial attempt to secure Skurweplaas against further invasion, by employing security 
guards, failed due to the intimidation of the guards by the unlawful occupiers.522 In another 
attempt to prevent the unlawful occupation of Skurweplaas, PPC obtained an interim interdict 
against future land invasion, as well as an interim eviction order against those who had 
already invaded the land.523 Again, this did not affect the existing and continued invasion and 
unlawful occupation of the property. In fact, by the time the Constitutional Court decision 
was heard the number of unlawful occupiers had more than doubled from 50 families to over 
a hundred families. Hence, half of the occupiers were there in contempt of the interdict and 
half in contempt of the eviction order.524 
On the return date, the interim order was extended to allow the municipality to report on its 
ability to provide alternative accommodation and the unlawful occupiers to respond to the 
application.525 The municipality reported that it could accommodate the unlawful occupiers in 
its short-term housing programme that commenced in the subsequent financial year. It had 
applied for funding from the national authority to purchase land for alternative 
accommodation, but the outcome of the application was not indicated.526 Disregarding the 
municipality’s report on when it would have resources available, the High Court ordered it to 
provide the unlawful occupiers with alternative accommodation within just over two months. 
Furthermore, it ordered the eviction of the unlawful occupiers after the two months, 
regardless of whether the municipality complied with the alternative accommodation order.527  
The order was founded on sections 9 and 26 of the Constitution.528 Justification for relying on 
section 9 was that continued occupation would amount to the individual landowners having 
to carry the state’s housing duty. This would constitute an unfair discrimination, since other 
private parties do not have a similar duty.529 Modderklip was given as authority for this 
finding, despite the Constitutional Court in Modderklip not relying on section 9.530 No 
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explanation was given as to why section 26 justified the granting of an alternative 
accommodation order in the face of the municipality’s apparent lack of resources. In fact, 
nothing further was mentioned about this duty.  
In response, the unlawful occupiers applied for leave to appeal against the High Court order. 
Leave to appeal was denied by both the High Court and the Supreme Court of Appeal, but 
was allowed by the Constitutional Court.531 Accordingly, the unlawful occupiers appealed to 
the Constitutional Court. The relief sought was that the eviction must be made conditional 
upon the provision of alternative accommodation by the municipality, to avoid the risk of 
becoming homeless once evicted.532 
In support of this argument, the unlawful occupiers contended that precedent has created the 
principle that evictions, which lead to homelessness, are usually not just and equitable. This 
argument was primarily based on the oft-quoted statement in PE Municipality regarding 
relatively settled occupiers.533 In response to this argument, PPC argued that this statement 
was not applicable to the current matter, as the occupiers had been in occupation of the 
property for shorter than six months. They were not “relatively settled”.534 Moreover, in terms 
of PIE, a court is not required to consider whether alternative accommodation is available if 
the occupation was less than six months.535  
Nonetheless, the court found that the PE Municipality statement still applied to the current set 
of facts, since the Constitutional Court, in PE Municipality, found that “PIE does not 
envisage any set formula connecting time to stability”.536 No attention was paid to the fact 
that this statement was made in a case where persons were in occupation for up to eight 
years.537 In addition, PPC questioned whether the unlawful occupiers would, in fact, become 
homeless once evicted. It argued that the fact that their occupation had been short means that 
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they might still be able to return whence they came.538 Some occupiers had also admitted that 
they could afford accommodation elsewhere.539 
A number of other arguments were made in support of the appeal. For one, making the 
eviction conditional upon the provision of alternative accommodation would prevent further 
eviction matters.540 If they were evicted without alternative accommodation, the unlawful 
occupiers argued, they would just invade another property.541 This would create uncertainty 
for other landowners in the area because there would be the constant threat that their land 
would be invaded.542 However, the fact that more people kept moving onto Skurweplaas (and 
that these occupiers were not limited to those evicted from portion 15) suggests that provision 
of alternative accommodation to this group of persons might not avert the threat of land 
invasion.543 The argument that once evicted the unlawful occupiers would invade other land 
relates to the third lesson taught by the decisions that preceded alternative accommodation 
orders – a lack of alternative accommodation can result in the infringement of other human 
rights. In this instance, the right infringed upon is the right of the landowner, as well as other 
landowners in the area, to property.  
Another argument raised in support of the appeal is that, if unlawful occupiers face 
homelessness, their rights would outweigh that of the landowner.544 This is especially the case 
where there is no evidence that owner is to use the property, as was alleged in this matter.545 
Hence, if alternative accommodation is not provided, the occupiers should not be evicted. In 
support of this argument, reliance was placed on an interpretation of Modderklip by 
Wilson.546 However, Wilson applies the reasoning of the Supreme Court of Appeal decision, 
which was not confirmed in the Constitutional Court decision.547 Moreover, the allegation that 
the landowner did not intend to use the land is problematic, since the land is dolomitic and 
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the business of PPC is to mine dolomite.548 This second argument also relates to the third 
lesson taught by the previous Constitutional Court decisions: that a lack of alternative 
accommodation can result in the infringement of other human rights. In this instance, the 
right infringed upon is the right of the unlawful occupiers to access to adequate housing. 
Yet another argument in favour of the appeal seems to be that the short-term housing 
programme of the municipality was unreasonable and, therefore, not constitutional. The 
unlawful occupiers argued that the municipality did have a programme to provide 
accommodation to those living in informal settlements in the area. For no apparent reason, 
the informal settlement of Itireleng was not included in the plan.549 While this argument might 
succeed, it would not necessarily translate to an alternative accommodation order. This is 
because, first, not all of the unlawful occupiers were from Itireleng. Second, a more 
reasonable outcome would be that the municipality must amend its housing programme to 
include Itireleng and not place the burden on the court to decide how and when 
accommodation must be provided. 
In respect of the argument relating to its short-term housing duty, as in Blue Moonlight, the 
municipality argued that it did not have a duty to use its own resources in the provision of 
emergency housing.550 It also asserted that it would be unable to provide alternative 
accommodation within the given timeframe.551 The provincial authority, which was joined to 
the matter, disagreed with the argument that the municipality should not and could not 
provide accommodation from its own resources.552 Nevertheless, it requested the court to 
postpone the matter to allow the municipality to comply with the EHP, something it had 
failed to do.553 These arguments seem to relate to the principle of co-operative government.554 
Unfortunately, these arguments were not really addressed by the Constitutional Court. The 
municipality’s argument that it does not have the duty to provide alternative accommodation 
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from its own resources was not considered because the municipality did not appeal against 
the High Court decision.555 The Constitutional Court upheld the appeal by the unlawful 
occupiers, thereby making the eviction conditional upon the provision of alternative 
accommodation by the municipality.556 The municipality was ordered to gather information 
regarding which unlawful occupiers face homelessness once evicted. Alternative 
accommodation was then to be provided to those who face homelessness within five months 
from the order.557 The court’s basis for the order seems to be that it believed the municipality 
would comply with the alternative accommodation order and, therefore, it did not really make 
a difference to the original order to make the eviction conditional upon this compliance.558 
3.3 Precedent value of the cases 
A possible argument in respect of these cases is that they create precedent for placing a duty 
on the state to provide alternative accommodation in eviction matters. Since the orders were 
handed down by the Supreme Court of Appeal and the Constitutional Court, all other courts 
are bound by these decisions.559 However, these cases cannot be used as precedent that the 
state must immediately provide alternative accommodation immediately to all unlawful 
occupiers who face homelessness because of eviction. The reason for this is twofold. First, 
some of these cases involved an appeal based on other grounds and did not involve the actual 
granting of an alternative accommodation order. Second, the cases in which the 
Constitutional Court or the Supreme Court of Appeal granted alternative accommodation 
orders are based on very specific facts. 
With regard to the first reason, the alternative accommodation orders of Hlophe and 
Skurweplaas were made by the High Court. Whether the alternative accommodation orders 
themselves were constitutionally sound was not appealed against to the Supreme Court of 
Appeal or the Constitutional Court. Hence, these cases can only act as precedent in the 
relevant jurisdiction of the High Courts and only to the effect that the facts are similar.  
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In respect of the second reason, the alternative accommodation orders made by the 
Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court of Appeal in Blue Moonlight and Changing 
Tides were based on very specific facts. Both of the evictions were from bad buildings. The 
buildings posed a health and safety risk, which meant that the eviction could not be denied, as 
was the case in PE Municipality. In both of these matters, the group to be evicted was large, 
which posed a risk of social disorder or the subsequent unlawful occupation of other private 
land. Moreover, in both of these decisions, it was argued that the state had the available 
resources to provide alternative accommodation. Hence, it is not a precedent for disregarding 
whether the state has available resources. Instead, it might be used as precedent for placing an 
onus on the state to prove that it lacks the required resources.560 In addition, these orders were 
both made against the City of Johannesburg during a time when the court was displeased with 
the municipality’s fulfilment of its short-term housing duty. This suggests that a court might 
not issue such an order if the municipality acted reasonably and was not blameworthy.561  
In seeming contradiction to this conclusion, the Constitutional Court in Occupiers of Erven 
87 and 88 Berea v De Wet NO and Another,562 interpreted the Blue Moonlight decision to 
place a duty on the state to provide alternative accommodation where an eviction would leave 
unlawful occupiers homeless. Nevertheless, this statement can be considered obiter. The 
matter involved an application for the rescission of an eviction order by consent on the basis 
that the consent was not valid. 563  
Moreover, even if this case is considered binding precedent, a court could still find that an 
eviction order with immediate effect should not be granted because the state does not have 
the available resources to provide alternative accommodation. This does not order that the 
unlawful occupiers be evicted without alternative accommodation. It might find that such an 
order would not be just and equitable. Rather, it means that the solution to the problem might 
not lie in an alternative accommodation order with immediate effect and might deny or delay 
the eviction of the unlawful occupiers. 
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3.4 Possible grounds for alternative accommodation orders 
In an eviction matter, the court is required to consider all relevant circumstances and grant an 
order that is just and equitable.564 One of the most important relevant circumstances to be 
considered seems to be whether the unlawful occupiers have alternative accommodation.565 
As learnt from PE Municipality and Skurweplaas, courts are reluctant to grant an eviction 
order that would leave the unlawful occupiers homeless.566 In matters where unlawful 
occupiers were unable to secure their own alternative accommodation, courts have looked to 
the state to provide alternative accommodation.567  
A court can only order the state to provide alternative accommodation if there is a valid legal 
ground for placing this duty on the state.568 The state has a duty to fulfil the rights within the 
bill of rights.569 It must implement positive measures to ensure the realisation of rights,570 
including the right of access to adequate housing.571 This duty on the state is confirmed by 
section 26(2) of the Constitution.572 The lesson learnt from Grootboom is that this duty 
includes a positive short-term housing obligation toward unlawful occupiers. If in terms of 
this duty, the state has a duty to provide alternative accommodation to the unlawful occupiers 
immediately, a court can require the state to fulfil the duty. Accordingly, they would not face 
homelessness and the eviction is likely to be just and equitable.573  
If for some reason,574 the state does not have an obligation, in terms of its short-term housing 
duty, to provide alternative accommodation to the unlawful occupiers immediately, they 
might be left homeless if evicted. Under such circumstances, an eviction might not be just 
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and equitable toward the unlawful occupiers. However, the denial of an eviction might not be 
just and equitable toward the landowner.575 To prevent an outcome that is not just and 
equitable, a court would want to make an alternative accommodation order against the 
state.576 Since this discussion concerns situations where the state does not have an immediate 
short-term housing duty toward the unlawful occupiers, the court must find another ground 
for granting the order against the state.  
The state has a duty to respect and protect human rights, under section 7(2) of the 
Constitution. In terms of this duty, the state must refrain from interfering with people’s 
rights577 and must prevent the interference of rights by other persons.578 This duty might 
provide a ground, other than the state’s housing duty, for granting an alternative 
accommodation order against the state. This is because a lack of alternative accommodation 
could result in the infringement of other rights. The cases discussed in this chapter suggest 
that a denial of an eviction could amount to the violation of the landowner’s right to 
property,579 equality580 or of access to the court.581 The granting of an eviction could amount to 
the violation of the unlawful occupiers’ right not to be deprived of their existing access to 
housing.582 Placing the duty on the state to prevent or mitigate the violation by compensating 
either of the parties583 could be justified due to the state’s duty to respect and protect human 
rights. As an alternative to compensation, a court could require the state to provide alternative 
accommodation to the unlawful occupiers.584 
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4 Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter was to identify the possible grounds for alternative accommodation 
orders by examining Constitutional Court jurisprudence. The first part of the chapter 
identified three lessons taught by the decisions that preceded alternative accommodation 
orders. These lessons can be used to identify the possible grounds for alternative 
accommodation orders. The lessons are that the state’s housing duty includes a duty to assist 
persons living in emergency housing situations; that the availability of alternative 
accommodation can affect whether an eviction is just and equitable; and that a lack of 
alternative accommodation can result in the infringement of other human rights. The second 
part of the chapter considered two Constitutional Court decisions that resulted in alternative 
accommodation orders: Blue Moonlight and Skurweplaas. Two Supreme Court of Appeal 
cases that heavily relied on the precedent of Blue Moonlight were also discussed. 
Conclusions regarding two matters are reached in light of this chapter. One is that the cases, 
in which alternative accommodation orders were granted, do not create a precedent that 
places a duty on the state to provide alternative accommodation to unlawful occupiers in all 
eviction matters. The other conclusion relates to the possible grounds for alternative 
accommodation orders. The first possible ground for granting an alternative accommodation 
order against the state is based on the state’s duty to fulfil human rights, specifically the 
unlawful occupiers’ right of access to adequate housing. The second possible ground for an 
alternative accommodation order against the state is based on the state’s duty to protect 
human rights, specifically the landowners’ right to property, equality and of access to courts 
and the unlawful occupiers’ right of access to adequate housing. The following two chapters 
consider when an alternative accommodation order based on these grounds would adhere to 
the existing legal framework. 
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CHAPTER THREE: THE STATE’S DUTY TO FULFIL 
HUMAN RIGHTS 
1 Introduction 
The previous chapter analysed the jurisprudence from the Constitutional Court to identify the 
possible grounds for alternative accommodation orders. Two possible grounds for requiring 
the state to provide alternative accommodation were identified. The first relates to the state’s 
duty to fulfil the right of access to adequate housing (the state’s housing duty) and the second 
relates to the state’s duty to respect and protect human rights. In this chapter, the first possible 
ground for alternative accommodation orders is examined to determine when orders based on 
this ground would adhere to the existing legal framework.  
An order requiring the state to provide alternative accommodation to unlawful occupiers 
facing eviction would adhere to the existing legal framework if the framework requires the 
state to comply with the order. In other words, an alternative accommodation order can be 
granted if justification for placing such a duty on the state can be found in the legal 
framework.585 In determining whether an alternative accommodation is authorised, a court 
must apply the legislative provision or policy that gives effect to the relevant constitutional 
right. A court should not apply the constitutional right directly unless the constitutionality of 
the constitutional right is challenged.586 Moreover, in applying the legal framework, a court 
must take cognisance of the fact that others are not before the court and their rights should 
not be prejudiced by its order.587 
The following section sets out the existing legal framework for the first ground for alternative 
accommodation orders. The subsequent sections analyse this framework to determine when 
alternative accommodation orders in terms of these measures would adhere to the legal 
framework. 
                                                 
585
 This relates to the rule of law as formal protection. See Chapter 1:3.1.1. 
586
 This relates to the principle of subsidiarity, see the discussion in Chapter 1:3.1.4. 
587
 As required by the substantive and formal elements of rule of law. See Chapter 1:3.1.1. 
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2 The legal framework 
The first ground for alternative accommodation orders is that the state’s housing duty 
includes a duty to assist persons living in emergency housing situations. This section aims to 
identify the existing legal framework for this ground. This includes the relevant constitutional 
provisions, the legislation and policies giving effect to these provisions, applicable common 
law rules and precedent in which these instruments were interpreted and applied. 
International law also plays a role in the existing legal framework. 
2.1 Constitutional provisions 
Since the first ground for alternative accommodation orders relates to the state’s duty to fulfil 
the right of access to adequate housing, section 26(1) of the Constitution forms part of the 
existing legal framework. This provision affords everyone a right of access to adequate 
housing. The duty to fulfil this right is placed on the state in terms of section 7(2) and 
section 26(2) of the Constitution. Section 7(2) generally requires the state to respect, protect, 
promote and fulfil human rights. Section 26(2) provides that the state must implement 
reasonable legislative and other measures to ensure the realisation of the right of access to 
adequate housing, specifically.588 The state needs only to fulfil its housing duty progressively, 
to the extent allowed by its available resources.589 
It would be unnecessarily vague to engage with the question whether the state’s measures for 
realising the right of access to adequate housing are reasonable. This is a contextual question 
that deserves constant scrutiny. For purposes of this chapter, instead, the reasonableness of 
the measures is assumed. The existing measures forming part of the legal framework are then 
explored to establish when an alternative accommodation order would adhere to these 
measures. The assumption used here should not be taken to mean that those measures are 
necessarily always reasonable. Their reasonableness can be challenged in court. The point 
here, however, is to acknowledge the paradigm in which practical decisions need to be made.  
                                                 
588
 Similarly, s 25(5) of the Constitution requires the state to “take reasonable legislative and other measures, 
within its available resources, to foster conditions which enable citizens to gain access to land on an equitable 
basis. 
589
 S 26(2) of the Constitution. 
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To reiterate, whether the measures of the state are reasonable may differ depending on the 
relevant circumstances of a specific matter. The Constitutional Court’s analysis of the state’s 
housing programme, in Grootboom, and the criteria it provides for a reasonable housing 
programme indicate the measures that would be considered reasonable.590 Should the 
reasonableness of the measures be challenged successfully, the existing measures and legal 
framework could change. Until such time, the existing measures are analysed.591 
2.2 Legislation 
One of the legislative measures, adopted by the state to give effect to sections 26(1) and (2) 
of the Constitution, is the Housing Act 107 of 1997.592 Since it was adopted to give effect to 
these rights, the Housing Act should be applied in matters relating to the state’s fulfilment of 
it housing duty and not section 26 directly. It provides general principles for fulfilling the 
state’s housing duty and defines the specific roles of the national, provincial and local spheres 
of government in fulfilling this duty.593 Section 4 of the Housing Act requires the Minister of 
Human Settlements to adopt a policy called “the National Housing Code” (the Code).594 The 
Code should set out the national housing policy595 and shall bind provincial and local 
government.596 Such a code was adopted in 2000 and revised in 2009.597  
                                                 
590
 Grootboom para 39-44. The court also found that the municipality’s short-term housing programme would be 
reasonable if implemented, see para 99. 
591
 For more on the reasonableness review in terms of s 26(2) of the Constitution, see  Chapter 4. For more on 
the reasonableness review in terms of s 26(2) of the Constitution, see Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights  
Chapter 4. 
592
 National Housing Act 107 of 1997; Department of Human Settlements National Housing Code (2009) 9. See 
also, Community Law Centre & Socio-Economic Rights Institute of South Africa Jumping the Queue (2013) 13. 
593
 Community Law Centre & Socio-Economic Rights Institute of South Africa Jumping the Queue (2013) 13-
14; Socio-Economic Rights Institute of South Africa A Resource Guide to Housing (2011) 14; Mostert 
"Landlessness, Housing and the Rule of Law" in Essays  85. For an explanation of the specific roles of the 
spheres of government in fulfilling its housing duty, see Chapter 5:4.  
594
 S 4(1) of the Housing Act. See also, Socio-Economic Rights Institute of South Africa A Resource Guide to 
Housing (2011) 14,72. 
595
 S 4(2)(a) of the Housing Act. 
596
 S 4(6) of the Housing Act. 
597
 Department of Human Settlements National Housing Code (2009). See also, Socio-Economic Rights 
Institute of South Africa A Resource Guide to Housing (2011) 21. 
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2.3 Policy 
The Code contains the state’s national housing policy and programmes.598 These programmes 
are aimed at addressing different types and levels of need.599 The different types of housing 
assistance provided include serviced sites without dwellings, serviced sites with dwellings 
and rental housing. Contribution by the beneficiaries is required depending on their ability.600 
A specialised Upgrading of Informal Settlements Programme aims to provide serviced sites 
for persons living in informal settlements.601  
Another specialised programme contained in the Code, the Emergency Housing 
Programme (EHP),602 aims to address emergency housing situations, such as situations where 
persons are facing homelessness because of an eviction.603 The EHP was adopted in 
compliance with Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom604 (hereinafter 
“Grootboom”).605 In this matter, the state’s constitutional housing duty was interpreted to 
include a duty to adopt a programme, which focused on short-term housing delivery to those 
most in need.606 It stipulated that a reasonable housing programme must be balanced and 
flexible. A reasonable programme, which is balanced and flexible, purportedly includes 
catering for long, medium and short-term housing needs.607 Short-term housing programmes 
must cater for those who have “no roof over their heads”, are “living in intolerable 
conditions” or are at risk of losing their homes.608  
                                                 
598
 Socio-Economic Rights Institute of South Africa A Resource Guide to Housing (2011) 72. 
599
 As is evident from the several different programmes contained in the Code. See, Department of Human 
Settlements National Housing Code (2009) 13-50. 
600
 See, Department of Human Settlements National Housing Code (2009) 13-50. 
601
 Upgrading of Informal Settlements Programme. See, Department of Human Settlements National Housing 
Code (2009) 16-17. See further, Pienaar Land Reform  678-681. 
602
 See, Department of Human Settlements National Housing Code (2009) 21-22. For the full programme, see 
Department of Human Settlements EHP (2009). 
603
 Department of Human Settlements EHP (2009) Part A 2.3.1.(e).  
604
 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC). 
605
 Socio-Economic Rights Institute of South Africa A Resource Guide to Housing (2011) 44. 
606
 See the discussion on Grootboom in Chapter 2:2.1. 
607
 See the discussion on Grootboom in Chapter 2:2.1. See also, Modderklip para 49; Kruuse ‘The art of the 
possible’ SALJ 623-4; Chenwi (2008) Harv L Rev 119-120. 
608
 Grootboom para 52. 
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As a result, the state was ordered to adopt and implement a short-term housing programme as 
part of its national housing policy.609 This programme was to be implemented by the 
provincial and local government, who in turn, were required to adopt and implement their 
own short-term housing programmes.610 Since the EHP sets out the measures adopted by the 
state to address its housing duty toward persons facing eviction,611 it is relevant to consider 
this programme when determining when alternative accommodation orders adhere to the 
existing legal framework.612  
The EHP, contained in the Housing Code, is considered “binding” or “executive” policy 
since it is given binding effect by the Housing Act.613 While its inclusion in the legal 
framework to be adhered to by the court is controversial, it can be justified. First, in 
Nokotyana v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality614 the Constitutional Court acknowledged 
that the principle of subsidiarity applies to the EHP.615 Second, provincial and municipal 
governments are bound by the EHP in terms of the Housing Act.616 An alternative 
accommodation order against these spheres of government would not be in line with the rule 
of law if it does not adhere to the EHP.617 Third, adherence to the EHP creates legal certainty 
and equality before the law.618 If a court is of the opinion that the EHP is unconstitutional, it 
should order that it be brought in line with the Constitution.619 The court should not make 
isolated orders that conflict with the EHP.620 If it does, the result would be that the law is 
applied inconsistently and an unconstitutional application of the law is allowed.621 Fourth, the 
                                                 
609
 See the discussion on Grootboom in Chapter 2:2.1. 
610
 Grootboom para 68, 99. See also, Currie & De Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook  574-580. 
611
 Socio-Economic Rights Institute of South Africa A Resource Guide to Housing (2011) 44. 
612
 Ebrahim argues that the state’s housing waiting list also forms part of the housing programme. See, Ebrahim 
(2015) SAPR/SAPL 119. 
613
 S 4 of the National Housing Act. See the discussion on binding policy in Chapter 1:3.1.4. 
614
 2010 (4) BCLR 312 (CC). 
615
 Nokotyana v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality para 47-49. 
616
 S 4 of the National Housing Act. 
617
 This relates to the formal protection of the rule of law, see Chapter 1:3.1.1. 
618
 Certainty and equality before the law are norms of the rule of law, see Chapter 1:3.1.1. For a discussion on 
how adherence to binding policy creates certainty, see Chapter 1:3.2.1. 
619
 That short-term housing policies should be tested against the Constitution is evident from the decision in 
Blue Moonlight. See the discussion of this case in Chapter 2:3.1.1. 
620
 As argued by the municipality in Fischer v Unlawful Occupiers, Erf 150, Philippi (Municipality's Head of 
Argument) (9443/14)  17-19. 
621
 This would create a parallel system of laws. See Chapter 1:3.1.4. 
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EHP is a measure taken by the state in terms of section 26(2) of the Constitution.622 
Grootboom found that such measures should be respected unless they are found to be 
unreasonable.623 Hence, a court should apply these measures, unless it is of the opinion that 
they are unreasonable. The reasonableness of the EHP has not been questioned.624 If a court 
simply creates and applies its own notion of the state’s duty in emergency housing situations, 
this could amount to an interference with the state’s functions and a violation of the 
separation of powers doctrine.625  
Several cases have interpreted section 26(2) of the Constitution, as well as the Housing Act 
and the EHP. These cases also form part of the existing legal framework in respect of the first 
ground for alternative accommodation orders. Some cases have higher precedent value 
because they have wider jurisdiction.626 
2.4 The role of international law instruments 
International law does not bind courts as such, but courts must be guided by international law 
when interpreting the law. Section 39(1) of the Constitution requires courts to consider 
foreign law when interpreting human rights. Further, section 233 of the Constitution provides 
that the court’s interpretation of legislation must preferably be in line with international law. 
Hence, international law plays an important role in the interpretation of the constitutional and 
legislative provisions above. 
Several international law treatises and conventions are relevant to the state’s duty to fulfil the 
right of access to adequate housing and the interpretation of this right, as well as the 
legislation and policies that give effect to the right.627 The international law instrument most 
                                                 
622
 S 26(2) of the Constitution requires that the state take measures that are reasonable to ensure the realisation 
of the right of access to adequate housing. 
623
 See the discussion of Grootboom in Chapter 2:2.1. 
624
 The reasonableness or constitutionality of the EHP has not been tested. See, Liebenberg Socio-Economic 
Rights  406. 
625
 On the separation of powers doctrine, see Chapter 1:3.1.2 and Chapter 5:3. 
626
 See Chapter 5:2.3. 
627
 These include the , which requires states (in art 5) to guarantee the enjoyment of the right to housing; ; , 
which (in art 14) requires states to give rural women the right to adequate living conditions; , which (in art 27) 
requires states to assist parents in implementing the right of the child to an adequate standard of living; , which 
includes the right to property, to the best possible mental and physical health and the protection of the family; , 
which requires states to assist parents in securing the requisite living conditions for children; , which requires 
states to grant women access to adequate housing. See, 671-672. These include the International Convention on 
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relevant to the right of access to adequate housing is the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (the ICESCR). It was signed in 1994 but only ratified 
in 2015.628  
Article 11 of the ICESCR requires states to ensure the realisation of everyone’s right to 
adequate living conditions and the continuous improvement thereof, including the right to 
adequate housing. Article 2.1 requires that states take steps to achieve the full realisation of 
the rights entrenched in the ICESCR, progressively, to the maximum of their available 
resources. This provision is similar to the limitations found in section 26(2) of the 
Constitution. A difference between article 11 of the ICESCR and section 26(1) of the 
Constitution is that article 11 entrenches a right to adequate housing, whereas section 26(1) 
entrenches a right of access to adequate housing. The significance of this difference is 
discussed below.629 Another difference is that the ICESCR requires that states realise rights to 
the maximum of their available resources. This implies that the phrase “within its available 
resources” does not only signify a maximum benchmark but also a minimum. 
Adequate housing, as required in terms of the ICESCR right to adequate housing, requires 
legal tenure security; available services, infrastructure, facilities and materials; affordability; 
habitability; accessibility; proximity to schools, jobs and other essential amenities; and 
cultural adequacy.630 This interpretation can provide guidance on the interpretation of section 
26(1) of the Constitution.631  
                                                                                                                                                        
the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination of 1965, which requires states (in art 5) to guarantee the 
enjoyment of the right to housing; ICESCR; Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination 
against Women of 1979, which (in art 14) requires states to give rural women the right to adequate living 
conditions; Convention on the Rights of the Child of 1989, which (in art 27) requires states to assist parents in 
implementing the right of the child to an adequate standard of living; African Charter on Human and Peoples' 
Rights of 1981, which includes the right to property, to the best possible mental and physical health and the 
protection of the family; African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child of 1990, which requires states 
to assist parents in securing the requisite living conditions for children; Protocol to the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa of 2000, which requires states to grant women 
access to adequate housing. See, Pienaar Land Reform  671-672. 
628
 ESCR-Net The Government of South Africa Ratifies the ICESCR (2015) https://www.escr-
net.org/news/2015/government-south-africa-ratifies-icescr 14-03-2016. ESCR-Net The Government of South 
Africa Ratifies the ICESCR (2015). 
629
 See 6.1 below for an explanation of this difference between these two rights as interpreted by the 
Constitutional Court. This is also discussed in Pienaar Land Reform 674-675. 
630
 United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights The Right to Adequate Housing (Art 
11.1 of the Covenant, UN Doc E/1992/23) General Comment No 4 (1991) para 8(a)-(f). For a discussion of these 
characteristics, see G Muller "Proposing a way to develop the substantive content of the right of access to 
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The remainder of this chapter is broken down into four parts and discusses the state’s duties 
in terms of section 26(2) of the Constitution, as interpreted by the Housing Act, the EHP and 
case law. The first part considers what is meant by the phrase that the state must take 
measures to fulfil the right. The second and third parts consider the measures to be taken. 
These parts focus on which persons are to benefit from the measures and the standards of the 
benefits to be received. The fourth part analyses the internal limitations, in section 26(2), that 
the realisation of the right need only be ensured progressively and within the state’s available 
resources. 
3 Duty on the state 
Section 26(2) of the Constitution places the duty on the state to fulfil the right of access to 
adequate housing.632 This seems redundant since section 7(2) of the Constitution already 
requires the state to fulfil the rights contained in the Bill of Rights.633 However, the express 
statement that the housing duty falls on the state suggests that private entities do not have an 
equivalent constitutional duty.634  
While section 26(2) of the Constitution does not specify which branch or sphere of 
government has the duty to provide housing,635 the EHP is more specific regarding the duty to 
provide emergency housing.636 In terms of the EHP, municipalities must identify emergency 
housing situations within its jurisdiction. Once an emergency housing situation is identified, 
the municipality must draft a plan to address the situation.637 If it lacks the required resources, 
it must apply to the provincial authority for funding.638 The provincial authority must assist 
the municipality as far as possible.639 The provincial authority must set aside money in its 
                                                                                                                                                        
adequate housing: an alternative to the reasonableness review model" (2015) 30 Southern African Public Law 
71 82-93. 
631
 Muller (2015) SAPR/SAPL 82. 
632
 S 26(1) of the Constitution. 
633
 This duty has a positive element. See, Glenister v President of the Republic of South Africa para 105; Davis 
(2012) PER/PELJ 3. 
634
 However, the state can delegate the duty to private entities. See the discussion in Chapter 4:3.1. 
635
 Schedule 4 does specify that housing falls within the powers of the national and provincial governments, see 
Chapter 5:4. 
636
 Department of Human Settlements EHP (2009)Part A 2.6. 
637
 Department of Human Settlements EHP (2009) Part A 2.6.1. 
638
 Department of Human Settlements EHP (2009) Part A 2.6.1. 
639
 Department of Human Settlements EHP (2009) Part A 2.6.2. 
99 
 
yearly budget for emergency housing situations. It can also reprioritise money under certain 
circumstances.640 In addition, the provincial authority can apply for assistance from the 
national authority.641 
Whether the EHP requires the municipality to use its own resources has been a topic of 
contention in courts.642 Municipalities have argued that they are not required to use their own 
resources to provide emergency housing, but need only apply to the provincial authority for 
the requisite funding.643 In contrast, the “suggestions on how to undertake emergency housing 
projects” in the EHP stipulate that the municipality should first assess whether it would be 
able to provide emergency assistance from its own resources, before applying for funding 
from the provincial authority.644 The court has interpreted this to mean that the municipality 
has a duty to provide alternative accommodation from its own resources in emergency 
housing situations.645 Whether it is within the court’s power to question the municipality’s 
report of a lack of required resources, as it did in City of Johannesburg Metropolitan 
Municipality v Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd646 (hereinafter Blue Moonlight),647 is 
considered below.648 Nonetheless, where it is found that the municipality does not have the 
available resources, the provincial government should be joined to the matter rather than 
postponing the matter until the municipality has the available resources.649  
To determine whether a municipality has the resources to assist everyone requiring relief in 
terms of the EHP, one must determine who can benefit from this programme. Only then can 
the magnitude of the state’s responsibility and the cost of complying with its responsibility be 
gauged. The following section examines the EHP to determine who can benefit from this 
programme.  
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 Department of Human Settlements EHP (2009) Part A 2.6.2. 
641
 Department of Human Settlements EHP (2009) Part B 3.4.1. 
642
 This was the case in Blue Moonlight and Skurweplaas. 
643
 See, for example, Blue Moonlight para 65; Skurweplaas (2nd Resp HoA) para 14. 
644
 Department of Human Settlements EHP (2009) Part B 3.1. See Blue Moonlight para 66. 
645
 See, Blue Moonlight para 66. See also, Blue Moonlight and Skurweplaas in Chapter 2:3.1.1 and 3.2 
respectively. That the duty placed primarily on the municipalities is also evident from Grootboom; PE 
Municipality; Olivia Road; Hlophe; Joe Slovo. Van Wyk confirms this interpretation by the court in Van Wyk 
(2011) PER/PELJ 51; Wilson (2011) Urban Forum 271. 
646
 2012 (2) SA 104 (CC).  
647
 See discussion of Blue Moonlight in Chapter 2:3.1.1. 
648
 Chapter 3:6.3. 
649
 See further discussion in Chapter 3: 6.3, Chapter 5:4.5 and Chapter 7:3.1.2 
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4 Beneficiaries of the short-term programme 
The EHP caters for a range of housing emergencies.650 It generally describes the situations it 
caters for as “emergency situations of exceptional housing need”.651 A list of such situations 
is also provided.652 The list includes persons who have lost their homes due to a natural or 
industrial disaster or live in conditions that are prone to disasters, like fire or flood.653 Persons 
living in the way of established or proposed engineering services, such as services for water, 
power or roads, including property reserved for this purpose, are included.654 Further included 
are those persons who are evicted or whose homes are demolished, as well as those persons 
who face such fates.655 Persons who are displaced due to civil conflict are also included.656 
Lastly, two broad catchall categories of persons are mentioned: those living in conditions that 
threaten their lives, health or safety and those who have an exceptional housing need “that 
can reasonably be addressed only by resettlement or other appropriate assistance, in terms of 
this Programme”.657  
This list expressly includes persons facing eviction and, hence, confirms the duty of the state 
to provide alternative accommodation to persons who would be homeless once evicted. 
However, all persons who live in one of the mentioned emergency housing situations are not 
automatically included in the state’s short-term housing programme, but must first meet 
certain qualifications.658 The most important qualification is that the housing emergency 
should not have been caused by the person requiring assistance, but should exist due to 
circumstances outside of his control.659 For a person to qualify for assistance he must also 
lack the resources to address the housing emergency himself.660 The qualifications set by the 
EHP are less strict than those set in terms of the state’s longer-term housing programmes.661 
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 Department of Human Settlements EHP (2009) Part A 2.3.1. 
651
 Department of Human Settlements EHP (2009) Part A 2.3.1. 
652
 Department of Human Settlements EHP (2009) Part A 2.3.1. 
653
 Also a declared state of disaster, see Department of Human Settlements EHP (2009) Part A 2.3.1(a)-(c). 
654
 Department of Human Settlements EHP (2009) Part A 2.3.1(d). 
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 Department of Human Settlements EHP (2009) Part A 2.3.1(e)-(f). 
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 Department of Human Settlements EHP (2009) Part A 2.3.1(g). 
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 Department of Human Settlements EHP (2009) Part A 2.3.1(h)-(i). 
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 Department of Human Settlements EHP (2009) Part A 2.3.1, 2.4. 
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 Department of Human Settlements EHP (2009) Part A 2.3.1. 
660
 Department of Human Settlements EHP (2009) Part A 2.4. 
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 Department of Human Settlements EHP (2009) Part A 2.4. 
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Unlike the state’s longer-term programmes, the EHP includes persons who have a higher 
monthly income, have no dependents and have previously owned a home or received housing 
assistance. Illegal immigrants are also included, but only those who meet the conditions set 
by the Department of Home Affairs on an ad hoc basis.662 
Most of the cases discussed in the previous chapter involve persons who face eviction.663 
Hence, they would be considered to be living in emergency housing situations under the 
EHP.664 However, not all of the additional qualifications had been considered in the cases 
where alternative accommodation orders were granted. In none of the cases did the court 
consider the fact the EHP does not cater for all illegal immigrants, but only those who 
comply with the conditions set by the Department of Home Affairs.665  
In City of Johannesburg v Changing Tides 74 (Pty) Ltd666 (hereinafter “Changing Tides”), the 
court justified its disregard of the additional qualification because continued occupation 
threatened the health and safety of the unlawful occupiers. It found that the municipality 
could apply these qualifications once everyone had been taken to safety.667 However, a similar 
concession was not made in City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Hlophe668 
(hereinafter “Hlophe”), where the court ordered that the municipality provides all of the 
occupiers with alternative accommodation that afforded them safety against further eviction. 
This might be due to the municipality’s failure to take up the opportunity to apply the 
qualifications within the time it was afforded to do so.669 
In President of the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd670 (hereinafter 
“Modderklip”), a third of the 40 000 people were deemed to be illegal immigrants.671 
Accordingly, if an alternative accommodation order was to be issued in terms of section 
26(2) of the Constitution, the Department of Home Affairs would have had the authority to 
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 Department of Human Settlements EHP (2009) Part A 2.4. 
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 PE Municipality, Modderklip, Olivia Road, Blue Moonlight, Changing Tides, Hlophe and Skurweplaas. 
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 Department of Human Settlements EHP (2009) Part A 2.3.1(e)-(f). 
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 Department of Human Settlements EHP (2009) Part A 2.4. 
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 2012 (6) SA 294 (SCA). 
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 See the discussion of Changing Tides in Chapter 2:3.1.2.1. 
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 [2015] 2 All SA 251 (SCA). 
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 See the discussion of Hlophe in Chapter 2:3.1.2.2. 
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 2005 (5) SA 3 (CC). 
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 See the discussion of Modderklip in Chapter 2:2.3. 
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set conditions for the inclusion of the illegal immigrants in the order.672 Moreover, due to the 
size of the group, it would have been difficult to prove that all of them lacked the resources to 
get alternative accommodation. These complications might have contributed to the fact that 
the court did not found the duty to prevent the unlawful occupiers from becoming homeless 
on the state’s housing duty, but rather on the landowner’s right of access to the court.673 
It is arguable that both case law and the EHP can be criticised for casting the net too wide in 
including people facing eviction in the definition of living in emergency housing situations.674 
Unlawful occupiers do not seem to fit within that category of persons who require housing 
due to an emergency as comfortably as persons who have lost their homes due to a flood or a 
fire. Yet, a closer examination illustrates the link. Just as those who lost their homes due to 
natural disasters have nowhere to live, evictees who face homelessness have nowhere to live. 
To differentiate between them might amount to unfair discrimination.  
What needs to be established is just how far this net is cast and to what extent parameters can 
be identified. This is where the additional qualifications, set by the EHP, are useful. The EHP 
only caters for persons who were not responsible for their housing emergency.675 In respect of 
flood or fire victims, the emergency is usually not deliberately caused by the people who lose 
their homes.676 In the same way, people might live on the street because of circumstances 
beyond their control. However, some situations can be identified where persons caused their 
own emergency housing situation. Two such situations are discussed here. The first situation 
establishes itself when a lawful occupier does something intentionally, knowing that his 
actions will cause his lawful occupation to be terminated. The second situation establishes 
itself when a person unlawfully occupies land with the sole purpose of triggering the state’s 
short-term housing duty.  
The court’s approach to the first scenario is clear from City of Cape Town v Daniels.677 In this 
case, a woman was evicted by the City of Cape Town (the municipality) from council 
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 Since the EHP would have applied, see Department of Human Settlements EHP (2009) Part A 2.4. 
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 S 34 of the Constitution. See the discussion of Modderklip in Chapter 2:2.3. 
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 See, Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 404-405. 
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 Department of Human Settlements EHP (2009) Part A 2.3.1. 
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 Cf. Schubart Park. See, Currie & De Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook  183 on how “victim responsibility” 
is generally taken into account when deciding on a remedy for a violation of a right. 
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 City of Cape Town v Daniels (5090/2011) [2011] ZAWCHC 340 (hereinafter (“Daniels”). 
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housing.678 One of the reasons for her eviction was that her house was being used for drug 
dealing.679 She was participating in and/or allowing the drug dealing, knowing that her actions 
might cause her lawful occupation to be terminated.680 The municipality obtained an order for 
her eviction, without the court considering whether the state can provide her with alternative 
accommodation.681 This suggests that the court did not consider her to fall under the state’s 
EHP. 
The court took a similar approach in SOHCO Property Investments (Company Incorporated 
under Section 21) v Ramdass.682 The occupiers of a block of flats deliberately withheld their 
rental payments.683 This was done as part of a rent boycott and not because any of them could 
not afford the rental.684 The court ordered the eviction of the unlawful occupiers and stated: 
“such conduct amounts to the kind of self-help that is inimical to our legal order.”685 It did not 
consider whether the occupiers would be able to afford alternative accommodation elsewhere, 
despite some of the occupiers arguing that they would not be able to afford such.686 
The second scenario, where persons can be considered responsible for their emergency 
housing situation, occurs when they unlawfully occupy land to force the state to provide them 
with housing. If they succeed in their endeavour, this would amount to so-called “queue 
jumping” since they would be prioritised above others in benefitting from the state’s housing 
programme. In Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers687 (hereinafter “PE 
Municipality”), the state argued that the provision of alternative accommodation would 
amount to such queue jumping. The court rejected this on the basis that there was no 
intention on the part of the unlawful occupiers to gain priority.688 This suggests that an 
intention to jump the queue might bar a person from benefiting under the EHP.  
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What is not apparent from this finding is why the court looks at the intention of the unlawful 
occupiers in deciding whether an alternative accommodation order would amount to queue 
jumping. It might create more certainty and be more rational if the finding was based on the 
actual effect of such an order, that is, whether the effect of the alternative accommodation 
order would be to prioritise the unlawful occupiers above others living in emergency housing 
situations.689 A court should not prioritise unlawful occupiers simply because they are before 
the court.690 
While the reasoning of the court, in PE Municipality, may be faulted, it does indicate that the 
court values the reason for the unlawful occupation. This is in line with section 6(3) of the 
Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998 (PIE), 
which requires the court to consider the reason for the occupation as a relevant circumstance 
in deciding whether an eviction would be just and equitable. Where the intention of the 
unlawful occupiers is to gain priority, courts are less likely to support their receiving 
alternative accommodation from the state.691  
In City of Cape Town v Persons who are presently unlawfully occupying erf 1800, 
Capricorn: Vrygrond Development692 (hereinafter “Vrygrond Development”), the High Court 
granted an eviction order against persons who had deliberately invaded land earmarked for 
housing.693 It did not consider whether the municipality could or should provide them with 
alternative accommodation. Hence, it did not consider the unlawful occupiers to be living in 
emergency housing situations and in line to be accommodated under the municipality’s short-
term housing programme. It justified this approach by stating:694 
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“In my view, the most compelling factor weighing in applicant’s favour is simply that it is, in my 
view, imperative that land invasions are denounced and rejected as an appropriate way to enforce 
one’s constitutional right to access to adequate housing.” 
This relates to the second type of situation that can be identified where persons caused their 
own emergency housing situation – when a person unlawfully occupies land with the sole 
purpose of triggering the state’s short-term housing duty.  
It might not be easy to determine whether an unlawful occupier was motivated by greed or 
need.695 In both Vrygrond Development and Modderklip, the unlawful occupiers were seen as 
motivated by greed.696 Yet, the fact that some of them could not afford accommodation 
elsewhere shows that they were also in need.697 In both Grootboom and Occupiers of 
Skurweplaas 353 JR v PPC Aggregate Quarries (Pty) Ltd698 (hereinafter “Skurweplaas”), 
land was unlawfully occupied out of frustration for waiting in the queue for a very long time. 
Nevertheless, in these cases, the occupiers were seen as motivated by need.699 It is unclear 
when a court would consider a group of occupiers as either needy or greedy. It is a fact that 
an unlawful occupier who cannot afford alternative accommodation is needy.700 If he 
unlawfully occupied land out of frustration with the slow progression in housing provision, 
he might also be considered greedy.701 He created the emergency housing situation. However, 
he was possibly already living in an emergency housing situation before the unlawful 
occupation.702 While unlawful occupation due to frustration with the state is not ideal, it is 
often the only way these occupiers can force the municipality to take notice of them.703 
It is submitted that an unlawful occupier, however greedy, must be considered needy if he 
cannot secure alternative accommodation. If the matter is dealt with speedily, a person who 
acted out of greed might be able to return to his previous home or secure accommodation 
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elsewhere. As is explained below, this does not necessarily mean that the municipality must 
provide them with alternative accommodation immediately.704  
In terms of the Constitutional Court’s statement in Occupiers of Erven 87 and 88 Berea, the 
EHP’s exclusion of blameworthy persons might not be in line with the Constitution. In this 
decision, the court interpreted Blue Moonlight to place a duty on municipalities to provide 
alternative accommodation whenever people are left homeless due to an eviction. This 
statement does not allow exclusion based on the blameworthiness of the unlawful occupiers. 
As explained, this statement can be considered obiter and non-binding. Moreover, the 
decision, in Blue Moonlight, was based on very specific facts where the unlawful occupiers 
were not considered blameworthy. An argument can be made that the “rule” taken from Blue 
Moonlight is not absolute and there can be exceptions, such as that the unlawful occupiers 
were blameworthy. Nevertheless, this decision does indicate that the Constitutional Court 
might find the EHP to be unconstitutional if challenged. Moreover, it suggests that extent of 
the blameworthiness must be compelling enough to support an eviction without alternative 
accommodation. 
Another class of persons that might be excluded as beneficiaries under a municipality’s 
general emergency housing programme is people who are catered for under other 
programmes. They might fall under the EHP,705 but since there is a specific programme for 
them, they might not be able to seek assistance in terms of the municipality’s general 
emergency housing programme. Examples of such programmes are the City Regeneration 
Programme in Blue Moonlight706 or the Upgrading of Informal Settlements Programme707 as 
implemented in Skurweplaas.708 It is submitted that, while these programmes can help 
alleviate the plight of those living in emergency housing situations, they cannot be excluded 
from the EHP if they are genuinely living in an emergency housing situation. 
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 Chapter 3:6. 
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Another specialised programme is the City of Cape Town’s programme; which caters 
specifically for street people.709 The purpose of the programme is to address health and 
substance abuse problems and to develop skills for employment to assist the street person to 
secure accommodation.710 During this time, they might be provided with accommodation if 
they meet certain requirements.711 However, it is arguable whether, if such persons would be 
considered living in emergency housing situations, this programme would meet the 
requirements of the EHP. Hence, persons living in emergency housing situations, who qualify 
in terms of this programme, should still not be excluded from the EHP. 
From the above, it can be concluded that the state’s short-term housing programme caters for 
unlawful occupiers facing homelessness because of eviction. However, it excludes certain 
persons, like those who deliberately caused the unlawfulness of their occupation. Arguably, it 
also excludes persons who are catered for under other specialised programmes. However, it is 
submitted that this should not be the case if they live in an emergency housing situation and 
the other programmes do not comply with the EHP.  
5 Standards under short-term emergency programme 
In Grootboom, the court described the relief, to be provided in terms of the short-term 
emergency housing programme, as “temporary relief”.712 Such relief may be “short of 
housing which fulfils the requisite standards of durability, habitability and stability 
encompassed by the definition of housing development in the [Housing] Act.”713 Two 
questions emerge from this. One, what are suitable emergency accommodation standards? 
Two, just what is meant by “temporary” accommodation? This section aims to answer these 
two questions by considering the provisions of the EHP, as well as relevant case law. 
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5.1 Suitable emergency accommodation standards 
In respect of the first question, the court in Grootboom found that for emergency 
accommodation to be suitable it must at least include land, basic services and a dwelling.714 In 
response, the EHP sets certain standards for emergency accommodation.715 It requires lower 
standards than the standards for non-emergency housing.716 Moreover, these standards are 
described as mere “guidelines” and are non-prescriptive.717 The EHP suggests that dwellings 
should have minimum floor coverage of at least 24m
2
,718 as opposed to the 40m
2
 required for 
non-emergency housing.719 In terms of the EHP, water and sanitation facilities are to be 
supplied in the form of maximum one water point for every 25 units and one toilet per five 
units.720 The non-emergency housing standards require that at most each unit must have its 
own water point and toilet.721 Under the EHP, electricity need only be provided under special 
circumstances and then only in the form of high-mast lighting (street lamps).722 Non-
emergency housing standards include street lamps, as well as “a ready board electrical 
installation” per unit.723 Both standards require only gravel roads.724 
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The court has not always required the accommodation to be provided to meet the housing 
standards of the EHP.725 This makes sense since these standards are very difficult to meet 
immediately and are only guidelines.726 Forms of alternative housing that the court has 
accepted as suitable, although strictly they do not follow EHP standards, include vacant land 
without dwellings (where the ground has been prepared, dirt roads established and services 
provided, in other words, site-and-service plots).727 In PE Municipality, the court considered 
the state-owned overcrowded and crime-ridden land without the provision of dwellings for 
alternative accommodation,728 whereas in Changing Tides the court indicated that communal 
dwellings with dormitory-style sleeping quarters might be acceptable alternative 
accommodation.729 The court, in Mtshali v Tayengwa730 found alternative accommodation 
acceptable where the employed unlawful occupiers were required to pay rent at R10 per 
day.731  
In City of Johannesburg v Dladla732 (hereinafter “Dladla”), the beneficiaries of temporary 
accommodation, in terms of an alternative accommodation order, approached the court on the 
basis that the accommodation provided violated their human rights.733 The occupiers were 
those evicted in Blue Moonlight.734 Due to the limited resources of the municipality, it 
collaborated with a non-profit organisation that provides shelter to homeless persons.735 The 
accommodation was dormitory-style and subject to certain rules.736 Some of these rules 
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included gender separation (regardless of marital status)737 and being locked out during the 
day (to force the people to seek employment).738 The residents were not satisfied with these 
rules and challenged their constitutionality on the basis that it infringed their rights to human 
dignity, freedom and security of person and privacy.739 The High Court agreed with these 
allegations and interdicted the shelter from enforcing these rules.740  
The municipality appealed to the Supreme Court of Appeal. In this decision, the court 
considered the practical implications of the High Court order. Due to the finding that the 
gender separation rule was not enforceable against spouses and life partners, yet still 
enforceable against the other occupiers, several beds could not be used.741 Moreover, there 
was only one married couple in the group and one female child, who stayed with her 
mother.742 Even before the application was launched, the married couple had been given leave 
to occupy a four-bed dormitory.743 
The Supreme Court of Appeal acknowledged that all persons have a right to freedom of 
movement and that spouses have a right to live together,744 but that, like all other rights, these 
rights are subject to limitation.745 Admittedly, it is harsh to say that occupiers of emergency 
accommodation must accept accommodation of a lower standard. However, the court 
justified this harshness by the fact that lower standards allow more people to be 
accommodated within the municipality’s limited resources.746 Accordingly, the appeal was 
upheld.747 Since the High Court decision was celebrated by some scholars, the Supreme Court 
of Appeal decision is bound to receive criticism.748 
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While the above indicates that courts are willing to accept the alternative accommodation that 
falls short of the EHP standards, courts have also ordered alternative accommodation that 
exceeds these standards. One such higher standard that is often required by courts in eviction 
matters is that that the emergency accommodation must be close to the schools and jobs of 
the unlawful occupiers.749 Another is the provision of tarred roads and pre-paid electricity.750  
As explained, the EHP only requires the provision of electricity in exceptional circumstances 
and then only in the form of high-mast lighting.751 Neither the EHP nor the National 
Standards requires that roads be tarred.752 Nevertheless, in Residents of Joe Slovo Community, 
Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes,753 the court required the municipality to meet these 
standards in providing alternative accommodation to the unlawful occupiers.754 It is not clear 
from the judgment why such high standards were required. The high standards set by the 
court were unattainable and the municipality consequently applied to have the eviction order 
rescinded.755 There does not seem to be justification for these high standards. For most of the 
occupiers, the emergency housing was to be temporary, until the occupiers could move into 
the homes being built for them in terms of the N2 Gateway Project.756  
It is clear from the above that the court has not been consistent with the requisite standard of 
alternative accommodation. It has required the provision of alternative accommodation that is 
both of a lower end of a higher standard than what is required by the EHP. Where the 
standards required in terms of an alternative accommodation order are too high for the 
municipality to meet, the alternative accommodation order does not adhere to the existing 
legal framework. This is because it disregards the internal limitation within section 26(2) of 
the Constitution regarding the limited resources of the state. Since the provisions regarding 
the standard of housing in the EHP are described as non-prescriptive,757 neither an order 
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requiring a lower nor a higher standard of housing would violate the principle of subsidiarity. 
It is sensible that a court orders the provision of accommodation of a lower standard so that 
more persons can be accommodated within the state’s available resources. Nevertheless, the 
need for such an order indicates that the standards of the guidelines in the EHP are too high 
and might have to be amended.758 
5.2 Definition of temporary accommodation 
Part of the initial relief sought, in Dladla, was an interdict restraining the municipality from 
evicting the occupiers from the temporary accommodation without a court order.759 The 
municipality had reserved the right to evict the occupiers after six months’ occupation 
without first obtaining a court order.760 However, the court did not decide on the matter, since 
the municipality later acknowledged that it could not forcibly evict unlawful occupiers 
without a court order.761 This suggests that a municipality might stipulate a reasonably short 
time for the accommodation, but that it would need to follow PIE if the occupiers are 
unwilling to move. Hence, despite the accommodation being “temporary”, it would be very 
difficult to end the accommodation, unless the occupiers’ circumstances have changed. 
The court, in Dladla, did not comment on the fact that the municipality evidently regarded 
the occupation as temporary and did not find that the municipality would not be allowed to 
apply for their eviction. This differs from the approach in Hlophe where the court’s 
alternative accommodation order included a condition that the accommodation provided must 
be secure against further eviction, pending the provision of permanent housing.762 This latter 
decision seems to be in line with the EHP, which stipulates that the accommodation provided 
should be upgradable, wherever possible, to meet the non-emergency housing standards.763 
This will assist the state to meet its medium and long-term housing goals.764  
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Hence, in terms of both Hlophe and the EHP, “temporary” seems to refer to “until it can be 
upgraded”. In this regard, it is not the duration of the accommodation that is temporary, but 
the lower standard of housing.765 However, the EHP includes certain qualifications for 
including beneficiaries,766 which are not always adhered to by courts granting alternative 
accommodation orders.767 In Hlophe specifically, the court did not allow the municipality to 
exclude the unlawful occupiers who did not qualify in terms of the EHP.768 This might have 
been due to the health and safety threat that continued occupation of the bad building held for 
the unlawful occupiers.769 Should a court make an alternative accommodation order without 
allowing the municipality to apply its qualifications, the order must allow the municipality to 
apply these once temporary alternative accommodation has been provided. Otherwise, the 
order would not be in line with the EHP.770 Accordingly, it should be allowed to evict those 
who do not qualify under the EHP from the emergency housing provided. 
Furthermore, the emergency housing qualifications are lower than that of the permanent 
housing.771 For example, emergency housing might be provided to illegal immigrants under 
certain circumstances, but illegal immigrants do not qualify for permanent housing.772 For this 
reason, a court order would not be in line with the Code if it required that all beneficiaries 
under the alternative accommodation order must have security against eviction. Since 
temporary emergency housing means “until permanent housing is provided”, the idea seems 
to be that the occupation of the emergency housing itself is temporary. Once those who 
qualify for permanent housing are provided with such, or their emergency housing is 
upgraded, those who do not qualify for permanent housing would probably face eviction. 
Hence, the duration of the alternative accommodation provided to those who do not qualify 
for permanent housing would be temporary. Where such persons are unwilling to move from 
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the alternative accommodation, the municipality would most likely have to obtain an eviction 
order in terms of PIE.773 
Based on both the experiences in Grootboom and Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Berea 
Township and 197 Main Street Johannesburg v City of Johannesburg,774 it seems like this 
distinction between those who qualify for permanent housing and those who do not is purely 
academic. Years after both of those decisions, the unlawful occupiers were still awaiting the 
“upgrade” to permanent housing. The state is criticised for providing emergency housing of a 
low standard and then “forgetting” about the unlawful occupiers.775 
From the discussion in this chapter thus far, the limitations on the state’s housing duty keep 
emerging. The next section examines the effect of the internal limitations in section 26(2) of 
the Constitution on the court’s ability to grant an alternative accommodation order. For an 
alternative accommodation order to adhere to the existing legal framework, it must take 
cognisance of these limitations. 
6 Progressive fulfilment of measures within the state’s 
available resources 
The fact that the state is struggling to meet housing needs,776 does not necessarily translate 
into a failure to fulfil its housing duty. The state’s housing duty is limited, in that the right of 
access to adequate housing needs only be realised progressively, within the state’s available 
resources.777  
This section, firstly, explores whether the provision regarding progressive realisation 
absolves the state against demands for immediate realisation of the right of access to adequate 
housing. In other words, it considers whether those whose rights have not been realised can 
approach the court for an order forcing the state to provide them with housing immediately. 
Second, the chapter explores whether progressive realisation means ensuring basic 
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accommodation for all, before implementing longer-term housing programmes. Third, the 
chapter investigates the court’s power to question and interfere with the state’s allocation of 
its available resources in realising the right of access to adequate housing.  
6.1 No immediate realisation of short-term housing needs 
In Grootboom,778 the unlawful occupiers sought immediate fulfilment of their short-term 
housing needs. They approached the court for an order that the state must provide them with 
alternative accommodation immediately. It was argued that, although the state only needs to 
provide housing progressively, it still has to ensure at least minimum core realisation of the 
right of access to adequate housing. In other words, the state had to ensure that everyone has 
basic shelter.779 This interpretation of the state’s duty was based on the interpretation of the 
ICESCR,780 which entrenches a similar duty for the progressive realisation of socio-economic 
rights, such as housing.781  
This interpretation was rejected by the Constitutional Court.782 It indicated that the wording of 
the ICESCR differs from section 26(1) of the Constitution. Section 26(1) involves a right of 
access to adequate housing, whereas the ICESCR entrenches the right to housing. The court 
found that it would be difficult to determine what would constitute a minimum core of access 
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to adequate housing.783 Rather, the reasonableness measure prescribed in section 26(2) must 
be used to analyse the state’s housing programme.784  
This finding against a minimum core right to housing has been subjected to criticism.785 The 
main critique is that section 26(1) gives a standalone right, both in a positive and negative 
sense.786 The duty of the state in terms of section 26(2) is additional to the positive right in 
section 26(1) and applies only to full realisation of the right.787 Hence, in terms of section 7(2) 
of the Constitution, the state has a duty to ensure minimum core fulfilment of the positive 
right in terms of section 26(1).788 However, the argument that section 26(1) provides a 
standalone positive right was rejected by the Constitutional Court, which regards these two 
subsections as forming one right.789  
The court’s reluctance, in Grootboom, even to decide the standards to be met for the 
minimum core fulfilment of sections 26(1) and (2) has also been criticised. It is argued that, 
in the absence of a definition of the right of access to adequate housing, there can be no real 
reasonableness review.790 Only once the court has defined the right, with reference to a 
minimum core, can it evaluate whether measures implemented by the state are reasonable.791 
Bilchitz argues that the court, in Grootboom, confused principle with policy. It should have 
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said what the minimum core standard is (principle), not how it should be met (policy).792 In 
counterargument, Steinberg comments that defining the content of a right is not within the 
functions of the court and that it would amount to a violation of the separation of powers 
doctrine.793  
Although the court, in Grootboom, acknowledged that “there may be cases where it may be 
possible and appropriate to have regard to the content of a minimum core obligation”,794 no 
subsequent court has expressly done so. Accordingly, this suggests there is currently no duty 
on the state to provide basic housing on demand.795 However, the idea that the state has a duty 
to provide at least temporary housing to all evictees facing homelessness, challenges this 
suggestion. If this duty is based on the state’s housing duty, it signifies a minimum core 
obligation on the state and, accordingly, housing on demand.  
As explained, the Constitutional Court and Supreme Court of Appeal decisions, discussed in 
Chapter 2, do not create a precedent for the conclusion that such a duty exists.796 The court in 
Grootboom specifically acknowledges that not all desperate people will be assisted 
immediately.797 Moreover, even if these cases did create a minimum core obligation on the 
state, this obligation is not limited to evictees. Everyone lacking basic shelter should then be 
able to approach the court for an order forcing the state to provide him with 
accommodation.798 Practically speaking, this would create an impossible duty on the state.799 
For this reason, even in terms of the ICESCR, a minimum core duty is still limited by the 
state’s available resources.800 This raises the question of whether the state’s short-term 
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housing obligation places a duty on the state to ensure minimum core fulfilment of the right 
to all, before implementing further realisation of the right of access to adequate housing. The 
answer to this question is sought in the following section. 
6.2 No prioritisation of short-term housing needs 
It has been argued that minimum core realisation does not imply housing on demand, but 
prioritisation of basic needs where after the access to the right should be progressively 
increased.801 Roux argues that all the state’s available resources must be spent on realising 
basic needs.802 A similar approach is taken by Bilchitz.803 
Neither section 26(2) nor the EHP places a duty on the state to ensure minimum core 
fulfilment of its housing duty before spending resources on the further realisation of the right. 
In Grootboom, the court commended the state for its medium- and long-term programmes 
and did not order the state to refrain from implementing these in favour of short-term 
emergency programmes.804 Moreover, the occupiers did not demand that the municipality 
ensures basic shelter before addressing other housing needs. They simply requested that the 
municipality also implements a programme to ensure basic shelter. This programme should 
prioritise persons in need and not just prioritise persons based on the duration that they have 
been on the municipality’s housing list.805 A dedicated budget should be allocated to the 
programme. There should be a focus on the rapid release of land, instead of adhering to the 
high housing standards prescribed for permanent housing.806 This is confirmed by the fact that 
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the court found the state’s short-term housing programme must run parallel with the medium 
and long-term housing programmes of the municipality and not in their stead.807 
This interpretation is consistent with the EHP. In terms of the EHP, the provincial authority 
should set aside money in its yearly budget for emergency housing situations.808 There should 
be a separate budget for emergency housing.  
In practice, it is evident that to neglect further realisation of socio-economic rights, in favour 
of minimum core realisation, would create disorder. Protests on insufficient service delivery 
allegedly occur on a daily basis,809 with over 150 major service delivery protests occurring 
yearly.810 These protests can become violent,811 resulting in the destruction of property,812 
injury and even death.813 Often, it is not that the protestors have no access to local services, 
but that they are unsatisfied with the standard of the existing access.814 Access to services is 
part of the right of access to adequate housing.815 Ensuring only minimum realisation of the 
right of access to housing might, therefore, be met with resistance. 
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Accordingly, short-term housing programmes should not be prioritised above longer-term 
housing programmes.816 There should be a separate budget for short-term housing 
programmes and the state should implement these programmes in so far as its available 
resources allow. In the context of alternative accommodation orders, this means that a court 
should be cautious of requiring the state to reprioritise funds budgeted for longer-term 
housing programmes. Just how cautious the court should be is discussed in the following 
section. 
6.3 No challenge to the fact of lacking resources  
This section considers to what extent a court can challenge a municipality’s report that it has 
insufficient funds to assist unlawful occupiers who are facing eviction. From the outset, a 
distinction must be made between three possible situations. One situation involves a 
municipality that has adopted and implemented a reasonable short-term housing programme 
and has budgeted accordingly, yet it still lacks sufficient resources to provide alternative 
accommodation. A second possible situation involves a municipality that has adopted a 
reasonable short-term housing programme and has budgeted accordingly but has not 
implemented it reasonably. A third possible situation involves a municipality that has failed 
to adopt a reasonable short-term housing programme at local level and to budget accordingly.  
With regard to the first scenario, in terms of the EHP, municipalities must identify any 
emergency housing situation within their jurisdictions and prepare a plan to address the 
situation.817 It must budget separately for such eventualities and if its resources are 
insufficient, it must apply to the provincial authority for funding.818 The provincial authority 
must set aside money in its yearly budget for emergency housing situations.819 The provincial 
authority can also apply for assistance from the national authority.820 Hence, if the 
municipality implemented a reasonable short-term housing programme, budgeted accordingly 
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and still reports it lacks the available resources821 it should not be required to provide 
alternative accommodation in terms of the EHP immediately.822 Nevertheless, the court could 
require the municipality to apply to the provincial government for funding if it had failed to 
do so.  
In Brookway Property 30 (Pty) Ltd v People Who Intend Invading Portion 150 of the Farm 
Zandfontein 317 J.R., Portion 124823 (hereinafter “Brookway”), the High Court accepted the 
municipality’s report that it lacked the resources to accommodate the unlawful occupiers 
immediately.824 It found, however, that this does not translate into a lack of available 
resources overall. The EHP provides a procedure for applying to the provincial authority if 
the municipality cannot afford emergency housing.825 In failing to implement this procedure, 
the municipality had not exhausted all of its options and had not implemented the national 
short-term housing programme properly.826 Accordingly, the court ordered the municipality to 
apply to the provincial authority for assistance.827 
If both the provincial and national governments have adopted and implemented a reasonable 
short-term housing programme and budget and report that they do not have the resources to 
provide alternative accommodation a court should accept such a report. In such situations, the 
state would not have an immediate short-term housing duty toward the unlawful occupiers 
and an alternative accommodation order with effect within the specific budget cycle cannot 
be made. 
The second possible situation is where a municipality has adopted a reasonable short-term 
housing programme and has budgeted accordingly but has not implemented it reasonably. 
This means that funding has been set aside for emergency housing. In this situation, a court 
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can either order the state to implement its programme, as it should have in the first place, or it 
can issue an alternative accommodation order. For an alternative accommodation order to 
adhere to existing legal framework, a court would have to consider whether the municipality 
could assist the unlawful occupiers within the available resources. If the municipality’s 
funding within its short-term housing budget is insufficient, a court should also consider the 
fact that the provincial authority could also be joined to report on its available funds. While 
an alternative accommodation order in the second scenario might adhere to existing legal 
framework, it might not be the most appropriate solution. This is because it might not be in 
line with the court’s duty to respect the functions of government and to administer justice. 
This is addressed in the following two chapters. 
A third possible situation involves a municipality that has failed to adopt a reasonable short-
term housing programme at local level and to budget accordingly. The lack of budget can be 
approached in different ways. First, the court can accept that the municipality lacks the 
available resources and refrain from making an alternative accommodation order that has 
immediate effect. Second, the court can accept that the municipality lacks the available 
resources, but then require it to apply to the provincial authority, in terms of the EHP, for 
funding. Third, the court can scrutinise the municipality’s general budget to determine 
whether resources allocated elsewhere or any budget surplus could be used to fund the 
provision of alternative accommodation.828 
In Blue Moonlight, the court opted to scrutinise the municipality’s budget for resources to 
spend on providing alternative accommodation to the unlawful occupiers. The court did not 
accept the municipality’s report that it could not afford alternative accommodation.829 It found 
that the municipality could not claim it lacked the available resources to house the unlawful 
occupiers since the lack was a result of an unreasonable short-term housing programme.830 
The municipality had not budgeted to use its own resources to provide the unlawful occupiers 
with alternative accommodation.831 While it had applied to the provincial authority in terms of 
the EHP, the application was denied. Despite this, the court found that there is no need to join 
the provincial government if the municipality could be found to have the available resources 
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elsewhere within its budget. Accordingly, the court probed the entire budget of the 
municipality and found that an overall surplus was predicted for that year.832 The municipality 
denied the existence of a surplus, arguing that the projection was incorrect and there was 
actually a budget deficit.833 Nonetheless, the municipality was ordered to finance alternative 
accommodation for the unlawful occupiers by using the alleged surplus.834 Since the 
reallocation of funding is allowed in terms of the EHP, such an order is not necessarily in 
conflict with the court’s duty to adhere to existing legal framework. However, the order 
might not respect the functions of government or ensure justice. This is addressed in the 
following two chapters.  
Another issue, which a court must take cognisance of, is that available finances do not 
necessarily translate into resources that are available immediately. It takes time to convert 
those finances into adequate emergency housing. Land might have to be acquired or 
prepared,835 dwellings built or existing buildings renovated.836 Accordingly, where the court 
finds that the state has the available finances it must still give the municipality sufficient time 
to convert the funding into accommodation. Moreover, if the court finds that the state lacks 
the resources to provide alternative accommodation immediately, the state does not have an 
immediate short-term housing duty toward the unlawful occupiers, regardless of which 
budget the court scrutinises or what the reason for the lack is. Hence, the court cannot make 
an alternative accommodation order with immediate effect. A court must consider whether an 
order is implementable, which in this context means considering whether the state would be 
able to provide alternative accommodation by the eviction date within its available resources, 
before granting an alternative accommodation order.837  
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7 Conclusion 
One possible ground for alternative accommodation orders is that the state’s housing duty 
includes a duty to assist persons living in emergency housing situations.838 This chapter aimed 
to determine when alternative accommodation orders based on this ground would adhere to 
existing legal framework. 
The legal framework identified includes the state’s duty to ensure the realisation of the right 
of access to adequate housing in terms of section 26(2) of the Constitution. The Housing Act 
that was enacted to give effect to this constitutional provision also forms part of the legal 
framework. In addition, the Code is included. The Code is a policy adopted, in terms of the 
Housing Act, to give effect to the state’s housing duty. Focus was placed on the EHP, which 
is a programme within the Code that deals with the state’s housing duty in emergency 
housing situations. International law instruments, especially the ICESCR, also play a role in 
interpreting these measures. 
In analysing when the existing legal framework would allow for the granting of an alternative 
accommodation order, the discussion was broken into four parts that loosely resemble the 
structure of section 26(2) of the Constitution. First, what is meant by the notion that the state 
must carry the duty to fulfil the emergency housing duty was explored. Second, who should 
benefit from the emergency housing duty was analysed and what the effect of that would be 
on the granting of alternative accommodation orders. Third, the standards prescribed by the 
legal framework were explored and their effect on the granting of alternative accommodation 
orders. Finally, the effect of the limitation on the state’s housing duty, in so far as fulfilment 
thereof need only be progressive and within the state’s available resources, was examined.  
It was found that, in terms of the EHP, the primary duty to provide emergency housing is 
placed on municipalities. However, municipalities can seek assistance from the provincial 
authority if they lack the relevant resources. The provincial authority can also seek assistance 
from the national authority if necessary. Courts have not always acknowledged the 
involvement of provincial authorities. This is not in line with the EHP. This raises the 
question: are courts required to involve provincial authorities if municipal authorities report 
that they are unable to provide alternative accommodation?  
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The legal framework includes unlawful occupiers who face homelessness because of eviction 
as beneficiaries to the state’s short-term housing duty. Nevertheless, not all unlawful 
occupiers facing homelessness are able to benefit from the state’s short-term housing duty. 
Some persons are excluded, such as those who were responsible for their living in an 
emergency housing situation. An alternative accommodation order that adheres to the 
existing legal framework cannot disregard the exclusions within the EHP and confirmed by 
jurisprudence. 
In respect of the standards of the alternative accommodation to be provided, the EHP sets 
quite high standards. However, except for the minimum surface area, the standards set by the 
EHP are maximum standards. Courts have both made alternative accommodation orders 
where the accommodation was to be lower than these standards and orders that required 
higher standards than those specified in the EHP. Where the standards required in terms of an 
alternative accommodation order are too high for the municipality to meet, it does not adhere 
to the existing legal framework. This is because it disregards the internal limitation within 
section 26(2) of the Constitution regarding the limited resources of the state. An alternative 
accommodation order that requires lower standards of housing is sensible since it ensures that 
more persons can be accommodated within the state’s available resources. The need for such 
an order indicates that the state should reconsider the standards suggested in the EHP.839 
The state needs only realise the right to housing progressively, within its available resources. 
This qualification has certain implications. Firstly, it means that persons cannot demand the 
immediate realisation of their housing rights in terms of section 26(2) of the Constitution. 
Secondly, it means that short-term housing programmes need not be prioritised above 
medium and long-term housing programmes. Lastly, it might affect the powers of the court in 
questioning the state’s report regarding its available resources. This raises the question: to 
what extent are the court’s powers to question the state’s report affected by this constitutional 
limitation?  
This chapter raised several questions. Part 2 aims to shed more light on these issues. Another 
pertinent question is whether an alternative accommodation order can be justified on grounds 
other than the state’s housing duty. If the state does not have the available resources to assist 
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all persons living in emergency housing situations, is there something unique about evictions 
that justify their prioritisation? If the state has no available resources, could an alternative 
accommodation order based on other grounds circumvent the limitation within section 26(2)? 
This is where the second possible ground for alternative accommodation orders comes into 
play. The following chapter addresses these questions. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE STATE’S DUTY TO RESPECT 
AND PROTECT HUMAN RIGHTS 
1 Introduction 
The previous chapter examined the first possible ground for alternative accommodation 
orders to determine when orders based on this ground would adhere to the existing legal 
framework. Evident from this discussion was that, due to the limited resources of the state, 
the high standards of the Emergency Housing Programme (EHP)840 and the exclusions within 
the EHP, it is quite a feat for someone seeking alternative accommodation to base such a 
claim on the state’s housing duty alone. This chapter considers whether these limitations can 
be avoided, by founding the alternative accommodation order on the second possible ground 
for alternative accommodation orders – the state’s duty to respect and protect human rights. 
The aim of this chapter is to determine when orders based on the second ground for 
alternative accommodation orders would adhere to the existing legal framework. An order 
requiring the state to provide alternative accommodation would adhere to the existing legal 
framework if the framework authorises the state to comply with the order. In other words, an 
alternative accommodation order can be granted if justification for placing such a duty on the 
state can be found in the legal framework.841 In determining whether an alternative 
accommodation is authorised, a court must apply the legislative provision or policy that gives 
effect to the relevant constitutional right. A court should not apply the constitutional right 
directly unless the constitutionality of the right is challenged.842 Moreover, in applying the 
legal framework, a court must take cognisance of the fact that others are not before the court 
and their rights should not be prejudiced by its order.843 
The following section sets out the existing legal framework of the second ground for 
alternative accommodation orders. The remaining sections analyse this framework to 
determine when alternative accommodation orders in terms of these measures would adhere 
to the legal framework. 
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 Department of Human Settlements EHP (2009). 
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 This relates to the rule of law as formal protection. See Chapter 1:3.1.1. 
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 This relates to the principle of subsidiarity, see the discussion in Chapter 1:3.1.4. 
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 As required by the substantive and formal elements of rule of law. See Chapter 1:3.1.1. 
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2 The legal framework 
 This section aims to identify the existing legal framework for the second possible ground of 
alternative accommodation orders. This includes the relevant constitutional provisions, the 
legislation and policies giving effect to these provisions, applicable common law rules and 
precedent in which these instruments were interpreted and applied. International law also 
plays a role in the existing legal framework. 
2.1 Constitutional provisions 
The second ground for alternative accommodation orders is relevant in situations where an 
eviction does not seem just and equitable since it would leave the unlawful occupiers 
homeless. This relates to the court’s duty, in terms of section 172(1)(b)844 and 26(3)845 of the 
Constitution to grant an eviction order only if it would be just and equitable, considering all 
the relevant circumstances. Hence, these constitutional provisions form part of the existing 
legal framework. As explained, under such circumstances a court might be able to justify 
requiring the state to provide alternative accommodation on the basis that the state has a duty 
to prevent the violation of the rights of the parties involved. This duty could be based on 
section 7(2) of the Constitution, which requires the state to respect and protect all human 
rights in the bill of rights.846 
The rights in the bill of rights that could potentially be violated in eviction matters are also 
included in the legal framework. These include the landowner and other landowners’ right to 
property in terms of section 25(1) of the Constitution.847 This right prohibits deprivation of 
property that is arbitrary or not authorised by a law of general application. Section 26(1) of 
the Constitution, as a negative right, could also potentially be violated, since it entrenches a 
right of access to adequate housing. It has been suggested that unlawful occupiers of land 
have a negative right in terms of section 26(1) not to be deprived of their existing access to 
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 This provision states that in a constitutional matter a court can grant any remedy that is just and equitable. 
845
 This provision states that all evictions must be court-ordered and that the court must consider all relevant 
circumstances before granting an order. 
846
 Chapter 2 of the Constitution. 
847
 That this right is involved is evident from Blue Moonlight and Changing Tides. For a discussion of these 
cases, see Chapter  2:3.1.1 and 3.1.2.1 respectively.  
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housing.848 Other rights that might potentially be violated are the right of access to the courts 
in terms of section 34 of the Constitution and the right to equality in terms of section 9 of the 
Constitution.849 
2.2 Legislation 
The Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 
1998 (PIE) was enacted to give effect to section 26(3) of the Constitution and forms part of 
the existing legal framework.850 It provides the procedural and substantive requirements for 
obtaining an eviction order in terms of section 26(3) of the Constitution. In addition, it gives 
effect to section 25(1) and section 26(1) of the Constitution.851 That it aims to balance these 
rights of the landowner and the unlawful occupiers is evident from the title. The “prevention 
of illegal evictions from land” protects the unlawful occupiers, whereas the “prevention of 
unlawful occupation of land” protects the landowner. Contrary to the title of the act, PIE does 
not prevent unlawful occupation from occurring. Rather, it protects the interests of the 
landowner by providing a tool for evicting the unlawful occupiers and protects the interests of 
the unlawful occupiers by requiring that unlawful occupiers only be evicted if the eviction is 
just and equitable.852  
2.3 Role of international law 
As explained in Chapter 3, courts must consider international law when interpreting the 
constitutional and legislative provisions above. Article 11.1 of the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (the ICESCR) is relevant for the interpretation of the 
right against arbitrary evictions in section 26(3) of the Constitution, as well as the court’s 
duty to protect section 26(1) of the Constitution.  
In interpreting of article 11.1 of the ICESCR, the United Nations Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (the Committee) provides an explanation of the term “adequate 
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 In Grootboom para 34.  
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 See the discussion on Modderklip in Chapter 2:2.3. 
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 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights  271. 
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 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights  271. 
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 Z-Z Boggenpoel & J Pienaar "The continued relevance of the mandament van spolie: recent developments 
relating to dispossession and eviction" (2013) 46 De Jure 998 1018. 
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housing” as included in section 26(1) of the Constitution. Adequate housing requires legal 
tenure security, which prohibits forced evictions.853 The term “forced evictions”, in this sense, 
refers to the removal against their will of persons, without access to appropriate (legal) 
protection. This means that evictions in terms of the law that conform to International Human 
Rights law are not prohibited.854 However, according to the Committee, evictions should not 
leave evictees homeless. If evictees are unable to secure their own alternative 
accommodation, the state should provide such to the maximum of its available resources.855  
Another international law instruments relevant to the protection of section 26(1) and 
realisation of section 26(3) of the Constitution is the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights. Article 17(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
prohibits arbitrary and unlawful interference with a person’s home. This article is similar to 
section 26(3) of the Constitution. 
Regarding the protection of section 25(1) of the Constitution, the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights requires that the right to property be guaranteed and should only be 
limited if it is in the interest of public or community need and in terms of the law. Further, the 
prohibition on forced evictions in terms of article 11.1 of the ICESCR has been interpreted to 
include a requirement for compensation for property affected.856 This could include 
compensation to the landowner if an eviction is denied.857  
The following section considers when, within the existing legal framework, eviction matters, 
where the unlawful occupiers face homelessness, would lead to situations where a court 
would want to make the eviction just and equitable by granting an alternative accommodation 
order. This is done by considering what the most important relevant circumstances are and 
how they might be weighed together in an eviction matter. Thereafter, it is examined whether 
and under what circumstances the state’s duty to respect and protect the human rights might 
justify requiring the state to provide alternative accommodation to “make” the eviction just 
and equitable. 
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 United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights General Comment No 7 (1997) para 1. 
For a discussion on this characteristic, see Muller (2015) SAPR/SAPL 82-83. 
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 United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights General Comment No 7 (1997) para 3. 
855
 United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights General Comment No 7 (1997) para 16. 
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 See Section 5 below. 
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3 Consideration of relevant circumstances 
In respect of the substantive requirements of PIE, the court is required to consider all the 
relevant circumstances in determining whether an eviction would be just and equitable.858 PIE 
provides an open list of such factors, including the duration of the occupation, whether the 
municipality can make alternative land available, the reason for the occupation and the 
vulnerability of the unlawful occupiers.859 Where the landowner seeks the eviction, PIE does 
not oblige the court to consider whether alternative accommodation is available if the 
unlawful occupation had been for shorter than six months.860 
In this section, the different factors that do or should weigh heavily in the balance to 
determine a just and equitable eviction order are discussed. These factors are identified based 
on the factors listed in the PIE, as well as factors stressed by courts. They include the identity 
of the applicant, the size of the group, the danger of the living conditions, the duration of the 
occupation, the purpose of the eviction, the blameworthiness of the occupiers and their 
vulnerability.  
3.1 Identity of applicant 
Whether the applicant is a private landowner or the state carries much weight in eviction 
matters.861 PIE allows for both landowners and the state to apply for eviction orders.862 When 
an eviction is sought by a private entity, a court is more likely to allow the eviction.863 There 
are two reasons why the eviction of the unlawful occupiers is more likely when a private 
entity applies for the eviction. Firstly, section 26(1) of the Constitution establishes a right of 
access to adequate housing. The duty to realise this right falls on the state in terms of section 
26(2).864 In the absence of alternative accommodation, an eviction order sought by the state 
allows it to deprive persons of their homes, which directly contradicts its housing duty. 
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 S 4(6), 4(7), 6(3) of PIE. 
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 S 4(6), 4(7), 6(3) of PIE. 
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 S 4(6) of PIE. 
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 PE Municipality para 12; Changing Tides para 12-20. 
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 In terms of s 4 and 6 of PIE, respectively. 
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 See the discussion of Blue Moonlight and Changing Tides in Chapter  2:3.1.1 and 3.1.2.1 respectively. 
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 Modderklip SCA para 16. See also, Chapter 3:2.4. 
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Hence, the court is reluctant to grant an eviction order on application by the state if no 
alternative accommodation is available.865 
No equivalent duty is placed on private individuals.866 The state might delegate its duty to 
private entities through legislative and other measures.867 A delegation of the state’s housing 
duty through legislative measures seems to have been the basis for the decision in All 
Building Cleaning Services CC v Matlaila868 (hereinafter “ABCS”). The court took into 
account the fact that the applicant, a private developer, had not offered to build the unlawful 
occupiers a home on the land.869 As a result, it denied the eviction order. The court’s refusal 
of the eviction potentially relates to the contention by the unlawful occupiers that, as a private 
developer, the applicant had a duty to provide them with housing in terms of the Inclusionary 
Housing Policy.870  
Inclusionary housing refers to a requirement by the government that part of new residential 
developments must be used to house families of low-income levels.871 Although the 
enactment of national legislation is contemplated to compel private developers, no such 
legislation has been adopted. As a result, there is currently no duty on private developers to 
partake in inclusionary housing.872 Despite a lack of legislation, a few inclusionary housing 
projects have already been implemented.873 The cooperation of private developers has been 
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 For decisions where it was found that the housing duty in s 26(2) of the Constitution is not enforceable 
against private individuals, see Modderklip HC2 para 7, Modderklip SCA para 17, Changing Tides para 35. See 
also, Pope "A Tricky Balancing Act" in DCM Festschrift  12; Mostert "Landlessness, Housing and the Rule of 
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 Grootboom para 35. See also, Chenwi (2008) Harv L Rev 116. 
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 All Builders And Cleaning Services CC v Matlaila (42349/13) [2015] ZAGPJHC 2. 
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 All Builders And Cleaning Services CC v Matlaila (First Respondent's Heads of Argument) (42349/13) 
[2015] ZAGPJHC 2 (hereinafter “ABCS 1
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 Resp. HoA)”) para 10. This policy was adopted by national 
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Housing (2009) 29. 
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 Unlike the Emergency Housing Policy, the Inclusionary Housing Policy is not executive (or binding) policy 
since it was not adopted in terms of an act and is not given binding effect through an act. On binding policy, see 
Chapter 1:3.2.1. 
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 For examples, see the Western Cape Government Inclusionary Housing (2009) 31, 36. 
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secured through incentives.874 Examples of such incentives include the state offering public 
land at a low price on condition that part of the land must be used for low-cost housing.875 
The adoption of inclusionary housing legislation and the conclusion of inclusionary housing 
agreements are examples of the state’s delegation of its housing duty. However, in ABCS, no 
such legislation was adopted876 or agreement concluded. Hence, the decision in ABCS cannot 
be justified on the basis that the state delegated its housing duty to the landowner. 
Apart from legislative measures, private entities may also have a duty to provide alternative 
accommodation in terms of the common law.877 This seemed to be the approach followed in 
Omar NO v Omar,878 where the court found that the unlawful occupiers had alternative 
accommodation through their families.879 It seemed to rely on the common law duty of 
support. However, there are certain requirements to be met for this duty to exist, which the 
court did not address.880 Courts should make sure that these requirements have been met 
before finding that family members must accommodate each other.881  
Furthermore, it can be argued that section 4(8)(a) of PIE places a limited housing duty on 
those private entities whose land have been occupied unlawfully. This section requires that 
the date of eviction be just and equitable. Courts seem to interpret this section to mean that 
individual private entities are obliged to “house” unlawful occupiers for a limited period.882 
Hence, in the absence of a delegation by the state or a common law duty of support, courts 
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 Western Cape Government Inclusionary Housing (2009) 9. 
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 Western Cape Government Inclusionary Housing (2009) 35. 
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 S 21(i) of Spatial Planning and Land Use Management Act 16 of 2013 does require a municipal spatial 
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are less likely to deny an eviction sought by a private landowner. Yet, it may delay the 
eviction to allow time for the unlawful occupiers to secure alternative accommodation.883 
The second reason why the eviction of the unlawful occupiers is a more likely outcome, 
where a private entity applies for the eviction, lies in the constitutional right to property.884 
Section 25(1) of the Constitution protects private owners from arbitrary deprivation of 
property. Even in its capacity as landowner, the state does not enjoy the protection of this 
provision. In City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Blue Moonlight Properties 
39 (Pty) Ltd,885 the court found that a private owner’s section-25(1) right is infringed even 
before it applies for an eviction.886 The mere unlawful occupation of its land is an 
infringement of its right to property.887  
This heavy weight placed on private ownership might not be justified under all 
circumstances. In City of Johannesburg v Changing Tides 74 (Pty) Ltd888 (hereinafter 
“Changing Tides”) and City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Hlophe,889 for 
example, the same private developer applied for the eviction of unlawful occupiers from 
different buildings.890 Due to the unlawful occupation, it probably did not acquire the 
properties at a high price and knew when it took ownership of the properties that they were 
unlawfully occupied by desperately poor persons. Nonetheless, it took transfer and proceeded 
to apply for the eviction of the occupiers, for the sole purpose of making a profit from the 
development.891 To privilege the landowner solely because it is a private entity does not seem 
justified under these circumstances. Instead, the owner’s right to property should carry less 
weight in such situations. 
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From the above, it is evident that the identity of the applicant is a weighty relevant 
circumstance in eviction matters. Since private owners do not have a constitutional duty to 
house unlawful occupiers and have a right to their property, an eviction order is a more likely 
outcome when they apply for an eviction. As the entity with the constitutional housing duty, 
the state is less likely to succeed in an eviction application where no alternative 
accommodation is available. In fact, it has been argued that an eviction sought by the state 
should never be allowed if the unlawful occupiers would be left homeless.892 However, once 
other relevant circumstances such as the blameworthiness of the unlawful occupiers are 
considered, the absoluteness of this statement is called into question.893 The heavy weight 
placed on the fact that the applicant is a private person might be unfounded under certain 
circumstances. 
3.2 Size of group 
The number of unlawful occupiers facing eviction is another weighty relevant circumstance 
in eviction matters. There are three explanations for the importance of this factor. First, it 
might be easier for the state to stretch its resources to house one or two additional persons.894 
Nevertheless, fact that the group is small has never been the basis of an alternative 
accommodation order.895 As is shown below, courts tend to require the state to provide 
alternative accommodation to larger, rather than smaller groups.  
Second, it may be possible to use the land productively in spite of the unlawful occupation if 
the group is very small. This was the case in ABCS. The developer would still have been able 
to develop the land for residential purposes, despite the unlawful occupation of the two 
people. He simply needed to allocate one of the housing units to the unlawful occupiers.896 
Third, the size of the group comes into play when the effect of the eviction is explored. The 
eviction of a large group of people might cause problems for the landowner or the 
surrounding neighbourhood. The unlawful occupiers might simply reoccupy the land or move 
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onto a nearby property. In President of the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery 
(Pty) Ltd897 (hereinafter “Modderklip”), for example, reoccupation of the land was feared and 
this was weighed against an eviction without alternative accommodation.898 In Occupiers of 
Skurweplaas 353 JR v PPC Aggregate Quarries (Pty) Ltd899 (hereinafter “Skurweplaas”), the 
unlawful occupiers had moved onto the land after their eviction in Occupiers of Portion R25 
of the Farm Mooiplaats 355 JR v Golden Thread Ltd900 (hereinafter “Mooiplaats”).901 Their 
first eviction simply relocated the problem. Furthermore, an eviction of a large group of 
people might affect the public order in some other way.902 In Mtshali v Tayengwa903 the 
eviction of the unlawful occupiers resulted in them taking refuge under a bridge.904  
A more subtle consequence of an eviction of a large group of people is the attention that it 
draws. The bigger the size of the group, the more media attention eviction without alternative 
accommodation will receive and the more public outrage can be harnessed.905 This was 
evident from the Sanral eviction discussed in Chapter 1, which resulted in the ministerial 
enquiry.906 Courts might be cautious to make a decision that would spark such public outrage. 
From this, it is clear that the size of the group of unlawful occupiers being evicted is a 
weighty factor. Small groups might be included in the state’s short-term housing programme 
more easily or might be able to remain on the property without interfering with the use 
thereof. Larger groups might violate the rights of the applicant or other landowners. 
Moreover, the eviction of a large group without alternative accommodation could disturb the 
public order or spark public outrage. 
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3.3 Danger of living conditions 
Whether it would be safe to deny the eviction is another relevant circumstance to be 
considered by the court in determining whether an eviction would be just and equitable. 
Continued occupation of the property might endanger the lives of the occupiers.907 Hence, an 
immediate eviction order is required.908 Often, this happens when the property was either not 
intended for residential occupation or not properly maintained for this purpose.909  
Where the property was not intended for residential occupation, either the nature of the land 
might be unsafe for human habitation or the land might not have been suitably prepared and 
lacked basic services, such as running water and ablution facilities.910 Skurweplaas is an 
example of an eviction matter where the nature of the land was unsafe for human 
habitation.911 The land was dolomitic, which meant that it could subside at any moment.912 An 
example of an eviction matter where the property was not prepared for residential occupation 
is Changing Tides. Since the case involved the occupation of a warehouse, there were “no 
toilet or ablution facilities, no water supply or sewage disposal, illegal electricity connections, 
inadequate ventilation and refuse, including human waste, strewn in open spaces”.913 The 
building was unsuited for human habitation and the unlawful occupiers had to be evicted.914 
In fact, all of the bad-building cases discussed in Chapter 2 are examples of cases where the 
occupation of residential property posed a health and safety risk due to the property not being 
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properly maintained.915 However, despite the apparent urgency, the eviction orders were only 
executed months after they were granted.916  
The above shows that the danger posed by the living conditions of the unlawful occupiers is a 
weighty factor in eviction matters. Where it is too unsafe to allow the unlawful occupiers to 
remain in occupation, an eviction order will be made. However, in some cases, the emphasis 
placed on this factor seems a bit artificial since the evictions orders were only executed 
several months after they were granted. 
3.4 Purpose of eviction 
Whether the owner intends to use the property is a weighty consideration in eviction 
matters.917 When the owner has no productive use for the property a refusal of the eviction 
order918 or a delay in the granting or execution of an eviction order919 until the state is able to 
provide alternative accommodation, is more likely.920  
Private owners often need property to earn an income or to live in.921 One example of a 
private eviction where the land was needed to earn an income is the High Court decision of 
Brookway Property 30 (Pty) Ltd v People Who Intend Invading Portion 150 of the Farm 
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Zandfontein 317 J.R., Portion 124922 (hereinafter “Brookway”).923 The owner of the land was a 
private company.924 It had purchased seven pieces of land for approximately R 30 million 
with the purpose of developing a shopping complex.925 Before they could develop the land, 
people started to occupy the properties unlawfully by erecting informal structures.926 The 
number of unlawful occupiers grew gradually and by the time the matter was heard, 
approximately 400 informal dwellings had been erected on the property.927 The unlawful 
occupiers were evicted so that the owner could use the land.928 In fact, in all of the cases 
discussed in Chapter 2, in which the court granted an alternative accommodation order, the 
private owner wanted to use the land to earn an income.929 
The applicant in Ives v Rajah930 was a natural person, the owner of the property.931 The reason 
for the eviction was that the owner wanted to use the property. The unlawful occupier had 
sold the property to a family friend.932 She, however, remained in occupation, since she 
believed she was granted a life-long right to occupy the property.933 This right was never 
registered.934 Eventually, the property was sold in execution to Rajah, pursuant to a mortgage 
bond.935 Ives was evicted so that Rajah could use the property.936  
In Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers937 (hereinafter “PE Municipality”), the 
land was apparently not needed by the private landowners.938 This factor distinguishes this 
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case from other private eviction matters.939 The non-use of the land is used to justify the 
denial of the eviction order.940  
Although the intended use of the land plays a role in both private and state evictions, the 
court tends to be more cautious where the state is the applicant. The state can easily abuse 
this excuse.941 However, where the state has a bona fide use for the property, such as 
converting it into an equestrian centre or using it to house others, this factor can carry much 
weight.942 
Minister of Local Government and Housing for the Western Cape v Various Unlawful 
Occupiers of Houses Situated in Precincts 4 and 6, Delft Symphony,943 is an example of a 
High Court matter where the state needed the land to fulfil its housing duty toward other 
people.944 Here, 1600 people had unlawfully taken occupation of houses allocated to other 
people in the housing queue.945 These houses were built as part of what was known as the 
state’s N2 Gateway Project, which was aimed at upgrading informal settlements in the area.946 
The state immediately reacted to the unlawful occupation and applied for an urgent eviction 
in terms of section 5 of PIE within eight days of their occupation.947 The eviction order was 
granted.948  
In the High Court decision of Resnick v Government of the Republic of South Africa949 
(hereinafter “Resnick”), a single mother of two started occupying a military base owned by 
the state in 1999, without consent.950 The base had not been in operation for 8 years.951 After 
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she moved onto the property, she approached the state and offered to lease the property. They 
entered into a valid lease agreement and her occupation became lawful.952 Some two years 
later, she fell into arrears and, after several failed negotiations, her contract was terminated in 
2005.953 She continued to occupy the property unlawfully.954 The state needed Resnick to 
vacate the premises because the South African Police Service wanted to use it as an 
equestrian centre.955 The purpose of this centre would be to “facilitate crime control within the 
area”.956 Resnick was evicted from the property without alternative accommodation.957  
From this section, it is evident that the purpose of the eviction is important in both public and 
private evictions. Where the purpose of the eviction is that the applicant intends to use the 
land, a court is more likely to grant the eviction order. Usually, in public evictions, the state 
intends to use the land to perform an official function. In private evictions, the owner either 
wants to use the land to generate an income or to occupy it. 
3.5 Duration of occupation 
Another important relevant circumstance is the duration of the occupation. Both sections 4 
and 6 of PIE emphasise the period of occupation. In terms of section-4 applications by private 
landowners, where the unlawful occupation had subsisted for less than 6 months a court is not 
obliged to consider whether alternative accommodation is available. As a result, a short 
occupation might weigh heavily in favour of an eviction, since section 4 provides that a lack 
of alternative accommodation would not play a role.958  
The approach, to disregard a lack of alternative accommodation where the occupation has 
been short is, not shared across the board.959 In Mooiplaats, the court concluded that, even 
though the consideration of alternative accommodation is excluded by section 4(6) of PIE, 
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the court would still consider it.960 This is because the court is enjoined by the Constitution to 
consider all relevant circumstances and the emphasis placed by PIE on the duration of the 
occupation is, therefore, relevant but not decisive.961 In Modderklip, the short occupation of 
the unlawful occupiers also did not lead to a disregard of the alternative accommodation 
consideration. One comment was that, although the application for eviction was made within 
6 months of the unlawful occupation, by the time the decision was made they had been living 
there for a year.962 Nevertheless, the fact that the applicant had acted quickly counted its 
favour. Moreover, the court’s decision to take the lack of alternative accommodation into 
account could be justified on the basis that the unlawful occupiers had previously been 
evicted from elsewhere.963 It might be that their previous occupation was for longer than six 
months and that the court had erred in not considering their lack of alternative 
accommodation in the earlier eviction. Hence, the court might be attempting to correct this 
wrong.964 If this was the case, the court should have made this clear to be consistent with the 
norm of certainty under the rule of law. Accordingly, it is likely that a short occupation would 
weigh in favour of an eviction unless the occupiers moved onto the land because of an 
eviction where their lack of alternative accommodation was not considered. 
Similar to the weight placed on short occupations, courts have been inconsistent regarding the 
weight placed on lengthy occupation periods. The oft-quoted statement in PE Municipality, 
which refers a reluctance to evict relatively settled occupiers without alternative 
accommodation, indicates that the length of occupation carries much weight.965 In contrast, in 
some instances, the court has found that a long period of unlawful occupation weighed in 
favour of an eviction. In those instances, it is reasoned that persons who were able to occupy 
property for a long period without paying rent had the opportunity to save money for 
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accommodation and to find an alternative place to stay.966 The difference could relate to the 
fact that, in PE Municipality the unlawful occupiers thought they had consent and were 
therefore not blameworthy.967 In Ives v Rajah, the unlawful occupier knew about the pending 
eviction for three years, whereas in Resnick the unlawful occupier knew her occupation was 
unlawful since she had defaulted on the lease agreement.  
The above indicates that the period of unlawful occupation can be an important relevant 
circumstance in eviction matters. A short period of occupation may weigh in favour of an 
eviction without alternative accommodation, whereas a longer period of occupation might 
weigh against an eviction without alternative accommodation. Courts have not been 
consistent in their approach. Sometimes a short period of occupation had carried no weight 
and other times a lengthy occupation had weighed in favour of an eviction without alternative 
accommodation. Whether a lengthy occupation is considered to weigh in favour of or against 
an eviction might have to do with the degree of blame to be placed on the unlawful occupiers. 
3.6 Blameworthiness of the occupiers 
The blameworthiness of the unlawful occupiers has often been considered by the court.968 
Unlawful occupiers are not automatically considered blameworthy since they are not 
necessarily responsible for their unlawful occupation. Hence, the blameworthiness considered 
by the court goes beyond mere unlawful occupation. On the one hand, unlawful occupiers can 
be blameworthy to the extent that they are responsible for the fact that they are facing 
eviction.969 On the other hand, they can be blameworthy to the extent that they did not attempt 
to procure alternative accommodation for themselves.970  
As concluded above, the state does not have a duty to accommodate people within its short-
term housing programme, who intentionally create the emergency, which leaves them 
homeless.971 There are two instances where it can be argued that persons intentionally create 
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the emergency that leaves them homeless. The first situation is when a lawful occupier does 
something intentionally, knowing that his actions will cause his lawful occupation to be 
terminated. By unlawfully dealing drugs from the property, the unlawful occupier, in City of 
Cape Town v Daniels972 (hereinafter “Daniels”), contributed toward the termination of her 
lawful occupation and was evicted.973 The second instance is when a person unlawfully 
occupies land with the sole purpose of receiving housing from the state. In City of Cape Town 
v Persons who are presently unlawfully occupying erf 1800, Capricorn: Vrygrond 
Development974 (hereinafter “Vrygrond Development”), the unlawful occupiers were evicted 
when they occupied land earmarked for the housing of others.975 As explained earlier, there is 
a fine line between a land invasion that was done out of need and one that was done out of 
greed.976  
While blameworthiness on the part of the unlawful occupier means that the state does not 
have a duty to house them within its short-term housing programme, a court could still find 
that their eviction without alternative accommodation would not be just and equitable. 
Nonetheless, in both Daniels and Vrygrond Development, the blameworthiness of the 
unlawful occupiers weighed heavily in favour of an eviction.977 
The blameworthiness of the unlawful occupiers in not securing their own alternative 
accommodation also plays a role. Unlawful occupiers are expected to do what they can to 
find alternative accommodation themselves and should not simply expect the state or the 
applicant to solve their housing problems.978 In Omar NO v Omar, for example, the case was 
postponed so that the unlawful occupiers could have time to apply to old age homes or secure 
other accommodation. After approximately a year, the unlawful occupiers had done nothing 
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substantial in this regard and the court found that their lack of proactivity could not count in 
their favour.979  
The court is even less sympathetic where the occupiers were aware of the illegality of their 
occupation for a long period and did not attempt to find a solution during that time. In both 
Ives v Rajah and Resnick, this was one of the reasons for evicting the unlawful occupiers 
without alternative accommodation.980 Although it might be difficult for indigent people to 
find accommodation themselves, the court has stated that the least they could do is to apply to 
the state’s housing programme.981 Neither Ives nor Resnick took this initiative, although they 
had been in unlawful occupation for several years.982 Such blameworthiness counted against 
them and they were evicted.983 It is this blameworthiness in Ives v Rajah and Resnick that 
might distinguish the cases from PE Municipality, where the unlawful occupiers allegedly 
believed that they had consent to occupy the property and were not aware of their unlawful 
occupation for the duration thereof.984 
In contrast with Ives v Rajah and Resnick, the blameworthiness of the unlawful occupiers, in 
Modderklip, seemed to count in their favour. Here, the court labelled the actions of the 
unlawful occupiers as a land invasion.985 Accordingly, the court found that this meant they 
should not be evicted without alternative accommodation. In the absence of alternative 
accommodation, an eviction would likely cause them to simply reoccupy the land or invade 
someone else’s land, which would just perpetuate the problem.986 The size of the group seems 
to have made the difference in how this factor was addressed in these cases. 
This section evidences that the blameworthiness of the unlawful occupiers can play a big role 
in eviction proceedings.987 Unlawful occupiers can be blameworthy either based on the reason 
for the eviction or based on their lack of proactivity in finding alternative accommodation. 
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Blameworthiness might count in favour of an eviction without alternative accommodation of 
the unlawful occupiers. However, as seen in Modderklip, sometimes the blameworthiness of 
the unlawful occupiers has actually counted in their favour.  
3.7 Vulnerability of occupiers 
The vulnerability of the unlawful occupiers should be an important relevant circumstance in 
eviction matters. Section 4 of PIE identifies certain people that might be more vulnerable 
when facing eviction. These are disabled persons, the elderly, children and women-headed 
households.988 In Vrygrond Development, where a group of people unlawfully occupied 
houses earmarked for low-cost housing,989 the court distinguished between those unlawful 
occupiers who were vulnerable and those who were not.990 Those who did not fall within one 
of the vulnerability groups were evicted without available alternative accommodation.991 
Persons falling within a vulnerable group were not evicted.992 Such a distinction can be 
justified by the fact that those who do not fall within one of these groups may be more 
capable of working and earning the money required to rent their own accommodation.993  
The approach in Vrygrond Development does not seem peculiar since it is in line with the 
provisions of PIE. It prioritises the vulnerable groups identified in the Act.994 Nevertheless, 
this case is unique. Very rarely has a court differentiated between those unlawful occupiers 
who can be classified as “vulnerable” and those who cannot.995 In Government of the Republic 
of South Africa v Grootboom996 (hereinafter “Grootboom”), for example, the court was not 
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prepared to treat those with children different from the other occupiers.997 A reason for this 
might be that it will result in only some of the unlawful occupiers being evicted. This will not 
solve the landowner’s problem since it will not obtain vacant occupation of the land.998 
Muller argues that the approach of the court should change to give more credence to the 
vulnerability of some unlawful occupiers.999 This would bring its jurisprudence in line with 
the existing legal framework. 
In this section, the relevant circumstances most often taken into account by courts, as well as 
those that courts are required to take into account were discussed. From this discussion, it is 
evident that courts are not always consistent in how they weight these circumstances in trying 
to determine a just and equitable court order. Often the same factor weighed in favour of an 
eviction without alternative accommodation in one case and weighed against an eviction 
without alternative accommodation in another. An explanation could be that these 
circumstances cannot be considered in isolation. The unique relevant circumstances of each 
case might justify a different weighting of a specific circumstance. For this reason, the way in 
which courts have balanced a mix of these relevant circumstances in actual cases, to 
determine whether an eviction order would be just and equitable, is discussed in the next 
section. 
4 Just and equitable orders 
Before the balancing of the above relevant circumstances is discussed, it is necessary to 
consider the constitutionally prescribed method of considering these circumstances. 
Section 172(1)(b) of the Constitution provides that, in constitutional matters, courts must 
issue orders that are just and equitable. All eviction matters are necessarily constitutional 
matters since they are governed by section 26(3) of the Constitution.1000 Hence, all eviction 
orders must be just and equitable.1001  
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This section explores the meaning of the just and equitable measure as interpreted by courts 
in eviction matters. The term is said to “elude easy description”.1002 As an abstract and vague 
measure, it is important to look at how the measure is defined in the context of evictions 
specifically. In the final part of the section, how this measure is applied in the granting of 
eviction orders is examined. 
4.1 Definition of the just and equitable measure in the context of 
evictions  
Only two Constitutional Court matters explore the meaning of the term ‘just and equitable’ in 
the context of eviction in detail.1003 These are PE Municipality and Residents of Joe Slovo 
Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes.1004 It is this requirement that evictions must 
be just and equitable that sets evictions under PIE apart from common law evictions.1005 
Courts are required to look beyond merely establishing whether the occupation is unlawful, to 
whether an eviction would be just and equitable. Moreover, where occupation is found to be 
unlawful, an eviction is not guaranteed.1006  
To determine whether an eviction is just and equitable the interests of the unlawful occupiers, 
the landowner1007 and the public must be balanced.1008 This means that an order should not be 
just and equitable toward the unlawful occupiers only, but also toward the other role 
players.1009 The interests of the different role players are gauged from the relevant 
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circumstances before the court. Balancing can have one of two outcomes. For one, there 
could be a finding that one right or interest outweighs the other. That is, one right or interest 
wins. The other is that a balance is struck between the rights and interests. That is, no right or 
interest wins, instead, a compromise is reached.1010  
The ‘just and equitable’ criterion determines the weight attached to the interests of the role-
players.1011 This criterion is given content by the values underlying the Constitution: human 
dignity, equality and freedom.1012 Another value, often associated with these, namely Ubuntu, 
should also be considered. Ubuntu is a customary law conception that “a person is a person 
through other people”1013 and that people find their worth through the acknowledgement 
thereof by others.1014 The effect of considering Ubuntu is that, although the individual rights 
of the role players are considered, their interdependence and duties toward one another are 
also acknowledged.1015 In addition to these concepts, the form and theory of justice applied by 
the court also plays a role in what it considers just and equitable.1016 
In applying this measure, the weight afforded to the interests and circumstances to be 
considered is at the discretion of the court.1017 This discretion can be interpreted widely or 
narrowly. A narrow interpretation means that if the procedural requirements of PIE were met 
and there is no valid defence a court must grant an eviction order but has discretion as to the 
content of the order and the conditions attached. A wide interpretation gives the court 
discretion to deny an eviction order even if the procedural requirements were met and no 
defence exists.1018 This wider discretion is preferred by the Supreme Court of Appeal.1019 Such 
a wide discretion is necessary because each case has unique circumstances, which means that 
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a blanket approach should not be employed.1020 Some inference regarding how certain 
circumstances are balanced against each other can be made.1021 Nevertheless, these inferences 
should not be used as templates for the adjudication of subsequent matters.1022  
4.2 Application of the just and equitable measure in the context of 
evictions 
Case law provides examples of how courts balance the possible relevant circumstances 
identified above. From this, it is possible to identify certain trends. This can assist in 
determining the specific situations wherein courts are likely to find that an eviction would not 
be just and equitable and to want to grant an alternative accommodation order to “make” the 
eviction just and equitable. This section focuses on cases where unlawful occupiers are 
unable to secure their own alternative accommodation and the state does not have an 
immediate duty to house the unlawful occupiers.1023 The chapter focuses on the possible 
grounds other than the state’s short-term housing duty for placing the duty to provide 
alternative accommodation on the state.  
From case law, it is evident that an eviction without an alternative accommodation order 
would be the most probable outcome where the unlawful occupiers are blameworthy, coupled 
with the fact that the group is very small. Daniels is an example of such a case. This case 
involved the eviction of only six people.1024 They dealt drugs from the property.1025 As a result, 
they were evicted without an alternative accommodation order.1026  
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The blameworthiness of the unlawful occupiers carries less weight if the size of the group is 
large. A court would be more reluctant to grant an eviction without an alternative 
accommodation order if the group is large. This is because the eviction of a large group of 
people without alternative accommodation might disturb the public order or cause the 
evictees to reoccupy the land or unlawfully occupy other land in the vicinity. Modderklip is 
an example of such a case. In this case, the unlawful occupiers were described as having 
committed a land invasion. Hence, they were acting out of greed. Nevertheless, since there 
were 40 000 unlawful occupiers, they could not be evicted without disrupting the social 
order.1027 
Whatever the size of the group, where the land is state-owned and not needed, a denial of the 
eviction is the most probable outcome.1028 In fact, in terms of PE Municipality, a denial of the 
eviction order is even a possible outcome where unlawfully occupied land is not needed and 
privately owned. However, this is less likely if the private owner itself applied for the 
eviction order.1029 Moreover, where the group is small, a denial of the eviction order might 
even be the case where the landowner intends to use the land if the use of the land would not 
be frustrated by the continued occupation of the land.1030 
The above situations illustrate the types of relevant circumstances that would involve a “win-
lose” balancing of interests or rights. One right would outweigh the other. There are, 
however, situations where the court is reluctant to employ this type of balancing. In these 
situations, the rights or interests carry similar weight and a compromise is necessary.1031 
Wilson refers to such situations as stalemate situations.1032 A stalemate situation exists when 
the court finds that an eviction would not be just and equitable toward the unlawful occupiers, 
but a denial would not be just and equitable toward the landowner (or other role players). 
Circumstances that have caused stalemate situations are ones in which there is a large group 
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 See the discussion of Modderklip in Chapter 2:2.3. 
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of unlawful occupiers, but the eviction is applied for by a private landowner and the land is 
needed for use and/or unsafe to occupy.1033 Other circumstances that might cause a stalemate 
situation are ones in which the unlawful occupiers are vulnerable, not blameworthy1034 and 
have lived on the land for a long time, but the land is privately owned and needed for use or 
unsafe to occupy.1035 In fact, whenever the unlawful occupiers face homelessness purely 
because the state does not have the resources to accommodate them within its short-term 
housing programme1036 and the private landowner wants to use the land a stalemate situation 
is created.  
A possible compromise in balancing these rights and interests is a delay in the granting or 
execution of an eviction order.1037 The purpose of the delay can either be to allow the 
unlawful occupiers to secure their own alternative accommodation or to wait until they can be 
accommodated in the state’s short-term housing programme.1038 A postponement of the 
matter, during the adjudication phase,1039 until the state can provide alternative 
accommodation is an example of a delay in granting the eviction order. Likewise, a denial of 
the eviction, during the adjudication phase, with the understanding that a subsequent 
application for eviction can succeed if alternative accommodation can be guaranteed, is an 
example of a delay in granting the eviction order. The execution of the eviction order can be 
delayed, during the adjudication phase, by setting a date for an eviction long after the eviction 
order to give the state time to provide alternative accommodation. Execution can also be 
delayed by postponing the eviction date, during the return phase, because the state argues that 
it needs more time to provide alternative accommodation. Another way of delaying the 
execution of the eviction order is to suspend the eviction order, during the return phase. 
While these delays may occur in different phases, they have the same effect of ensuring a just 
                                                 
1033
 Changing Tides is an example of a case in which all of these circumstances were prevalent. See the 
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and equitable outcome, considering all the relevant circumstances at that time, including that 
an immediate eviction would leave the unlawful occupiers homeless. This is the substantive 
requirement for an eviction and can be distinguished from the procedural requirements. It is 
important that this substantive requirement (that the eviction must be just and equitable) be 
met regardless of the procedural stage of the eviction. For this reason, all of these means of 
delay are dealt with together under the term “delay of the eviction” of “delay of an eviction”.  
In Grobler v Msimanga,1040 the state reported that it would only be able to accommodate the 
unlawful occupiers after two years.1041 By the time the matter was heard, only a few months 
of the two-year period were left. The court accepted the municipality’s projections and set the 
eviction date for eight months later.1042 In Brookway, the state, similarly, asked for a delay of 
two years.1043 The court denied the request because the private landowner would be without 
the use of its property for too long.1044 Accordingly, a delay of the eviction cannot cure a 
stalemate situation if the delay would be unreasonably long. Similarly, it cannot cure a 
stalemate situation if continued occupation would be too unsafe.1045  
A crucial question is whether, in circumstances where a delay of the eviction would not lead 
to a just and equitable order, the court should subject an eviction order to conditions that 
equalise the balance between the private landowner and the unlawful occupiers and ensure a 
just and equitable outcome. In other words, does the existing legal framework allow the court 
to attach conditions to the eviction order simply to equalise the balance (equalising 
conditions)?1046 The following section provides some insight into answering this question. 
The focus is on the situations where the interests of the private landowner compete with those 
of the unlawful occupiers. However, for the most part, the findings regarding the section 
26(1) right of the unlawful occupiers can be applied equally to the other stalemate situations. 
Where relevant, any differences in respect of other stalemate situations, such as where the 
state needs the land or the occupation is too unsafe, are indicated.  
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1044
 Brookway para 17. 
1045
 This was the case in Blue Moonlight; Changing Tides and Hlophe.  
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4.3 Use of the just and equitable measure to attach equalising 
conditions to eviction orders 
An equalising condition in this context refers to a condition attached to the eviction order by 
the court to ensure that an eviction order that would otherwise not be just and equitable is 
made just and equitable. This is relevant in stalemate situations. It comes into play where a 
simple eviction would not be just and equitable toward the unlawful occupiers. A delay of the 
eviction would not be just and equitable toward the landowner or other role players. The aim 
of the equalising condition is to choose one of these options but to mitigate the injustice by 
providing a remedy for the party who is wronged. An alternative accommodation order could 
be considered an example of such a remedy. 
An alternative accommodation order as an equalising condition is what the courts seem to 
allude to when they reference the popular quote from PE Municipality to justify ordering the 
state to provide alternative accommodation.1047 The reasoning seems to be that, if an eviction 
order of relatively settled occupiers without alternative accommodation will not easily be just 
and equitable, it should be “made” just and equitable by ensuring accommodation.1048 
Changing Tides confirms this line of thought. It interprets section 4(12) of PIE to authorise 
the court to make an eviction just and equitable by attaching certain conditions to the 
order.1049 This interpretation of PIE forms part of the existing legal framework. What needs to 
be determined, is whether the existing legal framework allows that the content of such a 
condition is that the state must provide alternative accommodation.  
One possible justification for placing this duty on the state is that it is the entity with the 
primary housing duty.1050 Orders to provide housing should be directed at the state. However, 
where the state has no duty to provide immediate housing,1051 this cannot be a ground for an 
alternative accommodation order. Where the state has such a duty, the reason for an 
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 The quote can be found at PE Municipality para 28. Such interpretation seems evident in Joe Slovo para 
148, 313; Changing Tides para 15. 
1048
 See Joe Slovo para 148, 313; Changing Tides para 15; Occupiers, Shulana Court, 11 Hendon Road, 
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alternative accommodation order would not be to equalise the balance but to force the state to 
comply with its duty.1052  
Another possible justification for placing the duty to provide alternative accommodation on 
the state is that it is responsible for the unlawful limitation of rights.1053 In the context of 
evictions that cause homelessness, the unlawful occupiers are deprived of their existing 
access to housing. This might constitute a limitation of their negative right of access to 
adequate housing.1054 Moreover, if the eviction is not granted, the private landowner’s use of 
its land is limited. This might constitute a limitation of its rights to property and equality.1055 
In addition, if it is a large group that cannot be evicted without alternative accommodation 
because the group would cause public disorder, reoccupy the land or occupy someone else’s 
land, this might constitute a limitation of the owner’s right of access to courts, as was found 
in Modderklip.1056 The following section considers when, within the existing legal framework, 
the state can be held responsible for such limitations of rights and whether, within the 
framework, an alternative accommodation order can be granted as remedy. 
5 Remedy for the limitation of rights 
In Brookway, the court ordered the municipality to apply for funding from the provincial 
authority for the provision of alternative accommodation to the evictees before it.1057 The 
court found that it would not order an eviction if the eviction would leave the unlawful 
occupiers homeless.1058 If the state, “for whatever reason”, was unable to provide alternative 
accommodation, the court would order it to pay constitutional damages to the landowner for 
the limitation of its rights.1059 This is an example of the types of orders discussed in this 
section.  
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As is evident from the Brookway decision, founding alternative accommodation orders on 
violations of human rights (other than the positive right of access to adequate housing)1060 is 
not subject to the internal limitation of section 26(2) of the Constitution that the state must 
have available resources. In fact, the court in Brookway only aimed to grant such an order if 
both the municipality and the provincial government reported that they did not have the 
available resources.1061 Since no evidence must be led regarding the state’s available 
resources, an alternative accommodation order based on the second ground is less 
complicated than alternative accommodation orders based on the first ground (the positive 
right of access to adequate housing). Even where the state proves that it lacks the available 
resources, a court is technically not limited by this fact and can still grant an alternative 
accommodation order.1062 
This section, first, explores whether an eviction order or the delay of the eviction in a 
stalemate situation might amount to an unconstitutional limitation of the human rights 
identified above, sections 9, 25(1) 26(1) or 34 of the Constitution. Second, it determines 
whether the existing legal framework permits granting an alternative accommodation order 
against the state as remedy for the limitation. Third, the section considers when the existing 
legal framework authorises holding the state liable for such limitations.  
5.1 Limitation of rights 
To determine whether there was an unconstitutional limitation of a right in the Bill of Rights, 
a two-stage process is followed.1063 The first stage is to determine whether the right has been 
limited.1064 Whoever alleges the limitation carries the burden of proving it.1065 In this context, 
the burden would be on either the unlawful occupiers or the landowner. The second stage is 
to consider whether the limitation is constitutionally sound in terms of section 36(1) of the 
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Constitution.1066 A limitation of a right in the Bill of Rights is constitutionally sound if it is 
done in terms of a law of general application and is reasonable and justifiable based on 
certain factors.1067 The burden of proof in this regard lies with the entity that caused the 
limitation.1068 In this context, since the aim is to get an alternative accommodation order 
against the state, the landowner or the unlawful occupiers would have to prove that their 
rights have been limited by the state. The burden of proof would then shift to the state to 
prove that the limitation was constitutional.  
This two-stage process is subsequently followed with respect to the potential limitation of 
sections 9, 25(1), 26(1) and 34 of the Constitution in the context of evictions. The potential 
limitation of the property1069 and housing1070 rights is discussed separately, whereas the 
potential limitation of sections 9 and 34 is discussed together. Although some general 
observations can be made regarding the application of section 36(1) of the Constitution, the 
enquiry is factual and the outcome might differ depending on the facts.1071 
5.1.1 Limitation of the right to property in terms of section 25(1) of the 
Constitution 
Section 25(1) of the Constitution provides that a deprivation of property is only lawful if it is 
done in terms of a law of general application and is not arbitrary. The court, in Changing 
Tides, suggested that a denial of an eviction would amount to an unconstitutional 
infringement of the landowner’s right in terms of section 25(1) of the Constitution.1072 It 
found that a delay of the eviction might amount to a limitation of the right, but might be just 
and equitable.1073  
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Kruger1074 fleshes out this argument that a delay of an eviction1075 might limit the landowner’s 
right in terms of section 25(1)1076 and argues that a court-sanctioned delay of the enjoyment of 
this right would amount to an unlawful deprivation. To succeed with this argument, there 
must have been a deprivation, which was either not authorised by a law of general application 
or arbitrary. He argues that any court-sanctioned delay an eviction can be classified as a 
deprivation, even within the strictest definition of deprivation provided by the Constitutional 
Court. That is, the definition given to deprivation in Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela 
Metropolitan Municipality.1077 In this case, the court found that deprivation is a “substantial 
interference or limitation that goes beyond the normal restrictions on property use or 
enjoyment found in an open and democratic society”.1078 This is because the landowner had to 
carry the financial burden of obtaining an eviction order, as well as endure the loss of use of 
his property during this time. Yet, even after obtaining the order, it cannot use its land.1079 
Kruger relies on the decision in Changing Tides, where it was found that section 4(8) of PIE 
sanctions a delay in the execution of an eviction order.1080 Similarly, section 4(6), 4(7) and 
6(3) of PIE authorises a delay in the granting of an eviction order. This means that 
deprivation is sanctioned by a law of general application.1081 Hence, his argument is that a 
delay of the eviction is a deprivation that is done in terms of a law of general application.  
For such a deprivation in terms of a law of general application to be unlawful under section 
25(1) of the Constitution, it must be arbitrary. An arbitrary deprivation is one where sufficient 
reason for the deprivation is not provided in the authorising law.1082 Kruger argues that a 
delay of an eviction is arbitrary since it places an unjustified housing duty on a single private 
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landowner.1083 This was argued in Modderklip and confirmed by the court in Skurweplaas.1084 
Accordingly, he contends that a delay of an eviction amounts to an unlawful deprivation of 
property.1085  
A counterargument could be that the temporary burden would not be arbitrary if the 
landowner acquiesced to the unlawful occupation1086 or knowingly acquired ownership of 
property that was unlawfully occupied.1087 In terms of this argument, a delay of the eviction 
order would be arbitrary if the landowner had not acquiesced to the unlawful occupation or 
had not knowingly acquired property that was unlawfully occupied. Moreover, the 
knowledge or consent of the landowner is unlikely to be determinative regarding whether a 
delay would be arbitrary, but would rather only be a factor in the decision.  
Van der Walt argues that a deprivation in terms of PIE would only be arbitrary if it amounts 
to an “unnecessarily heavy” burden on the landowner.1088 That is, if a landowner is unable “to 
reclaim its land within a reasonable time.”1089 It could be argued that a very long delay of the 
eviction order in a stalemate situation would fall into this category. While Kruger does not 
expressly limit his analysis to long delays, his focus is on such delays. That is, delays linked 
to the date on which the state is able to provide alternative accommodation within its short-
term housing programme, which could be “a number of years”.1090 Accordingly, a long delay 
of the eviction order might amount to an unlawful deprivation of the landowner’s property.1091 
This is confirmed in Brookway where the court found that a two-year delay would amount to 
a violation of section 25(1).1092 If this approach is followed, the fact that the landowner 
acquiesced to the unlawful occupation or acquired property knowing that it is unlawfully 
occupied would affect whether a delay would be considered unreasonably long. 
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In terms of the two-stage process, if it is found that section 25(1) of the Constitution is 
limited, the next step will be to consider whether the limitation is constitutional in terms of 
section 36(1) of the Constitution. Kruger argues that this subsequent test against the 
limitation clause cannot point to a lawful limitation if the deprivation has already been found 
to be arbitrary in terms of section 25(1) of the Constitution. This is because an arbitrary 
deprivation is by definition one without justification. It cannot be reasonable and justifiable in 
terms of section 36(1) of the Constitution.1093  
Based on this argument, an unreasonably long delay of an eviction in a stalemate situation 
would not be constitutionally sound and should not be granted. To prevent the limitation the 
eviction order must be executed within a short time. However, in a stalemate situation, an 
eviction within a short time would not be just and equitable toward the unlawful occupiers. 
Hence, if a court chooses to equalise the balance in a stalemate situation through a delay of 
the eviction for a long time,1094 this is likely to place an unconstitutional limitation on the 
landowner’s right to property.  
Whether the state can be held liable to prevent or remedy this limitation is discussed in 
Section 5.3 below. The following section considers whether the granting of an eviction order, 
to be executed within a short time, would amount to an unconstitutional limitation of the 
unlawful occupiers’ right in section 26(1) of the Constitution. 
5.1.2 Limitation of the negative right of access to adequate housing in 
terms of section 26(1) of the Constitution 
In Grootboom, the Constitutional Court found that section 26(1) of the Constitution 
entrenches at least a negative right not to be deprived of existing access to adequate 
housing.1095 To determine whether an eviction of unlawful occupiers would amount to an 
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unconstitutional limitation of this negative right, the two-stage process must be followed. 
Accordingly, it must first be examined whether an eviction of unlawful occupiers could 
constitute a limitation of the unlawful occupiers’ right of access to adequate housing. If so, 
the limitation clause must be applied to determine whether the limitation could be 
constitutional. 
It is difficult to determine whether an eviction would amount to a loss of existing access to 
adequate housing since the Constitutional Court refused to give content to the right.1096 One 
characteristic of the occupation in eviction matters that might be difficult to reconcile with 
the notion of adequate housing is that it is unlawful. It could be argued that unlawful 
occupation cannot be considered “adequate housing”. In fact, one of the things that courts 
place emphasis on when granting alternative accommodation orders is that the 
accommodation must be secure against eviction and provide some form of tenure security.1097 
This corresponds with the international law understanding of the term adequate housing, 
which includes legal tenure security; availability of services to ensure health, nutrition, 
comfort and security; affordability; habitability; accessibility; proximity to essential facilities; 
and cultural adequacy.1098 Tenure security is threatened when occupation is unlawful. 
Another characteristic of the occupation in some eviction matters that might be difficult to 
reconcile with the notion of adequate housing is that it poses a risk to the health and safety of 
the unlawful occupiers. This was the case in Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Berea Township 
and 197 Main Street Johannesburg v City of Johannesburg.1099 It is equally hard to imagine 
that such occupation would be considered adequate. 
If unlawful or unsafe occupation is not seen as adequate housing, an eviction would not 
constitute a violation of the occupiers’ negative right not to be deprived of their existing 
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access to adequate housing. Accordingly, an alternative accommodation order could not be 
justified on the basis that it remedies the violation of the unlawful occupiers’ negative right in 
terms of section 26(1) of the Constitution.  
This might be considered too strict an interpretation of section 26(1). It could be argued that 
the loss of any access to housing, whether adequate or not, would amount to a limitation of 
the negative right of access to adequate housing.1100 In terms of this interpretation, the rights 
of people, who are left homeless by the eviction, are limited.  
Another argument against the finding that there was a limitation of the right of access to 
adequate housing relates to the idea that a person’s rights are always limited to the extent that 
they may not interfere with the rights of others to exercise their rights.1101 Accordingly, the 
unlawful occupiers’ right of access to adequate housing is limited to the extent that they must 
not interfere with the right to property of landowners. Should a court dismiss this argument, 
the second step of the process must be followed. 
Accordingly, it must be determined whether the limitation is done in terms of a law of 
general application and whether it is reasonable and justifiable.1102 As with the section-25(1) 
enquiry, if an eviction order in terms of PIE amounts to a limitation, then the limitation is 
done in terms of a law of general application. In respect of whether the limitation is 
reasonable and justifiable, five factors must be considered:1103 
“ (a) the nature of the right; 
(b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation; 
(c) the nature and extent of the limitation; 
(d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and 
(e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose.” 
All of the factors are considered simultaneously, which means that a finding that one of the 
factors points to an unlawful limitation does not necessarily prevent the consideration of 
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other factors.1104 Inquiring into the nature of the right can be understood to require the court to 
determine the importance of the right in relation to other rights.1105 However, the 
Constitutional Court has found that rights should not be ranked.1106 Still, the protection of 
some rights would be more important to “an open and democratic society”.1107 Hence, the 
limitation of a more “important” right would require more compelling justification.1108 
Protection of the right of access to adequate housing is considered “important” in such a 
society.1109 Accordingly, justification for the limitation of such a right must be compelling.  
The factor relating to the importance of the purpose of the limitation requires the court to 
determine the purpose of the limitation first and then to examine its importance.1110 In the 
context of evictions, the purpose of the limitation is to prevent unlawful occupation1111 and the 
further limitation of the landowner’s right to property.1112 The purpose of the limitation is 
important because it ensures the protection of the constitutional right of the landowner.1113 
However, it might be less important in situations where the landowner has no intention to use 
the property in the near future. More broadly, the purpose of the limitation is to uphold social 
order. Rights are meaningless if they can be limited by others without consequence. Hence, in 
an open and democratic society, the prevention of illegal self-help would be an important 
objective. However, this self-help might occur because of need, not greed.1114  
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In respect of the factor regarding the nature and extent of the limitation, the greater the 
limitation, the more compelling the justification must be.1115 In an eviction matter that leaves 
the unlawful occupier homeless, there is a total loss of enjoyment of the right. However, 
where alternative accommodation is available or provided by the state, the extent of the 
limitation is mitigated. Hence, if an eviction would leave the unlawful occupiers homeless, 
the extent of the limitation would be great and would require compelling justification. 
The fourth factor considers the relationship between the limitation and its purpose. In the 
context of eviction of unlawful occupiers, there is a direct relationship between the limitation 
and the purpose thereof. The unlawful occupation and the limitation of the landowner’s right 
to property are both ended by the eviction.  
Finally, a court must consider whether there are less restrictive means to achieve the purpose 
of the limitation. In the context of eviction, less restrictive means are possible. The land could 
be expropriated,1116 which would end the limitation of the right to property, as well as the 
unlawful occupation. However, this might have separation of powers implications.1117 
Alternative accommodation could be provided to the unlawful occupiers by the state, which 
would prevent the complete loss of the enjoyment of the right of access to adequate housing 
by the unlawful occupiers. The landowner could be compensated, which would mitigate the 
continued limitation of its right.  
The fact that less restrictive means could be identified does not mean that the limitation is not 
justifiable. A court will always be able to come up with less restrictive means.1118 Two 
considerations affect the weight of this factor. One consideration is whether these less 
restrictive means are as effective at achieving the purpose for the limitation.1119 None of the 
less restrictive means would be effective at addressing the social order issue of condoning 
unlawful behaviour. Hence, where the unlawful occupation occurred out of greed, these less 
                                                 
1115
 S v Manamela 2000 (3) SA 1 (CC) para 32,69; as referred to in Woolman & Botha "Limitations" in CLOSA  
79. 
1116
 S 9(3) of the National Housing Act allows for expropriation by municipalities for purposes of housing, 
referred to in Strydom & Viljoen (2014) PER/PELJ 1236. 
1117
 See Chapter 5. 
1118
 S v Mamabolo 2001 (3) SA 409 (CC) para 49, as referred to in Woolman & Botha "Limitations" in CLOSA  
89. 
1119
 In De Reuck v Director of Public Prosecutions (Witwatersrand Local Division) 2004 (1) SA 406 (CC) para 
81, the court found that means cannot be considered less restrictive in terms of s 36(2)(e) if it is less effective. 
Referred to in Woolman & Botha "Limitations" in CLOSA  34-91. 
165 
 
restrictive measures should not be taken. Moreover, only the alternative accommodation 
order really achieves the purpose of protecting the landowner’s right to property. The other 
consideration that affects the weight of the less restrictive means is the burden placed on the 
resources of the state.1120 All of the less restrictive measures place a heavy burden on the 
resources of the state. This is especially relevant in stalemate situations, where the reason for 
the limitation is often due to the limited resources of the state – the state was unable to 
provide alternative accommodation in terms of the EHP to prevent the loss of access to 
housing. Bypassing of the EHP in this way creates separation of powers issues.1121  
Three of the factors – the nature of the right, the extent of the limitation and availability of 
less restrictive means – suggest that the limitation is unconstitutional. Two factors – the 
importance of the purpose of the limitation and the relationship between the limitation and its 
purpose – point to the limitation being constitutional. Clearly, it yet again comes down to a 
tension between the landowner’s right in terms of section 25(1) of the Constitution and the 
unlawful occupiers’ rights in terms of section 26(1) of the Constitution.  
A circumstance such as greed or blameworthiness on the part of the unlawful occupiers 
would tip the scale in favour of the landowner. However, where the unlawful occupiers are 
poor; have been occupying the land for a long time; and qualify for the state’s housing 
scheme, an argument can be made that an eviction would not be reasonable and justifiable. 
Accordingly, an eviction would amount to an unlawful limitation of the unlawful occupier’s 
rights.  
If this final argument succeeds, a delay of the eviction would unlawfully limit the rights of 
the landowner, while ordering that the eviction order be executed within a short period would 
unlawfully limit the rights of the unlawful occupiers. The unlawful limitation of the rights of 
one of the parties is inevitable. Regardless of the side of the balance that the court chooses to 
uphold, any order would amount to the unlawful limitation of the rights of one of the parties.  
However, as indicated earlier in this section, it is unlikely that an eviction would constitute a 
limitation of the unlawful occupiers’ right in terms of section 26(1) of the Constitution. The 
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fact that such an argument has not been raised in eviction matters suggests that litigants do 
not consider it a viable argument. This does not mean that an eviction order with immediate 
effect would be just and equitable.1122 It only means that justification for an alternative 
accommodation order against the state is unlikely to be based on the unconstitutional 
limitation of the unlawful occupiers’ negative right of access to adequate housing. 
5.1.3 Limitation of other rights 
Even when an eviction that would leave the unlawful occupiers homeless is considered just 
and equitable toward them, it could still be argued that the unlawful occupiers should not be 
evicted because an eviction would cause them to reoccupy the land, unlawfully occupy other 
land or disturb the social order. In Modderklip an eviction order had been granted but could 
not be executed based on these reasons, as well as the fact that the execution would be too 
expensive.1123 The court found that these facts made it impossible for the landowner to 
execute the eviction order and this amounted to an unlawful limitation of its right of access to 
courts.1124 Furthermore, the limitation could not be lawful in terms of section 36 of the 
Constitution, since it was not done in terms of a law of general application.1125 
The facts that led to this decision were unique. This influences the extent to which the case 
can be used as precedent. For one, the reason for the landowner’s inability to execute the 
order was that the group of unlawful occupiers was extremely large; there were some 40 000 
people. Hence, the case can only be relied upon where the size of the group is similarly 
problematic. Two, the delay in the execution of the eviction order was not court ordered in 
terms of PIE. Accordingly, the limitation could not be constitutional.1126 
The extent to which this decision could apply to situations where there is a delay of an 
eviction, in terms of PIE, is uncertain.1127 If there is a delay of an eviction in respect of a large 
group of unlawful occupiers due to factors similar to that in Modderklip, could it still be 
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argued that the delay constitutes an unconstitutional limitation of the landowner’s right of 
access to courts? To answer this question the two-stage process must be followed. 
The first stage entails determining whether the landowner’s right of access to courts was 
limited. If the reasons for the inability to execute the order are similar to Modderklip, then 
this case is precedent for the fact that the landowner’s right of access to the court would be 
limited. 
During the second stage, one must determine whether the limitation is constitutional in terms 
of section 36 of the Constitution. Hence, it must be determined whether the limitation was 
done in terms of a law of general application and whether it is reasonable and justifiable. If 
there is a delay of an eviction in terms of PIE, the limitation would be in terms of a law of 
general application.1128 To determine whether the limitation is reasonable and justifiable, the 
factors listed in section 36 must be considered.1129  
One of these factors, “the nature and extent of the limitation”,
1130
 renders a particularly 
interesting outcome when applied in this context. The extent of the limitation is that the 
landowner is unable to protect his constitutional right to property. Hence, the actual issue in 
such a situation is the protection of the landowner’s right to property.1131  
With regard to this notion, Modderklip is a perfect example of an equalising condition.1132 An 
eviction would not have been just and equitable toward other landowners,1133 the public1134 and 
possibly also the unlawful occupiers. A delay of the eviction would not have been just and 
equitable toward the landowner since it would violate its right to property. To remedy this 
violation and equalise the balance, the court suspended the eviction order subject to the 
condition that the landowner must be compensated in the form of constitutional damages.1135 
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Hence, if a court orders a delay of an eviction to preserve the public order, this might amount 
to a limitation of the landowner’s right of access to courts. However, it is more likely to 
amount to an unconstitutional limitation of the landowner’s right to property.1136  
Similar to this finding, the allegations regarding limitation of section 9 of the Constitution are 
in fact about the landowner’s right to property.1137 The Supreme Court of Appeal, in President 
of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd1138 (hereinafter 
Modderklip SCA”), found that continued occupation would amount to an unfair 
discrimination against the landowner. This is because the landowner is required to carry the 
burden of housing the unlawful occupiers. Placing this burden on the landowner and not 
equally on other private persons is not justified.1139 To determine the correctness of this 
statement the two-stage process must be followed. As with the limitation analysis for section 
34 of the Constitution, application of the second stage reveals that the limitation is actually 
that of the landowner’s right to property. That is because the factor relating to the extent of 
the limitation would again indicate that the extent of the limitation is that the landowner is 
unable to enjoy its constitutional right to property. Hence, the actual issue in such a situation 
is the limitation of the landowner’s right to property.1140 The fact that the occupation amounts 
to unequal treatment of the landowner could be used to confirm that the deprivation is 
arbitrary.1141 
Wherever the rights of the parties are unconstitutionally limited, the possibility of a remedy is 
created.1142 The form that such a remedy may take and whether it can be in the form of an 
alternative accommodation order against the state is explored below.  
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5.2 Appropriateness of an alternative accommodation orders as 
remedy  
In a stalemate situation, the court finds that an eviction would not be just and equitable 
toward the unlawful occupiers or the public and a delay of the eviction would not be just and 
equitable toward the landowner. To solve the tension, the court might decide either to grant 
the eviction and remedy the limitation of the unlawful occupiers’ right or to delay the 
eviction and remedy the limitation of the landowner’s right. Section 38 of the Constitution 
stipulates that, upon the unconstitutional limitation of a right in the bill of rights, the court 
may grant any relief it finds appropriate.  
Modderklip is the only case in which a remedy had been specifically based on the violation of 
one of the rights discussed in this chapter. In this matter, the court ordered the state to pay 
constitutional damages to the landowner and not to provide alternative accommodation to the 
unlawful occupiers.1143  
The purpose of constitutional damages is to provide relief for the unconstitutional violation of 
a constitutional right.1144 Three types of constitutional damages can be identified, damages to 
correct a loss, damages as a punitive measure1145 and symbolic damages.1146 The first type of 
damages, damages to correct a loss, is most relevant to the current discussion. This is because 
the purpose of awarding relief is to “make” the order just and equitable.  
Constitutional damages should only be granted as last resort if no other remedy is 
available.1147 In the current context a constitutional remedy, like constitutional damages, 
might be the only solution to a stalemate situation. Kotze argues that the constitutional 
damages awarded in Modderklip cannot be considered effective. Her main argument in this 
regard is that the order did not realise the right of access to adequate housing of the unlawful 
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occupiers in that it did not provide legally secure tenure for the unlawful occupiers.1148 A 
counterargument to this contention is that the aim of the award for constitutional damages, in 
Modderklip, was not to provide relief for the limitation of the unlawful occupiers’ rights but 
the landowner’s right of access to courts. There was no finding that any right other than the 
landowner’s right of access to courts was unconstitutionally limited. Similarly, in the current 
context, constitutional damages are unlikely to be awarded due to the unconstitutional 
limitation of the rights of the unlawful occupiers. A second counterargument is that the order, 
in Modderklip, does provide secure tenure to the unlawful occupiers since it allows the 
unlawful occupiers to remain in occupation until the state provides them with alternative 
accommodation.1149  
Kotze further argues that the award of constitutional damages was ineffective, in Modderklip, 
because it amounted to an arbitrary deprivation of the landowner’s property.1150 It essentially 
allows an unlawful situation to prevail. However, the point of the order is to compensate the 
landowner for the unconstitutional limitation of its rights so that an unlawful situation (the 
non-execution of the eviction order) can prevail. In addition, it could be argued that the award 
of damages essentially provides effective relief for the arbitrary deprivation of the 
landowner’s property. This is certainly the case in the scenarios discussed in this chapter.  
Still, constitutional damages might not be appropriate in all situations. For one, some 
stalemate situations exist because the landowner needs to use the land. Receiving 
constitutional damages might not suffice.  
Second, a landowner might not be as willing, as the landowner in Modderklip was,1151 to part 
with its property indefinitely, possibly forever. This could be solved by placing a deadline on 
the state to ensure that the unlawful occupation is ceased. Usually, this would entail 
postponing the eviction order until the state has the available resources to fulfil any short-
term housing duty it has toward the unlawful occupiers. The state can fulfil its short-term 
housing duty either by expropriating the property or by providing those unlawful occupiers 
who qualify under the EHP with alternative accommodation. A deadline on the state would 
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also solve any potential problem regarding the continued ownership of the landowner and its 
continued responsibility for the property.  
Another possible problem with granting constitutional damages is that it probably would not 
be effective relief as compensation for the unlawful occupiers for the violation of their rights, 
unless it enables them to secure alternative accommodation elsewhere. With a large group, 
the resources could rather be used to provide them with alternative accommodation. This 
would solve the landowner’s problem and would probably be more cost-effective than 
funding individual places of accommodation. This begs the question, can an alternative 
accommodation order be granted as relief for the unconstitutional limitation of the rights 
discussed in this chapter? 
In Fose v Minister of Safety and Security,1152 the court found that section 38, on which the 
constitutional damages awarded in Modderklip was based, gives the court a wide discretion to 
forge new remedies if human rights are violated.1153 An alternative accommodation order 
might be one such remedy. In fact, the effect of the order, in Modderklip, was that the 
unlawful occupiers were not evicted without accommodation, but received (permanent)1154 
accommodation from the state. This has the same effect of not resulting in an eviction 
without alternative accommodation as an alternative accommodation order. The order in 
Skurweplaas, where the argument in favour of an alternative accommodation order is based 
on Modderklip, confirms the possibility that an alternative accommodation order could be 
granted as a constitutional remedy for the violation of one of the rights discussed in this 
chapter.1155  
A constitutional remedy for the provision of housing is not foreign to South African 
constitutional law. In Tswelopele Non-Profit Organisation and Others v City of Tshwane 
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Metropolitan Municipality,1156 the court created a constitutional remedy for the replacement 
and reconstruction of unlawfully destroyed informal houses.1157 The basis of the remedy was 
to provide relief for the unconstitutional limitation of the right, in section 26(3) of the 
Constitution, not to have one’s home destroyed without a court order.1158 In Tswelopele, the 
state had demolished homes that were unlawfully erected on land.1159 The state had not 
obtained a court order in terms of PIE.1160 Consequently, the demolition and eviction 
unconstitutionally limited the unlawful occupiers’ section-26(3) right.1161 The state was forced 
to provide the unlawful occupiers with alternative homes on the same piece of land.1162 
While the facts of Tswelopele are wholly different from the types of cases discussed in this 
chapter, the case does indicate that the court has a wide discretion in creating constitutional 
remedies. It is willing to make orders that go beyond mere compensation and require parties 
to provide housing. An alternative accommodation order can be considered as such a 
constitutional remedy.  
It is uncertain from which state budget the resources for complying with the alternative 
accommodation order should be provided. It might come from the state’s short-term housing 
budget since it amounts to the fulfilment of the state’s short-term housing duty toward the 
unlawful occupiers.1163 However, this line of argument is likely to be used when the state does 
not have sufficient funds within its short-term housing budget, the unlawful occupiers do not 
qualify under the short-term programme or the state has no reasonable short-term housing 
budget. Hence, the state would have to find the resources elsewhere.1164 It might have to 
reprioritise funds allocated to other causes. Whether such reprioritisation would be fair 
toward those who would have benefited from them is considered in Chapter 6.  
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Moreover, the availability of state resources is not a condition for granting an alternative 
accommodation order based on the second ground, unlike for the first ground for alternative 
accommodation orders.1165 It will be easier to get relief since the state cannot argue that it 
does not have the available resources. However, there is a risk that the state would not be able 
to comply with the order. Another risk is that the effect of such orders would be that the 
litigation budget increases, leaving even fewer resources for the housing budget.  
A problem with granting an alternative accommodation order in these matters is that the 
limitation was done in terms of PIE. Since PIE allows the limitations of rights, it can be 
argued that PIE is not in line with the Constitution. Hence, the remedy cannot simply be to 
address the loss of the victim, but must also bring PIE in line with the Constitution.1166 An 
argument could be that section 4(12) of PIE allows for the remedying of any limitation of 
rights by attaching a condition to the eviction order.1167 However, section 4(12) is only 
concerned with conditions attached to eviction orders and would not allow for an equalising 
condition attached to a denial or postponement of an eviction order. PIE should be amended 
to include the possibility of attaching a condition to any order made in terms of PIE, even an 
order that denies or postpones an eviction.1168 This can be achieved simply to strike out the 
words “for the eviction of an unlawful occupier or for the demolition or removal of buildings 
or structures” from s 4(12) of PIE so that it reads: any order in terms of this section is subject 
to the conditions deemed reasonable by the court. Such an amendment would provide 
certainty regarding the circumstances under which such remedy may be granted.  
5.3 Liability of the state 
Where an unlawful limitation of the rights is found, the liability of the state to remedy the 
limitation must be proved. If the state is the applicant, then the limitation of the rights of the 
unlawful occupiers can easily be ascribed to it.1169 Yet, where the application is made by a 
private landowner, it gets more complicated. Similarly, the limitation of the rights of the 
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landowner can be ascribed to the unlawful occupiers. It is more difficult to justify that the 
state must be held liable when the perpetrator seems to be a private party.1170 After all, the 
Constitutional Court in Grootboom confirmed the possible horizontal application of section 
26(1) of the Constitution,1171 whereas Modderklip SCA suggests that section 25(1) of the 
Constitution can have horizontal application.1172  
The extent to which these sections can be applied horizontally is not settled in our law. In the 
Constitutional Court decision of Modderklip, the court found it unnecessary to address the 
issue.1173 As explained above,1174 the housing duty in section 26 of the Constitution can and 
has been placed on private parties through legislative and other measures. In this way, section 
26(1) has found horizontal application. As for the horizontal application of section 25(1), 
despite the suggestion in Modderklip SCA that it might be applied horizontally, some regard 
its inability to be applied horizontally as a fact.1175 Van der Walt argues that, despite the fact 
that the court referred to the section’s horizontal application, the Modderklip SCA decision 
did not involve the horizontal application of section 25(1). According to Van der Walt, the 
fact that the court granted the order to provide relief against the state meant that it applied 
section 25(1) vertically.1176 Moreover, in Phoebus Apollo Aviation CC v Minister of Safety 
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and Security,1177 the Constitutional Court found section 25(1) of the Constitution irrelevant 
where someone was deprived of property by private persons.1178 Nevertheless, Van der Walt 
does argue that actions by private persons that are not authorised by law,1179 as is the case 
with an unlawful occupation, might amount to a deprivation or an expropriation.1180 
However, similar to the Constitutional Court decision of Modderklip, it is unnecessary to 
settle the dispute regarding the horizontal application of these sections here. The purpose of 
this study is to determine when a court can hold the state liable solving a stalemate situation. 
Hence, this section explores the possible reasons for holding the state liable for violating 
these sections, even in situations where the primary the perpetrator may be a private party. 
The limitations discussed above occur in terms of PIE. PIE sanctions the allowing, denying or 
delaying of an eviction, which might lead to the limitation of rights. PIE is legislation that 
was enacted by the state. Accordingly, it could be argued that the state, through PIE, 
sanctions the granting, denial and delaying of evictions. Hence, the state is liable for any 
limitation in terms thereof.1181 However, PIE simply gives effect to section 26(3) of the 
Constitution. The power to allow, deny or delay an eviction is conferred upon the court by the 
Constitution, not the state. Moreover, it could be argued that the court-sanctioned delay does 
not cause the limitation of section 25(1). Rather, the unlawful occupation itself causes the 
deprivation. The occupation was not authorised by law and might amount to the horizontal 
violation of section 25(1).1182 Therefore, additional justification, in terms of the existing legal 
framework, is necessary to hold the state liable. 
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Justification can be found in the state’s constitutional duty to protect both the landowner and 
the unlawful occupiers against interference with their human rights by others.1183 The 
unlawful occupiers’ loss of their homes or the landowner’s loss of the use of its property 
could mean that the state failed to comply with its duty to protect. Nevertheless, the state 
cannot be found liable if a party can be found responsible for their own loss.1184  
A question that arises is whether the state can be held liable even if no fault on its part is 
involved.1185 Fault on the part of the state seems to play a big role in the decision in which 
alternative accommodation orders have been granted.1186 To hold a person liable in terms of 
the common law, fault is usually a requirement.1187 This includes negligence1188 or intent.1189 
The Constitutional Court, in K v Minister of Safety and Security,1190 confirmed that it is “a 
basic norm of our society that liability for harm should rest on fault, whether in the form of 
negligence or intent”.1191 However, this case involved a claim in delict.1192 A distinction must 
be made between a common law delict and a constitutional infringement.1193 Fault is not 
necessarily a requirement for liability due to the infringement of a constitutional right.1194  
Nonetheless, it is unlikely that a court would grant a constitutional remedy against the state if 
the state was not blameworthy at all. Pienaar, in her discussion of the award of constitutional 
damages in Modderklip, supports this conclusion in stating that the court ordered the payment 
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of constitutional damages because the state failed to fulfil its duty in assisting the landowner 
in executing the court order.1195 No precedent suggests the court would grant a constitutional 
remedy against the state, where the state had not been blameworthy.1196 Such an order would 
defeat one of the aims of such a constitutional remedy, which is to prevent future 
violations.1197 An award for a constitutional remedy against the state could not attain this 
purpose if the infringement was not due to blameworthiness on the part of the state. That 
blameworthiness on the part of the state is a requirement for a constitutional remedy against it 
in eviction matters explains why the court, in Ives v Rajah, did not grant an alternative 
accommodation order, since it was satisfied that the municipality had acted reasonably.1198 
Blameworthiness on the part of the state is not necessarily limited to a failure to assist in the 
execution of an eviction order, as was the case in Modderklip.1199 Another example of 
blameworthiness on the part of the state is a failure to implement a reasonable short-term 
housing programme.1200 This was the case in Brookway. Since the state did not implement a 
short-term programme and budget accordingly, there were no available resources to fulfil the 
short-term housing needs of those living in emergency housing situations. Accordingly, the 
state could not assist the unlawful occupiers facing eviction and, hence, prevent their loss of 
access to housing.1201 This argument can only succeed if the unlawful occupiers would have 
benefited from the state’s short-term housing programme, had the state implemented it. 
A further example of blameworthiness on part of the state is unreasonably slow overall 
progress in housing delivery. If the pace of the realisation of this right had been appropriate, 
                                                 
1195
 Pienaar Land Reform  775. 
1196
 In Modderklip, for example, the court criticised the state for not taking the steps needed to resolve the 
problem. See, Modderklip para 33. Similarly, constitutional damages have been granted against the Eastern 
Cape government in a number of cases due to its unreasonable delay in considering applications for social 
grants. This violated the applicants’ rights to just administrative action in terms of s 33(1) of the Constitution. 
See, MEC for the Department of Welfare v Kate 2006 (4) SA 478 (SCA) para 17; Mahambehlala v MEC for 
Welfare, Eastern Cape 2002 (1) SA 342 (SE) at 353D-E; Mbanga v MEC for Welfare, Eastern Cape 2002 (1) 
SA 359 (SE) at 370B-C. In Darson Construction (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town 2007 (4) SA 488 (C) at 510D-
G, the court granted constitutional damages against the City of Cape Town for the infringement of the 
applicant’s right to just administrative action by allowing an unauthorised administrator to consider the tender.  
1197
 Van der Walt & Midgley Principles of Delict  7. 
1198
 It could nonetheless have ordered the municipality to apply for funding from the provincial government. See 
Chapter 3:6.3. 
1199
 See Pienaar Land Reform  775. 
1200
 In Blue Moonlight SCA 70-72 the state’s responsibility is considered conditional upon its blameworthiness. 
See also, Kruger (2014) SALJ 340-341. 
1201
 See the discussion of Brookway at the start of this Section. 
178 
 
the occupiers would not have been forced to occupy the land unlawfully.1202 This argument 
can only succeed if the unlawful occupiers had been on the state’s housing list and would 
have received housing, had the state acted reasonably. While this argument might be 
theoretically sound, it would be hard to prove. The party alleging that the state failed to fulfil 
its duty would have to prove that state’s progress was unreasonable, the unlawful occupiers 
would have already received housing had the progress been reasonable and the unlawful 
occupation was due to the slow progress of the state.1203 
The state could also be blameworthy in failing to respond reasonably to requests by the 
landowner for assistance in preventing the initial unlawful occupation of land. In Modderklip, 
the Constitutional Court criticised the state for not responding to the requests of the 
landowner for assistance in protecting its property against unlawful occupation.1204 This 
assistance must be provided before the unlawful occupiers make the property their homes.1205 
Moreover, the state’s fault could lie in not attempting to engage meaningfully with the 
unlawful occupiers, who might face homelessness,1206 to find a solution to the matter prior to 
it reaching the court. This requirement of meaningful engagement was established in Olivia 
Road.1207 The municipality, in whose jurisdiction the unlawful occupation occurs, should 
foresee and plan for a potential emergency housing situations due to the eviction of the 
unlawful occupiers.1208 It should engage meaningfully with the unlawful occupiers as soon as 
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it becomes aware of a potential eviction.1209 An amicable solution should be found,1210 instead 
of taking the matter to trial.1211  
Meaningful engagement is a “two-way process” in which the state communicates with the 
unlawful occupiers.1212 The state is required to act reasonably when engaging with unlawful 
occupiers. In Olivia Road, it was found that, even where unlawful occupiers are 
uncooperative, the state must make a reasonable effort to engage.1213  
The court has also found that a lack of meaningful engagement will weigh in the balance 
against an eviction order (without alternative accommodation).1214 However, the definition of 
meaningful engagement is unclear. In part, the uncertainty can be ascribed to the fact that 
what would constitute meaningful engagement would depend on the context.1215 In Joe Slovo, 
Yacoob J states that the engagement need only meet the standard of reasonableness.1216 There 
are realistic and practical limits to this duty.1217 Yacoob J found that it was not realistic to 
expect the state to engage with each member of a large group individually.1218 This contradicts 
Olivia Road, in which the court required individual and collective engagement. The court 
accepted the engagement by the city although the engagement was not structured and co-
ordinated and it did not lead to a solution regarding relocation.1219 This acceptance of the 
court of engagement that falls short of what is expected in Olivia Road has been subject to 
criticism.1220 It is possible that the court accepted the watered-down engagement because 
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overall it accepted the government’s approach and its willingness to provide alternative 
accommodation as reasonable. 
If the state responded reasonably1221 to the unlawful occupation, implemented a reasonable 
housing programme, including a reasonable short-term housing programme and budget, but 
was still unable to assist the unlawful occupiers under the EHP, it would not be blameworthy. 
In such situations, the court would likely not be able to hold the state liable in terms of its 
duty to respect, protect, promote and fulfil human rights. In other words, its constitutional 
mandate would not allow it to grant an alternative accommodation based on the second 
ground. This does not mean that the unlawful occupiers must be evicted without alternative 
accommodation. It simply means that another solution must be found.  
6 Conclusion 
This chapter aimed to determine when alternative accommodation orders based on the second 
ground would adhere to existing legal framework. In other words, it explored the possibility 
of founding alternative accommodation orders on grounds other than the state’s housing duty.  
If a court finds that an eviction would not be just and equitable toward the unlawful occupiers 
and a delay of the eviction would not be just and equitable toward the landowner (or role 
players), it might want to grant an alternative accommodation order against the state. 
Justification for granting this order against the state might be found in the state’s duty to 
respect and protect human rights.  
This chapter explored situations in which a court might find that an eviction would not be just 
and equitable toward the unlawful occupiers but that a delay of the eviction would not be just 
and equitable toward the landowner (or role-players). This is referred to as a “stalemate 
situation”. Circumstances that have caused stalemate situations are that there is a large group 
of unlawful occupiers, but the eviction was applied for by a private landowner, the land is 
needed for use and/or unsafe to occupy. Other circumstances that might cause stalemate 
situations are that the unlawful occupiers are vulnerable, not blameworthy and have lived on 
the land for a long time, but the land is privately owned and needed for use or unsafe to 
occupy. In fact, whenever the unlawful occupiers face homelessness, purely because the state 
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does not have the resources to accommodate them within its short-term housing programme 
and the land is privately owned and to be used, a stalemate situation is created. 
Subsequently, the chapter investigated which rights might be unconstitutionally limited in a 
stalemate situation. It was found that the landowner’s right to property is likely to be 
unconstitutionally limited by an unreasonably long delay of the eviction order. While an 
eviction, with relatively immediate effect, may unconstitutionally limit the negative right of 
access to adequate housing of the unlawful occupiers, such a conclusion was found to be 
unlikely. Moreover, the potential limitation of other rights, such as the landowner’s right to 
equality or of access to courts, should not be considered in lieu of the limitation of the 
landowner’s right to property. This is because the effect of the limitation of these rights is 
that the landowner’s right to property is limited.  
Further, it was found that the state might be held liable for any unconstitutional limitation of 
these rights, based on its duty to respect and protect these rights. However, its liability is 
likely to be limited to the extent that the state is blameworthy. In holding the state liable, the 
right holder’s loss can be remedied in terms of a constitutional remedy. An alternative 
accommodation order is an example of a possible constitutional remedy. However, if the 
court relies on this ground for granting alternative accommodation orders, PIE should be 
amended to allow for the attaching of conditions to any order in terms of PIE, In other words, 
PIE should not only those orders in which evictions are granted, but also those in which 
evictions are postponed or denied.  
Despite this solution, some stalemate situations remain unsolved. If no fault is proved on the 
part of the state, it cannot be held liable and an alternative accommodation order cannot be 
made against it. This creates a problematic situation since the stalemate situation would 
remain.1222 
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PART TWO: RESPECT FOR THE FUNCTIONS OF 
GOVERNMENT 
This part considers when alternative accommodation orders would comply with the second 
criterion – respect for the functions of government. A court respects the functions of 
government when, one, it acknowledges the separate functions of other branches of 
government and, two, it fulfils its own functions properly. The requirement to acknowledge 
the separate functions of other branches of government is explored in Chapter 5. This 
requirement involves respecting the fact that other branches of government have different 
functions and the court should not interfere with these functions. In other words, the court 
must respect the constitutional principle of the separation of powers.1223  
In addition, acknowledging the separate functions of other branches of government relates to 
the notion of co-operative government. It requires respecting that, within those other 
branches, different entities have different functions and powers. In the context of alternative 
accommodation orders, this means that a court should not order one entity to perform the 
duties of another. Moreover, a court must also take into account the fact that the different 
spheres of government are required to co-operate with one another and assist each other. 
Hence, where more than one sphere is responsible for fulfilling the same function, a court 
should not place the duty to fulfil this function on only one of the spheres.  
Part of the requirement that the court must respect the functions of government is that it must 
fulfil its own functions properly. This is examined in Chapter 6. The court’s primary function 
is the administration of justice.1224 To determine when alternative accommodation orders are 
just, the appropriate form of justice must be identified. Once the appropriate form is 
identified, it is possible to determine under what circumstances alternative accommodation 
orders are just. Moreover, the content of a just alternative accommodation order can be 
established. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: RESPECT FOR THE FUNCTIONS OF 
THE LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE BRANCHES OF 
GOVERNMENT 
1 Introduction 
Two criteria are used in this thesis to determine when an alternative accommodation order as 
a condition to the eviction of unlawful occupiers in terms of PIE would comply with the 
court’s constitutional mandate.1225 The first criterion – that the order must adhere to the 
existing legal framework – was discussed in Part 1. The second criterion is that the order 
must respect the functions of government. This involves acknowledging the separate 
functions of other branches of government, the legislative and executive branches, and 
fulfilling its own functions properly. This chapter considers what “respecting the functions of 
other branches of government” entails.  
Broadly, it must be acknowledged that different branches of government have different 
functions and that the court should not unduly interfere with these functions. In other words, 
the court must respect the constitutional principle of the separation of powers.1226 In addition, 
acknowledging the separate functions of other branches of government relates to the notion 
of co-operative government.1227 It requires respecting that, within those other branches, 
different entities have different functions and powers. In the context of alternative 
accommodation orders, this means that a court should not order one entity to perform the 
duties of another. Moreover, a court must also take into account the fact that the different 
spheres of government are required to co-operate with one another and assist each other. 
Hence, where more than one sphere is responsible for the same matter a court should not 
focus on only one of the spheres.1228 
Before the implication of the separation of powers and co-operative government on the 
granting of alternative accommodation orders can be examined, the structure of government 
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is set out. Thereafter, this structure is used to examine what it means when the court respects 
the other branches of government in granting alternative accommodation orders. 
2 Separate powers of government 
The separation of powers doctrine separates the government into three branches: the 
legislative, executive and judicial authority.1229 Each branch must have its own personnel, 
powers and functions.1230 One branch is not allowed to perform or interfere with the powers 
and duties allocated to another branch.1231 In turn, each branch is required to keep the other 
branches in check to make sure that the performance of their powers and duties are 
constitutionally sound.
1232
  
The executive and the legislative branches are further separated into national, provincial and 
municipal spheres.1233 Each sphere has its own powers and functions.1234 The provincial sphere 
consists of nine provincial governments, one for each province. The municipal sphere 
consists of 278 municipal governments, each with their own area of government.1235 This 
ensures that government is in line with local demands and needs.1236 Moreover, separation of 
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government power into specific physical areas guarantees that government revenue is spent in 
every area of the country.1237 
Alternative accommodation orders amount to duties imposed on the state by the court. 
Usually, the duty is imposed on a specific sphere of government. Both the entity making the 
alternative accommodation order (the court) and the one against which the order is made (the 
state) form part of the government. As far as alternative accommodation orders are 
concerned, the entity making the order forms part of the judicial authority and the entity 
against which the order is made forms part of the executive authority. These authorities have 
different functions and powers. For an alternative accommodation order to be in line with the 
separation of powers, the entity making the order must have the power to do so. Furthermore, 
the entity against which the order is made must have the duty and the capacity to comply with 
the order.1238 The following section examines the composition and functions of the three 
branches of government to determine whether an alternative accommodation order would be 
in line with the judicial authority’s duty to respect the functions of other branches of 
government. 
2.1 The legislative authority 
The primary function of the legislative authority is to prepare1239 and pass legislation.1240 
Preparing legislation refers to the drafting of potential legislation, referred to as a “bill”.1241 
For a bill to become binding legislation, it must be passed and signed.1242 Passing legislation 
refers to voting on whether the bill should become binding law.1243 The legislative authority 
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has the exclusive power to pass legislation.1244 Members of the legislative authority are voted 
into office by South African citizens through elections.1245 They represent the people of South 
Africa.1246 
The legislative authority comprises of the national, provincial and municipal spheres.1247 Each 
sphere has the power to prepare and pass legislation for its jurisdiction. The legislative 
authority of the national sphere is vested in parliament.1248 Parliament prepares and passes 
national legislation that is binding on the whole of South Africa.1249  
The legislative authority of the provincial sphere is vested in the provincial legislatures.1250 
Each province has its own provincial legislature.1251 The provincial legislatures prepare and 
pass provincial legislation that is binding within the respective provinces only.1252  
The legislative authority of the local sphere is vested in municipalities.1253 Each municipality 
has an area of jurisdiction within a province.1254 Unlike the national and provincial spheres of 
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government, the executive and legislative authorities of municipalities are not separated, but 
both vest in the municipal council of the relevant municipality.1255 Municipalities prepare and 
pass by-laws that are only binding within their respective municipalities.1256  
The existing legal framework for the first and the second possible grounds for alternative 
accommodation orders include the Housing Act 107 of 19971257 and the Prevention of Illegal 
Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998 (PIE).1258 These are national 
pieces of legislation since they were passed by parliament. Accordingly, the Housing Act and 
PIE bind the whole of South Africa, including the provincial and municipal spheres of 
government. This confirms the fact that courts, in granting alternative accommodation orders, 
cannot require municipalities to act outside these pieces of legislation.1259 
2.2 The executive authority 
The primary function of the executive authority is to govern the country. To govern the 
country, the executive authority must prepare plans (called policy)1260 and implement these 
plans.1261 The executive authority must also implement legislation.1262  
Similar to the legislative authority, the executive authority is separated into three levels: the 
national, provincial and local sphere.1263 The power of the national executive authority vests 
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in the cabinet that is headed by the president.1264 The power of the provincial executive 
authority vests in the executive councils of each respective province.1265 Each executive 
council is headed by a premier. The power of the local executive authorities vests in the 
municipalities.1266 Each municipality is headed by a mayor.1267 
The heads of the national and provincial executive authorities are elected by and from the 
corresponding legislative body. Hence, the president is elected by and from parliament1268 and 
the premier of the Western Cape, for example, is elected by and from the Western Cape 
provincial legislature.1269 The other members of the cabinet and the executive councils are 
selected by the respective heads of the executive bodies. They must be selected mainly from 
the corresponding legislative body. Hence, the president selects the cabinet members from 
parliament1270 and the premier of the Western Cape, for example, selects executive council 
members from the Western Cape provincial legislature.1271  
Since the members of the legislative authority are democratically elected, the executive 
authority consists mostly of democratically elected members. However, these members 
would most likely all be members of the same political party, because the head of the 
executive body will choose members from his own party.1272 As stated above, the executive 
and legislative authorities of municipalities are not separated, but both vest in the municipal 
council of the municipality.1273 Members of municipal councils are chosen to represent parties 
voted for in local government elections.1274 That the members of the executive authority have 
to be democratically elected means that they act on behalf of the people of South Africa. 
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The executive authority of each sphere shares the function of preparing legislation with the 
legislative authority.1275 Once legislation is prepared, the legislative authority has the power to 
pass the proposed legislation.1276 If the proposed legislation is passed, the head of the relevant 
executive body has the power to assent to and sign the legislation.1277 The proposed legislation 
only becomes binding law if this process is completed.1278 This back and forth process 
between the legislative and the executive authorities means that both branches must agree to 
any proposed legislation. In this way, each branch can ensure that the other complies with its 
duties, as is required in terms of the separation of powers doctrine.1279 Moreover, unlike the 
executive authority, the legislative authority represents more than just the ruling party.1280 
Requiring the legislative authority to consent to all proposed legislation promotes 
participation of the citizenry and democracy.1281 This means that the Housing Act and PIE are 
supported by both the executive and the legislative authorities. 
An exclusive function of the executive authority is to implement policy and legislation.1282 
The implementation of policy requires the prior preparation and adoption thereof. Policies are 
plans by the executive authority for the fulfilment of its duties.1283 Policies are only binding 
on other spheres of government insofar as legislation stipulates such.1284 
The cabinet develops and implements national legislation and policy.1285 The executive 
councils implement national legislation and policy. They also develop and implement their 
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own provincial legislation and policy.1286 Municipal councils implement national and 
provincial legislation and policy. They also adopt and implement their own municipal 
policies and by-laws.1287  
The National Housing Code (the Code),1288 which includes the Emergency Housing 
Programme (EHP),1289 is policy that was adopted by the national executive authority to give 
effect to the state’s housing duty. Since the policy was adopted in terms of the Housing Act, 
it is binding upon the executive and municipal councils.1290 Moreover, the executive councils 
and municipalities are required to adopt housing policies, specific to the needs of those within 
their jurisdictions, which are in line with the national policy.1291 
The availability of resources is critical in implementing the National Housing Act and Code. 
It is the primary duty of the national executive authority to collect revenue and distribute it 
amongst the provincial and municipal authorities.1292 Both the collection and distribution of 
revenue require the enactment of legislation. The preparation of such legislation falls within 
the exclusive powers of the executive authority.1293 The fact that the collection of revenue 
falls primarily on the national executive authority means that the provincial and municipal 
spheres of government are reliant on the national sphere for finance. They have limited 
means to raise funds for providing alternative accommodation. 1294 
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The Constitution requires the national sphere to divide the revenue that it collects 
equitably.1295 In dividing the revenue, the need of the provincial and municipal spheres of 
government to provide basic services and perform functions must be taken into account.1296 
There must also be flexibility to respond to emergencies and temporary needs.1297 Equitable 
division of revenue that is sufficiently flexible to respond to emergencies and temporary 
needs is of great importance for the fulfilment of the EHP regarding the provision of 
alternative accommodation to evictees.  
Furthermore, to apply the funds allocated to it effectively, each executive body must prepare 
a budget.1298 The state’s fulfilment of socio-economic rights, including the fulfilment of its 
housing duty, is limited by the amount allocated in the budget for this purpose. As the entity 
with the power to draft the budget, the executive authority essentially has the power to decide 
which needs must be prioritised and how needs and socio-economic rights must be fulfilled, 
subject to confirmation by the legislative authority.1299 The fact that the executive and 
legislative branches have the power to decide how revenue is collected, distributed and spent 
is in accord with the fact that they are democratically elected and should have the interests of 
the people at heart. 
2.3 The judicial authority 
The South African judicial authority is vested in the courts.1300 Although a hierarchy of courts 
exists, the judicial authority does not have a similar structure to the other branches of 
government and do not operate in three specific spheres. Within the judiciary, there are four 
primary levels and types of courts.1301  
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On the highest level in the hierarchy, is the Constitutional Court, which has national 
jurisdiction and is the highest court in the country.1302 The Constitutional Court can hear all 
constitutional matters and matters on appeal that are of importance to the general public.1303 
One level below the Constitutional Court is the Supreme Court of Appeal, which also has 
national jurisdiction.1304 The Supreme Court of Appeal can hear matters on appeal from the 
High Court.1305 On the level below the Supreme Court of Appeal is the High Court of South 
Africa, which is divided into nine divisions, one per province.1306 Each division has 
jurisdiction over its respective province.1307 The High Court can hear any constitutional or 
other matter not assigned to another court.1308 On the entry level in the hierarchy are the 
Magistrates’ Courts. They have jurisdiction within their specific district or region.1309 
Magistrates’ Courts are the courts of first instance for smaller matters. Magistrate Court 
decisions are not reported and are not used in this analysis. Unlike the legislative and 
executive authorities, members of the judicial authority are not democratically elected by the 
citizens of South African.1310 
The general function of the judicial authority is to administer justice “impartially and without 
fear, favour or prejudice”.1311 Courts are approached to interpret and enforce the law, usually 
for purposes of resolving a dispute between the parties before them. 1312 They have the power 
to order relief for the parties to remedy the matter. 1313 In respect of the state’s duty to respect, 
protect, promote and fulfil housing-and-eviction rights, the court has the power to interpret 
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this duty, as well as the specific human right.1314 In addition, it has the power to test whether 
the legislative and executive authorities have fulfilled this duty.1315 The power of the court to 
test whether the other branches of government have fulfilled their duties provides an 
important check on these branches.1316 
3 Alternative accommodation orders and the separation of 
powers 
Due to the separation of powers, each branch is specialised to perform its own functions.1317 
Furthermore, branches are able to act as checks and balances for each other, meaning that 
they hold each other accountable for performing their functions properly.1318 Both possible 
grounds for alternative accommodation orders involve holding the executive authority 
accountable for performing its functions properly.1319  
Ideally, the legislative authority should hold the executive authority accountable. However, 
complete separation of powers does not occur between these branches.1320 The majority of the 
members of the legislature support the dominant political party.1321 The members of the 
executive authority, chosen from the ranks of the legislature, often belong exclusively to the 
dominant party. Hence, they have the same political agenda.1322 This causes separation 
between the governing party and opposition parties, instead of between the three branches of 
government.1323  
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Since the separation of powers is hampered by the government officials’ membership to 
political parties,1324 the checks and balances, to be achieved through the separation of powers, 
are less effective.1325 When the majority of the legislature and the executive belong to the 
same political party, they are less likely to hold each other accountable. Under such 
circumstances, the media plays a role in holding the government accountable. It exposes 
abuse of power and self-interested conduct and has been referred to as the fourth branch of 
government.1326  
In the context of evictions, the media has caused public outrage at evictions that cause 
homelessness. An example is the eviction by the South African National Roads Agency that 
resulted in the Minister of Human Settlement’s request for a ministerial enquiry.1327 Due to 
the media coverage and the ensuing public outrage, the executive authority was forced to 
address the matter concerning the provision of alternative accommodation upon eviction 
comprehensively.1328 However, the media, especially social media, is a dangerous tool. It can 
spark public outrage and protests without the public knowing all of the facts or the applicable 
law. Hence, it is essential that an independent and objective entity, such as the judiciary, hold 
the executive accountable instead.1329  
While interference of branches with each other’s powers for the sake of checking and 
balancing power is necessary, interference must be limited. One branch should only interfere 
with the powers of another to the extent that it ensures that the other branch fulfils its 
functions.1330 The extent to which interference should be allowed is often a topic of debate, 
especially in matters relating to the state’s fulfilment of socio-economic rights, such as the 
right of access to adequate housing.1331 In other words, there is debate about the extent to 
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which a court should be allowed to dictate how the other branches of the state must fulfil 
their duties. Orders that place a positive duty on the state to fulfil the socio-economic rights 
of a party before the court, such as alternative accommodation orders, have been said to 
violate the separation of powers doctrine.1332  
In Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In Re Certification of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996,1333 it was argued that socio-economic rights 
should not be included in the Bill of Rights. In adjudicating socio-economic rights, courts 
would encroach on the powers of the other branches of government and this would violate the 
separation of powers doctrine.1334 The court found that it would not allow a rigid and 
formalistic view of the separation of powers doctrine, which prevents courts from issuing 
orders that affect state policy or budget. Without elaborating on this finding, the court said 
that, at least, socio-economic rights may be negatively protected.1335 From this judgment, it is 
clear that, although courts should be cautious not to interfere unduly with the powers of the 
other branches of government, it does have the power to make decisions that affect the 
policies and budget of the executive authority. An alternative accommodation order is an 
example of a decision that can severely affect the policies and budget of the executive 
authority. The provision of accommodation is financially costly and might detract from the 
funds budgeted for the implementation of policies. 
3.1 Arguments that alternative accommodation orders violate the 
separation of powers doctrine 
Arguments that alternative accommodation orders violate the separation of powers doctrine 
can be divided into three main categories. The first argument is that courts do not have the 
institutional and technical capacity to make orders that affect policy and budget. Second, the 
judicial officers are not democratically elected and, therefore, should not decide on policy 
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and budgetary matters. Third, such orders might have far-reaching budgetary implications 
and the executive authority might not be able to implement them.  
In the remainder of this section, these problems are discussed in more detail. Importantly, any 
investigation into whether conduct violates the separation of powers doctrine must consider 
the separation of powers doctrine as manifested in the Constitution and developed by the 
courts and not an abstract idea of the doctrine. This is because there are many different 
conceptions and interpretations of the doctrine, to which the South African Constitution does 
not subscribe.1336 
3.1.1 Technical capacity to decide on polycentric issues 
As stated, the first potential problem with alternative accommodation orders is that courts do 
not have the institutional and technical capacity to make such orders.1337 Courts themselves 
have referred to their lack of technical expertise and the fact that their position makes it 
difficult for them to access and process information.1338 In fact, in the High Court decision of 
Hlophe v City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality,1339 Satchwell J admitted to having 
no “knowledge of town planning, urban development, provision of housing or budgeting”.1340  
The matter is exacerbated when the issues before the court are so-called “polycentric 
issues”.1341 A polycentric issue requires the court to consider several different “interlocking 
and interacting” interests,1342 including the interests of others who are not before the court.1343 
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An alternative accommodation order requires the executive authority to use its resources for 
the provision of housing to a specific group of persons. This affects the rights of others to 
have their rights respected, protected and fulfilled.1344 Compliance with the order would leave 
fewer resources for meeting their needs. 
The contention is that other branches of government are in a better position to make decisions 
on polycentric issues, such as the provision of alternative accommodation in eviction 
matters.1345 The executive authority, for example, is specialised in fulfilling the function of 
providing housing. It is in a better position to know what emergency housing situations exist 
within its jurisdiction and what resources it has to address these situations.1346 
A counterargument can be made that all matters before the court are polycentric and require 
technical expertise. Yet, this does not prevent courts from deciding other matters.1347 
Furthermore, other branches of government are not necessarily better at making decisions 
regarding respecting, protecting and fulfilling human rights.1348 Liebenberg states that the 
argument that decisions regarding the fulfilment of socio-economic rights should be left to 
the other branches of government relies on the (possibly flawed) notion that the legislative 
and executive branches care about the poor, have the expertise to set up perfect programmes 
and do so.1349 While this argument is sound, it does not justify transferring the power to the 
courts. The executive might not have the requisite compassion and expertise, but this does not 
mean that the judiciary does.  
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Another counterargument, for saying that the courts should not make decisions relating to 
technical, polycentric issues, is that courts should be able to make these decisions if it has all 
the necessary information before it.1350 Instead of refusing to decide matters where they lack 
the requisite information, courts should engage with other interested groups, like organs of 
civil society or the other branches of government, to gather the information.1351 To some 
extent, courts have done this in eviction matters by relying on information provided by amici 
curiae or by requiring the state to report on its policies and budgets.1352 Nonetheless, some of 
the eviction decisions do not seem to take into account the polycentrism of the issues.1353 This 
first problem can only be addressed if the court has all the relevant information before it and 
appreciates the polycentrism of the matter before it. 
3.1.2 The counter-majoritarian dilemma 
The second problem with alternative accommodation orders is that the courts are not 
democratically elected, while the executive and legislative authorities are.1354 This is called 
the counter-majoritarian dilemma,1355 which describes the issue that important decisions are 
placed in the hands of a few unelected judges who might not be wiser, more moral or more 
principled than the other branches of government.1356 The court itself has referred to its lack 
of democratic accountability.1357  
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The counterargument is that those averse to placing important decisions in the hands of an 
unelected few are interested in protecting democracy.1358 However, democracy is not simply 
majority rules.1359 It is not simply institutional.1360 Democracy means that every person has a 
voice. Courts provide a way for minorities to participate and give them a mechanism to 
protect their rights.1361  
Another counterargument is that checks and balances do not amount to a battle between the 
branches. All branches of government have the same task, to uphold the Constitution. 
Ngcobo argues that checks and balances should resemble a constitutional dialogue whereby 
the branches work together to ensure that the Constitution is upheld.1362 The court should 
provide guidance as to how another branch of government must comply with their duties, 
instead of dictating how it should fulfil its duties.1363 Ngcobo refers to Government of the 
Republic of South Africa v Grootboom1364 (hereinafter “Grootboom”) as an example of such a 
dialogue, since the court allowed the state to respond to its findings that the housing 
programme was not constitutionally sound.1365 
This seems like an argument against alternative accommodation orders. This is because 
alternative accommodation orders do not allow the executive the opportunity to react to a 
finding that it did not comply with its constitutional duties and to decide how it would rectify 
the matter.1366 However, this constitutional dialogue is impossible if all the parties do not 
participate.1367 The Constitutional Court’s attempt at a constitutional dialogue is evident from 
the decisions discussed in Chapter 2. In Grootboom, the court simply stated that the executive 
authority did not fulfil its housing duty properly and then allowed the executive authority to 
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react and rectify its omission.1368 In Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Berea Township and 197 
Main Street Johannesburg v City of Johannesburg,1369 the court stated that the executive 
authority has a duty toward the unlawful occupiers and allowed the executive authority to 
engage with the unlawful occupiers to find a solution.1370  
It is evident in the subsequent cases where alternative accommodation orders were granted 
that the court grew less enthusiastic about entering into a dialogue with the executive 
authority. The decline in enthusiasm appears to be related to the executive’s failure to 
participate. In City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Blue Moonlight Properties 
39 (Pty) Ltd1371 (hereinafter “Blue Moonlight”), the court criticised the executive authority for 
not acknowledging responsibility toward the unlawful occupiers and for not participating by 
providing sufficient information regarding its available resources.1372 The court, in City of 
Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Hlophe1373 (hereinafter “Hlophe”), gave the 
executive authority the opportunity to identify those unlawful occupiers who qualify under 
the EHP, but the executive authority failed to do so in the stipulated time.1374  
In situations where the executive authority is unwilling to participate properly, a 
constitutional dialogue is not feasible. Such situations justify the court dictating to the 
executive authority on how to perform its functions. However, a court must not interpret a 
genuine inability on the part of the executive authority as an unwillingness to participate and 
to fulfil its functions. Similarly, a court must not require the executive authority to participate 
in a way that does not fall within its duties. In Blue Moonlight, for example, the court 
required the municipality to report on its general budget.1375 The municipality is not required 
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to use resources outside its emergency housing budget to provide emergency housing.1376 
Hence, the participation of reporting on its general budget would fall outside its duties. 
3.1.3 Far-reaching budgetary implications 
As indicated above, the third problem with alternative accommodation orders is that they 
might have far-reaching budgetary implications and that the state might not be able to 
implement them.1377 In Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign1378 (hereinafter 
“TAC”), the Constitutional Court found that, while courts should not rearrange the state’s 
budget, it should not refrain from making orders simply because it has budgetary 
implications.1379 “[G]overnment is constitutionally bound to give effect to such orders 
whether or not they affect its policy and has to find the resources to do so”.1380 This case 
involved an order that the state must provide a drug that prevents transmission of HIV from 
mother to baby to all HIV-positive pregnant women. It has been argued that the court’s 
distinction between actively rearranging the state’s budget and making an order that 
necessarily interferes with the state’s budget is merely a fiction aimed at allowing 
rearrangement without admitting it.1381 Importantly, although this case is often used to show 
how the court has granted a remedy with far-reaching budgetary implications, the 
manufacturers of the drug, in this case, had offered to provide the drug gratis.1382 This 
substantially lessened the financial burden on the state.  
A counterargument to the assertion that courts should not issue alternative accommodation 
orders since it has far-reaching budgetary effects is that even decisions that do not require the 
fulfilment of socio-economic rights might have far-reaching budgetary effects.1383 The 
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decision that capital punishment is unconstitutional,1384 for example, did not relate to the 
fulfilment of socio-economic rights. Still, it had far-reaching budgetary effects, since the 
sentences of all those awaiting execution had to be adapted.1385  
Nevertheless, the executive’s duty to provide housing is limited by the Constitution to the 
extent that it need only be within its available resources. Moreover, the executive has the 
exclusive power to budget and decide what amount of resources is spent on fulfilling this 
duty. Hence, where the executive has a short-term housing budget, the court must either make 
decisions concerning the provision of emergency housing that adheres with this budget or it 
must declare the budget unconstitutional.1386 Where the alternative accommodation order is 
based on the second possible ground, the state’s duty is not similarly limited to its available 
resources.1387 However, it could be argued that a short-term housing budget is necessarily also 
the state’s budget for the protection of the rights of the landowner and the unlawful 
occupiers.1388 Moreover, even if a separate budget is used, since the function of planning and 
budgeting for the respect and protection of rights falls within the powers of the executive 
authority, the court should respect such a budget, unless it finds to be unreasonable.1389 What 
is considered reasonable would depend on the circumstances.  
Furthermore, the decision in TAC took into account all poor, HIV-positive, pregnant women. 
The order was for the benefit of all of these women. An alternative accommodation order 
should similarly take into account all persons in similar situations. This would reduce further 
similar violations.1390 From a budgetary perspective, it would also ensure that the executive 
authority does not spend all its available resources on complying with one alternative 
accommodation order and then it cannot comply with any subsequent alternative 
accommodation orders. A court should not grant orders with which the executive authority is 
unable to comply.1391 
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3.2 Alternative accommodation orders that adhere to the 
separation of powers doctrine 
To adhere to the separation of powers doctrine, alternative accommodation orders must be 
granted as last resort. Where a court finds that the executive authority did not comply with its 
short-term housing duty or its duty to protect the rights of the landowner or the unlawful 
occupiers, it should engage in constitutional dialogue with the executive authority.1392 This 
involves allowing the executive authority to decide how to rectify its omission.1393  
Where the executive authority is unwilling to participate in the dialogue, the court may be 
more prescriptive. In prescribing to the executive authority how it should fulfil its duties, the 
court must take cognisance of the polycentrism of eviction matters.1394 This requires that the 
court has all the relevant information before it.1395 Moreover, it must employ the services of 
experts to ensure that it is able to understand the technical aspects of the matter.1396 It must 
also consider how its order would affect others that are not before the court.1397  
If the alternative accommodation order is based on the state’s failure to fulfil its short-term 
housing duty or its failure to protect the unlawful occupiers’ negative housing right, the court 
should consider whether the executive authority has a short-term housing budget.1398 The 
existence of such a budget means that a court must adhere to this budget unless it finds it 
unreasonable. Furthermore, whether there is a budget or not, before granting an alternative 
accommodation order a court must ensure that it does not prevent the executive authority 
from being able to assist others, in a similar position to the unlawful occupiers, who are not 
before the court by exhausting its available resources.1399  
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4 Alternative accommodation orders and co-operative 
government 
In all the cases, in Chapter 2, where alternative accommodation orders were granted, the 
orders were granted against municipalities.1400 Placing the primary duty to provide alternative 
accommodation has been met with objection from municipalities.1401 In Blue Moonlight, the 
municipality argued that it does not have the duty or the competence to fund the provision of 
alternative accommodation. This objection relates to the principle of co-operative 
government. The court rejected this argument.1402  
This section considers when alternative accommodation orders would adhere to the principle 
of co-operative government. The discussion is focused on co-operative government in respect 
of the state’s housing duty. This relates directly to the first ground for alternative 
accommodation orders. The reason for this focus is that there are specific laws and policies 
dealing with housing in which the duty to co-operate can be assessed. However, this focus on 
the first ground should not be seen as an exclusion of the second. The conclusions relating to 
co-operative government and the state’s housing duty should be equally applicable to the 
second ground. This is because the laws and policies on housing are merely illustrations of 
how the branches of government have interpreted their duty to co-operate. Their 
interpretation of their duty to co-operate in complying with their duty to fulfil rights should 
be no different from their interpretation of their duty to co-operate in complying with their 
duty to respect and protect the same, or similar, rights.1403  
In determining when alternative accommodation orders would adhere to the principle of co-
operative government, the general purpose of co-operative government is explained. 
Thereafter, the special role afforded to municipalities in terms of the Constitution is 
discussed. The special duties of executive councils toward municipalities are also explored. 
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In addition, the state’s housing legislation and emergency housing policies are examined to 
determine whether they require co-operation between the spheres of government.  
4.1 General duty to co-operate 
Unlike the branches of government, the different spheres of government within a branch are 
not to function in a vacuum.1404 Section 40(1) of the Constitution provides that the spheres are 
distinct, interdependent and interrelated.1405 Spheres must each fulfil their own functions but 
must work toward the same goal.1406 This is where the principle of co-operative government 
comes into play.1407 There must be both vertical and horizontal co-operation within the 
spheres of government.1408  
Despite being assigned specific powers, the different spheres of government within a branch 
must assist and support each other in performing their functions.1409 They must inform and 
consult each other on matters of common interest and coordinate their actions and 
legislation.1410 One sphere cannot undermine the functioning of another sphere.1411 
Prior to the Interim Constitution, the notion of co-operative government was foreign to South 
African law.1412 There is no explicit direction in the Interim Constitution on how co-operation 
is to be effected.1413 In contrast, the final Constitution has more detailed rules for co-operative 
government than any other constitution worldwide.1414 Amongst others, it requires that 
legislation must be enacted to achieve co-operative government.1415 In response, several 
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pieces of legislation have been enacted and several institutions have been created,1416 
including the Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act 13 of 2005 (IGRFA). 
The IGRFA indicates a substantive dimension of co-operative government. It provides that 
co-operative government is necessary for the realisation of constitutional rights and that 
spheres must work together to alleviate poverty.1417 Hence, the realisation of constitutional 
rights and the alleviation of poverty are common goals that the spheres must work towards 
achieving. The provision of alternative accommodation concerns both the realisation of 
constitutional rights1418 and the alleviation of poverty. Accordingly, the spheres of 
government must co-operate in providing alternative accommodation. 
4.2 Special role of municipalities 
Municipalities are best placed to address the needs of the people within their respective 
jurisdictions since they are closest to the people.1419 The Constitution gives municipalities 
specific obligations toward those within their jurisdiction. The general purpose of a 
municipality is to govern the local government affairs of its community.1420 This includes 
ensuring the provision of services, promoting socio-economic development, promoting a safe 
and healthy environment and encouraging community involvement in local government 
matters.1421 The provision of services forms an integral part of the provision of housing and, 
hence, the fulfilment of the right of access to adequate housing.1422 Moreover, the provision of 
housing to the indigent evictees or those living in squalor promotes a safe and healthy 
environment, as well as socio-economic development.  
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Municipalities also have a constitutional duty to budget and plan in such a way that they 
prioritise the basic needs of communities.1423 In the context of housing and evictions, this 
suggests that they must focus their resources on ensuring that homeless persons or those 
facing homelessness because of eviction have alternative accommodation. Nonetheless, 
provision of alternative accommodation requires substantial resources. Municipalities are 
limited in their ability to raise revenue themselves.1424 Accordingly, the provision of 
alternative accommodation by municipalities is dependent on receiving an equitable portion 
of the national revenue.1425 Some municipalities have argued that they do not have the 
resources to provide alternative accommodation to unlawful occupiers.1426 In such situations, 
municipalities have looked to executive councils for assistance.1427 The following section 
considers the special duties of executive councils toward municipalities. 
4.3 Special duties of executive councils toward municipalities 
The Constitution specifically requires co-operation between executive councils and 
municipalities. Executive councils must provide support to and monitor municipalities within 
their respective provinces.1428 They may intervene if a municipality cannot or does not meet 
its obligations.1429 In doing so, they must either issue a directive to the municipal council1430 or 
take on the obligations themselves.1431 If the municipality’s failure to meet its obligations is 
due to financial constraints, the executive council must devise a recovery plan. In this way, 
the executive council ensures that the municipality can fulfil its obligations and assume 
responsibility for the recovery plan to the extent that the municipality has failed to assume 
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responsibility itself.1432 Moreover, if the municipality’s failure is due to a lack of budgeting, 
the executive council must intervene to ensure that a budget is approved.1433 Practically, this 
intervention is crucial since annual audits indicate that municipalities often fail to meet their 
responsibilities.1434 
Each executive council, therefore, has a duty to assist its municipalities to provide alternative 
accommodation and to take the responsibility upon itself where municipalities are failing to 
meet its responsibility. This contradicts the finding of the court in Blue Moonlight that the 
provincial authority need not be joined, despite the municipality’s failure to fulfil its 
duties.1435 
4.4 Housing and the duty to co-operate 
The provision of housing falls within the exclusive competencies of the national and 
provincial spheres of government1436 and not the competencies of municipalities.1437 In terms 
of section 156(1)(b) of the Constitution, these functions can be assigned to a municipality by 
national or provincial legislation.1438 The National Housing Act and the Local Government: 
Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000 (the Municipal Systems Act)1439 assign this matter to 
municipalities.1440  
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Outcomes of Local Government 2014-2015 (2016) 6-14, in which 54 municipalities received clean audits. 
1435
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Section 9(1)(a)(i) of the Housing Act requires municipalities to ensure access to adequate 
housing to those within its jurisdiction on a progressive basis.1441 Section 23(1) of the 
Municipal Systems Act requires municipalities to “undertake developmentally-orientated 
planning” to contribute to the realisation of section 26 of the Constitution, together with the 
other organs of state.  
Placing a housing obligation on municipalities is in line with the constitutional objects and 
duties of municipalities. That is, their duties to promote socio-economic development;1442 to 
prioritise the basic needs of the community within its jurisdiction;1443 and to participate in 
national and provincial development programmes.1444 Such development programmes include 
the national and provincial housing programmes. 
In fact, under the “suggestions on how to undertake emergency housing projects” in the EHP, 
it is recommended that municipalities first assess whether it would be able to provide 
emergency assistance from its own resources, before applying for funding from the provincial 
authority.1445 The court has interpreted this to mean that, to the extent they are able to, 
municipalities have a duty to provide alternative accommodation from their own resources in 
emergency housing situations.1446 
Nevertheless, all of these instruments require co-operation from the other spheres of 
government. Section 7(2)(c) and (e) of the Housing Act requires the provincial government to 
“take all reasonable and necessary steps” to support municipalities and to strengthen their 
capacities to fulfil their housing duties.1447 The constitutional duty on provincial authorities to 
intervene when a municipality cannot or does not fulfil its duties is strengthened in the 
                                                                                                                                                        
Moreover, the fact that PIE requires the court to consider whether the municipality can provide alternative 
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Housing Act.1448 The Constitution states that executive councils may intervene if a 
municipality cannot or does not perform its functions, whereas the Housing Act states that 
executive councils must intervene.1449 Similarly, the national authority must assist provinces 
and municipalities in fulfilling their housing duties.1450 Co-operative government is similarly 
required in section 3 and 24 of the Municipal Systems Act. The EHP requires the spheres of 
government to co-operate and support one another.1451 The EHP provides for a procedure by 
which the municipality can apply for a grant to fund the provision of alternative 
accommodation in emergency housing situations.1452 Nonetheless, only where the 
municipality does not have the available resources, should the provincial authority be 
involved.1453  
The Constitutional Court, in Grootboom, confirmed this duty to co-operate. It stressed that 
national government has the ultimate duty to ensure that emergency housing is provided.1454 
There must be nationwide planning, budgeting and monitoring of fulfilment.1455 Without 
national support, municipal plans cannot succeed.1456 This relates strongly to the need for 
sufficient resources to provide emergency housing. After the Grootboom decision, the 
National Department of Housing suggested that 1% of the state’s budget be reserved for 
emergency housing situations. The national treasury refused, stating the provision of 
emergency accommodation is a provincial matter. As a result, provinces were allowed to 
spend 0.5% to 0.75% of their annual revenue on such situations.1457 This allocation to 
provinces is not ideal since provinces do not have the same emergency housing needs.1458 The 
refusal of the national treasury is also not in line with co-operative government. 
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4.5 Alternative accommodation orders that adhere to co-operative 
government 
Municipalities have a special role, assigned to it by the Constitution, to ensure that the needs 
within its jurisdiction are met.1459 Similarly, the Housing Act and the EHP indicate 
municipalities as the first port of call for the fulfilment of general and emergency housing 
needs, respectively.1460 For this reason, an alternative accommodation order can be made 
against a municipality.  
In fact, in matters where a private eviction might leave the unlawful occupiers homeless,1461 
the requirement has developed that the relevant municipality must be joined as a party to the 
proceedings.1462 This is because the municipality has a direct and substantial interest in the 
outcome of the case.1463 If the eviction leaves the unlawful occupiers homeless, the emergency 
housing duty of the municipality is triggered. In terms of the laws of procedure, all parties 
with a direct and substantial interest in the matter should be joined to the proceedings.1464  
Once joined,1465 the municipality should report on its ability to provide alternative 
accommodation to the unlawful occupiers.1466 The report should indicate its ability, within its 
available resources, to provide alternative accommodation to the unlawful occupiers.1467 It 
should not be general but should address the specific circumstances of the unlawful 
occupiers.1468 Courts have been very critical of reports that merely describe the state’s housing 
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programme.1469 Reports should explain what has been done to assist the unlawful occupiers 
and what can be done in the future.1470  
In some circumstances, a municipality might report that it is unable to provide alternative 
accommodation to the unlawful occupiers. A municipality cannot provide alternative 
accommodation if it does not have the available resources. When a municipality does not 
have the resources to provide alternative accommodation, the provincial government must 
support it and must intervene if the municipality does not fulfil its duties.1471 Moreover, if 
neither the municipal nor the provincial authority can comply, the national authority must 
assist.1472  
This means that an investigation into the available resources of the state must not end at 
municipalities. Since the duty to co-operate is justiciable,1473 the court can require the 
provincial and even the national authorities to be joined to the matter and to report on their 
available resources.1474 Nonetheless, an approach that would be more in line with the 
separation of powers would be to postpone the matter to allow the municipality to apply for 
funding from the provincial authority.1475  
The fact that the provincial and national authorities must assist municipalities does not 
necessarily mean that an alternative accommodation order must be made against them. 
Technically, even if an order is made against the municipality alone, the other spheres must 
assist them in complying with the orders. However, it is evident from the executive council’s 
attitude, in Occupiers of Skurweplaas 353 JR v PPC Aggregate Quarries (Pty) Ltd,1476 that the 
other spheres of government are not likely to assist a municipality if they are not cited in the 
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order.1477 Accordingly, an alternative accommodation order must specifically bind the other 
spheres of government. 
The question arises whether the other spheres of government must be joined and required to 
comply with an alternative accommodation order if the municipality was at fault or whether 
the municipality’s fault justifies holding it exclusively liable. An example of fault on the part 
of the municipality lies in the fact that the municipality did not adopt and implement a short-
term housing programme or did not assist the landowner in protecting his land against 
unlawful occupation. The Constitution provides that if a municipality has failed to adopt a 
budget the executive council would have a duty to intervene to ensure that the duties of the 
municipality are fulfilled, regardless of the reason for the failure.1478 Executive councils are 
required to monitor municipalities.1479 This implies that they would be equally liable if they 
had not addressed any fault or failure on the part of the municipalities within its jurisdiction. 
Furthermore, while the Constitution stipulates that executive councils may intervene if 
municipalities fail to perform their functions (for whatever reason), the Housing Act states 
that they must intervene. Hence, a failure to intervene would place liability on executive 
councils.1480  
In respect of national government, the Constitutional Court in Grootboom found that the 
national government has the ultimate duty to ensure that emergency housing is provided.1481 It 
is required to monitor the other spheres of government to ensure that they fulfil their 
functions in this regard.1482 Hence, the national authority might be liable for not preventing 
the harm caused by the municipality, regardless of whether the municipality was at fault. 
5 Conclusion 
This chapter considered the duty of the court to respect the functions of other branches of 
government. An alternative accommodation order respects the functions of other branches of 
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government if it does not unduly interfere with their functions and does not place the duty to 
comply with the order on a sphere that does not have the power or the capacity to do so. 
These requirements relate to the separation of powers doctrine and the principle of co-
operative government. 
A court respects the functions of other branches if it only grants an alternative 
accommodation order in situations where the executive authority is unwilling to participate in 
a dialogue and rectify its failures itself. In this case, the court must take cognisance of the 
polycentrism of eviction matters. It must have all the relevant circumstances before it and 
must take cognisance of how its order would affect those who are not before the court. An 
alternative accommodation order is based on the executive authority’s duty to respect, protect 
and fulfil the housing rights of the unlawful occupiers or the right to property of the 
landowner. The parties before the court are usually not in a unique situation and that same 
duty that the executive authority owes them, it owes toward others in similar situations. For 
this reason, an alternative accommodation order should not negatively affect the ability of the 
executive to fulfil its duty toward those other persons.  
A court respects the functions of the different spheres of government if it only grants an 
alternative accommodation order against a municipality in situations where the municipality 
is able to comply with the order. If the municipality does not have the available resources, the 
court should allow it to apply to the executive council for assistance. Where a municipality 
had already applied to the executive council and it was unwilling to assist, a court can require 
the executive authority to be joined and to report on its available resources. A finding that the 
executive authority has the requisite resources necessitates that any alternative 
accommodation order must not only be granted against the municipality, but also against the 
executive authority. Similarly, if the executive authority does not have the available 
resources, a court should allow it to apply to the national authority for assistance. If the 
national authority is unwilling to assist, a court can order it to be joined and to report on its 
available resources. An availability of resources on the part of the national authority means 
that the court must require it to assist the municipality if an alternative accommodation order 
is granted. Such co-operation is required even if there was fault on the part of the 
municipality. That is because the national and provincial spheres are required to monitor 
municipalities and ensure that they fulfil their duties properly. 
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CHAPTER SIX: ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 
1 Introduction 
The general function of the judicial authority is to administer justice.1483 The dictionary 
defines justice as fairness and reasonableness.1484 While this seems simple, there are several 
forms and theories of justice, which makes for some complication.1485 Forms of justice relate 
to the different contexts within which justice must be served.1486 Justice in the distribution of 
resources is different from justice in the allotment of punishment.1487 Theories of justice 
concern the content of these forms of justice and the theoretical basis underlying each 
form.1488 Depending on the form and the theory applied, different court orders might be 
considered “just”.1489 Hence, under some forms and theories of justice, alternative 
accommodation orders may be considered just, whereas under other forms and theories it 
may not.  
This chapter explores two forms of justice, distributive and corrective justice.1490 They are 
often considered the primary forms of justice.1491 Distributive justice is applicable since 
alternative accommodation orders dictate how the state must distribute its resources. If the 
alternative accommodation order relates to a violation of rights, corrective justice is involved. 
Corrective justice requires that a person who has been wronged be put in the position he was 
in before the violation occurred.1492  
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The purpose of the discussion is to determine when which form of justice would be most 
appropriate and what the effect on the granting of alternative accommodation orders would 
be if the most appropriate form of justice is applied. Importantly, this entails determining 
whether different forms of justice might be more applicable to the different grounds for 
alternative accommodation. This might result in different remedies being appropriate 
depending on the ground for alternative accommodation. Such is a situation should be 
avoided since it creates parallel systems, which creates uncertainty in the law.1493 In the 
discussion of the two forms of justice, the theories underpinning each form are examined. To 
determine which theory of justice the court should apply in eviction matters, the theory that 
most aligns with the Constitution is identified. 
2 Distributive justice 
In granting an alternative accommodation order, the court dictates to the state how the state 
should distribute its resources. Distributive justice requires a fair distribution of goods 
amongst members of a specific group.1494 A decision regarding the distribution of resources 
must take into account the interests of all members of the group.1495  
Disagreement exists around how it should be determined who deserves what and what 
constitutes a fair distribution.1496 Essentially, no distribution should involve arbitrary 
distinctions between persons.1497 A decision regarding distribution cannot simply rely on the 
intuition of the decision maker.1498 This is especially important when judges make decisions. 
Without clear principles, different judges, relying solely on their intuition, might make 
contradictory decisions and create uncertainty.1499 To ensure certainty, distribution must be 
based on non-arbitrary principles.1500 Four possible principles of distribution can be identified: 
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utility, equality, need and equity.1501 The remainder of this section discusses the meaning of 
each of the possible principles of distribution. 
The first possible principle of distribution is utility.1502 In terms of this principle, a distribution 
is just if it achieves the greatest good for the greatest number of people.1503 It is about the 
greatest aggregate happiness of the group in question.1504 Rawls rejects utility, as a principle 
of distribution, on the basis that persons possess inherent “inviolability”.1505 Utilitarianism 
ignores this since it does not require attention to individuals. Resources might be distributed 
unequally, as long as the highest average satisfaction of the group is ensured.1506 For example, 
a group of a 100 people, where the happiness level of every member is 5 out of 10, will be 
ranked lower than a group of a 100, where 51 people have a happiness level of 10 and 49 
people have a happiness level of 0.1507 In the housing context, this could mean that a 
distribution where 51% of the homeless people receive permanent housing1508 and 49% are 
left homeless is preferred to a distribution where all homeless persons receive emergency 
housing.1509  
Rawls’ rejection of utilitarianism based on the inherent “inviolability” of persons is in accord 
with the constitutional right and value of human dignity.1510 The entrenchment of human 
dignity in the Constitution recognises that every person has inherent worth.1511 This means 
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that the interests of one person cannot be sacrificed for the greater good of the group. The 
Constitutional Court, in Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom1512 
(hereinafter “Grootboom”), confirmed this rejection. It found that, in realising the right of 
access to adequate housing, the distribution of resources, which is statistically the most 
effective, might not be just if it ignores the neediest in the group. The Constitution requires 
that the interests of each individual be considered.1513  
In defence of utilitarianism, it has been argued that utilitarianism can be interpreted to 
incorporate equality.1514 Both the level of happiness and the number of people enjoying it 
must be maximised.1515 While in some circumstances the outcome of applying this type of 
utilitarianism might amount to justice, it cannot be used as a principle of distribution.1516 The 
inherent worth of each individual is still not recognised1517 and individuals can still be 
sacrificed for the good of the group. Extreme inequalities could still be accepted if the 
aggregate happiness of the group was maximised.1518 Instead of trying to incorporate equality 
within the principle of utilitarianism, equality can be considered as a standalone principle. 
The fact that state distributions must adhere to the principle of equality is in accord with the 
language of the Constitution that entrenches socio-economic rights for all.1519 Moreover, 
equality as a principle for distribution is in line with the value of1520 and right to1521 equality 
recognised in the Constitution. It also acknowledges the inherent worth of all persons.1522 
What must be determined is the effect of applying the principle of equality to a group whose 
members do not have equal resources. In an unequal group, should the distributed shares be 
equal or should the distribution seek to achieve equality among the group members? If the 
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distributed shares are equal, inequality amongst the members remains. However, unequal 
shares that seek to address the inequality amongst the members of the group might ensure an 
equal outcome.  
Rawls argues that unequal distributions can be considered just if they “are to the greatest 
benefit of the least advantaged”.1523 Sen and Nussbaum argue that the focus should be on the 
outcome of the distribution.1524 Just distribution should ensure equal capabilities,1525 not equal 
resources, because not everyone’s needs and abilities are equal.1526 Capabilities refer to the 
ability to do certain basic things, such as the ability to have shelter, clothing and food.1527 To 
achieve equal capabilities, prioritisation should not be based on the level of poverty alone. 
Prioritisation should also be based on factors such as disability, age or gender since that could 
influence the person’s ability to convert the resources into capabilities.1528 Application of the 
equality principle to ensure an equal outcome is consistent with the Constitutional Court’s 
preference of substantive equality above formal equality.1529 
The capabilities approach and ensuring distributions that result in substantive equality relate 
to “need” as a possible principle of distributive justice. The principle of need requires that 
each person receives according to his need.1530 Distribution based on the principle of need is 
especially important in situations where the resources are scarce and cannot be distributed 
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amongst all members of the group.1531 This is the case in South Africa, where everyone’s 
socio-economic rights cannot be realised immediately.1532 The Constitutional Court in 
Grootboom supported the notion that special attention must be paid to the neediest in society. 
In the distribution of resources to realise the right of access to adequate housing, the needs of 
the most desperate must be considered.1533 
It has been argued that “need” should only attract advantage if the “need” is blameless.1534 A 
distribution should not advantage someone based on need if he is responsible for his own 
need. In the context of eviction, this implies that someone who deliberately causes his 
unlawful occupation or his inability to secure his own alternative accommodation should not 
be provided with alternative accommodation since he is responsible for his own need. This is 
in accord with the exclusions in the Emergency Housing Programme (EHP)1535 and the court's 
consideration of this relevant circumstance to determine whether an eviction would be just 
and equitable.1536 A counterargument to excluding persons who created their own need would 
be that withholding necessary resources is not the appropriate way to hold them liable. 
Instead, if they committed an unlawful act in creating their own need, such as selling drugs 
from their rented premises,1537 these actions must be dealt with in terms of the laws that 
prohibit the act.1538 Moreover, it can be argued that what is done out of need is blameless.1539 
Accordingly, the poor group of persons that occupied the land out of desperation, in Port 
Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers,1540 was not blamed for creating their unlawful 
occupation.1541  
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The notion that one’s actions must determine how much one receives speaks to the principle 
of equity. In terms of this principle, each person should enjoy the fruits of their own labour. 
What they receive must be directly correlated to their input.1542 Hence, the person who 
contributes most gets most.1543  
While Rawls supports distribution of resources based on need, he also supports compensation 
for labour. Equal pay for all work is not required but can differ based on factors like the 
effort, potential hazard of the work and training undergone to do the work.1544 However, 
persons who receive an income from their labour must pay taxes. The tax revenue must be 
used to assist those in need.1545 Moreover, the burden of taxation must be carried equally.1546 
This suggests that the continued unlawful occupation of land cannot be considered a just 
distribution even if the unlawful occupiers are needy since the burden would be carried by the 
landowner alone. This confirms the finding that an unreasonable delay would be an arbitrary 
deprivation in terms of section 25(1) of the Constitution.1547 
Nozick is a more uncompromising advocate of equity as a principle of distribution. He 
opposes the imposition of taxes since it takes away from what a person deserves.1548 
According to Nozick, a person is entitled to everything obtained through just means. Only if a 
person obtained something by an unjust means must this be corrected.1549 Hence, past 
injustices in distribution can mean that the current holding is unjust.1550 In South Africa, due 
to the forced removals of black people during Apartheid, a lot of property holding can be 
classified as unjust.1551 However, the correction of this unjust holding is more complicated 
than Nozick suggests. The unjust dispossession during Apartheid was done on a large scale 
and occurred years ago.1552 It is difficult to determine who dispossessed whom of what so that 
the unjust holding can be corrected. Moreover, often the person currently holding the 
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property was not the one who caused the injustice.1553 Due to these complications, land reform 
and restitution are only effected in terms of specialised legislation.1554 Moreover, unjust 
possession cannot be rectified by unjust means. Hence, an unlawful occupation cannot be 
considered just because the initial holding of the landowner was unjust.1555  
Where a person obtained property in a just manner, Nozick argues that he is entitled to such 
holding regardless of whether his social position or talents played a role in obtaining the 
thing.1556 Rawls differs from Nozick on the basis that people cannot choose or deserve their 
talents or the social position in which they are born and are not entitled to the things they 
receive because of their social position or talents.1557 Hence, effort should be the only equity 
ground upon which distribution is based.1558  
Nevertheless, Rawls does not advocate for interfering with a person’s property holding to 
correct injustice based on social position or talents to any extent further than collecting 
taxes.1559 This seems to be the position in South Africa. The Constitution allows for taxation, 
which indicates that Nozick’s view on equity is not supported.1560 Other than by means of tax 
collection, the Constitution does not allow for redistribution of property by the state, unless 
compensation is paid to the person who loses the property.1561 
While the four potential principles of distribution seem contradictory, it is evident from the 
discussion above that they can be used in conjunction with one another.1562 Alternative 
accommodation orders amount to the distribution of state resources to private persons. 
Taxation can be used to raise revenue. In distributing the revenue, the primary consideration 
should be substantive equality. This means, advantaging the neediest in society to increase 
equality amongst the members of the group. If the neediest are too many to assist 
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immediately, equity considerations, such as effort, might be taken into account. Effort, in this 
context, might refer to applying for housing and waiting for housing. Other equity 
considerations could include the blameworthiness of the unlawful occupiers. 
3 Corrective justice 
The previous section considered the fact that alternative accommodation orders involve the 
distribution of state resources, which concerns distributive justice. This section explores the 
relevance of corrective justice in the context of eviction matters.1563 Where an alternative 
accommodation order is granted to remedy a limitation of a right, such as the landowner’s 
right to property or the unlawful occupiers’ right of access to adequate housing, corrective 
justice might be applicable. Corrective justice concerns interference with existing rights.1564 
The focus in this section is on two potential limitations – that of the landowner’s right to 
property by continued unlawful occupation and that of the unlawful occupiers’ right of access 
to adequate housing by an eviction. 
According to Aristotle, corrective justice requires the rectification of an inequality because of 
something that one party did to another.1565 Aristotle asserts that corrective justice is relevant 
in civil and criminal law, but not in public law.1566 For example, if X steals Y’s car, corrective 
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justice requires X to return the car to Y. X is obliged to repair the harm he caused.1567 The 
requirements of Aristotelian corrective justice are that there must be two parties, 1568 one party 
must be responsible for the loss of the other,1569 the loss must be wrongful1570 and the remedy 
must be to restore the status quo ante.1571 The remainder of this section discusses these 
requirements in more detail. 
The first requirement of corrective justice is that there must be two parties involved,1572 the 
party that caused the harm and the party that suffered the harm. No other party can be 
involved.1573 A consequence of limiting corrective justice to two parties is that the interests of 
others are not taken into account.1574 The impact of the remedy on others is not considered.1575 
Whether the remedy will detract from the money earmarked for fulfilling the rights of others 
is not examined, even if those other persons are needier than the parties before the court 
are.1576 
In eviction matters, the two parties directly involved seem to be the landowner and the 
unlawful occupiers. Continued occupation of the land potentially amounts to interference 
with the landowner’s right to property, by the unlawful occupiers. Similarly, an eviction 
sought by the landowner amounts to interference with the unlawful occupier’s existing access 
to housing by the landowner. An eviction itself involves corrective justice toward the 
landowner. In a private eviction,1577 the state seems to be a third party. If so, its involvement 
would be inconsistent with the requirements of corrective justice. If a causal link can be 
drawn between the state’s actions and the party that suffered the harm, corrective justice 
                                                 
1567
 Klimchuk (2003) OJLS 56. 
1568
 Roach (1991) Ariz L Rev 868. 
1569
 Roach (1991) Ariz L Rev 860, 867, 871. 
1570
 Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics  83-84. See also, RA Posner "The concept of corrective justice in recent 
theories of tort law" (1981) 10 Journal of Legal Studies 187 190, 195-196, 200; J Coleman "Corrective justice 
and wrongful gain" (1982) 11 The Journal of Legal Studies 421 436. 
1571
 It puts the person in the position he would have been but for the violation. Mbazira Litigating Socio-
Economic Rights 8; Roach (1991) Ariz L Rev 859, 860, 867; Weinrib (1991) Iowa L Rev 410. 
1572
 Roach (1991) Ariz L Rev 868. 
1573
 Weinrib (1991) Iowa L Rev 410. 
1574
 Roach (1991) Ariz L Rev 871. 
1575
 Mbazira Litigating Socio-Economic Rights 8; Weinrib (2002) UTLJ 350. 
1576
 Weinrib (2002) UTLJ 352. 
1577
 One where it is not the landowner or the entity seeking the eviction. 
225 
 
might justify the involvement of the state. This relates to the second requirement of corrective 
justice.  
The second requirement of corrective justice stipulates that there must be a causal link 
between the actions of the one person and the loss of the other.1578 The one party must be 
responsible for the loss of the other. Only the responsible party can be made to bear the 
burden of correcting the injustice.1579 This means that, if the state is not responsible for the 
eviction, it cannot be required to remedy any harm suffered because of the eviction.1580 If the 
state is not responsible for the violation of the rights of the landowner or the unlawful 
occupiers, corrective justice cannot justify an alternative accommodation order against the 
state.  
The important question is how it can be argued that the state is responsible for the limitation 
of either the rights of the landowner or the rights of the unlawful occupiers? The state’s 
responsibility might lie in its duty to respect, protect, promote and fulfil both the landowner 
and the unlawful occupiers against interference with their human rights by others.1581 The 
unlawful occupiers’ loss of their homes or the landowner’s loss of the use of its property 
might have been caused by the state’s failure to comply with its duty.1582  
The third requirement of corrective justice is that the loss must be wrongful. A wrongful loss, 
in this context, refers to loss caused by another’s fault.1583 Aristotle does not support 
corrective justice if there is no fault on the side of the person who caused the loss.1584 In fact, 
he requires that the loss must be intentionally caused. Negligence is not enough.1585 Requiring 
wrongfulness means that the state can only be held liable if there was fault on its side in 
failing to protect the rights of the parties. Hence, for the state to be liable its failure to protect 
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the rights of either the unlawful occupiers or the landowner must have been intentional (or 
possibly negligent).1586 
That the loss must be wrongful is not supported by all. For example, Gardner argues that, 
even where there was no fault in causing the loss, the loss becomes wrongful if it is not 
corrected afterwards.1587 In contrast, Roederer contends that, without fault on the part of the 
person who caused the loss, distributive justice applies.1588 In respect of evictions, this means 
that an unlawful occupier, who is homeless after an eviction, must be treated like any other 
homeless person under the EHP. If the court were applying corrective justice in granting 
alternative accommodation orders, the fact that the court focused on the blameworthiness of 
the state1589 indicates that it considers fault as a requirement for holding someone responsible 
for correcting another’s loss. 
The fourth requirement for corrective justice is that the remedy must restore the status quo 
ante.1590 The purpose and effect of the remedy must be to put the victim in the position he 
would have been, but for the violation.1591 The remedy is backwards-looking and focuses on 
repairing past wrongs.1592 In respect of the rights of the landowner, it involves evicting the 
unlawful occupiers and returning possession of the land to the landowner. In respect of the 
rights of the unlawful occupiers, a literal correction would be to allow reoccupation of the 
land after an eviction.  
However, in a stalemate situation, such a correction is not possible. If the court decides to 
evict the unlawful occupiers immediately and this limits their rights, this cannot be corrected 
by allowing reoccupation. This is because reoccupation would limit the rights of the 
landowner. Gardner argues, “Most transactions cannot literally be reversed.”1593 Instead, the 
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wrong could be corrected through compensation or restitution.1594 The provision of alternative 
accommodation can be considered a form of restitution in kind. Moreover, Gardner argues 
that it is not the loss that must be undone, but the wrong.1595 In eviction matters, the wrong is 
sometimes not only a failure to protect the rights of the parties before the court. Often the 
wrong amounts to a failure to implement a programme that protects the rights of everyone 
within the municipality’s jurisdiction in a position similar to that of the parties before the 
court. In these matters, correcting the wrong would be to implement such a programme. 
4 Most appropriate form of justice 
Where an eviction order would leave the unlawful occupiers homeless, courts have granted 
alternative accommodation orders. Since this involves distributing the resources of the state, 
distributive justice is applicable. It might also involve remedying an unconstitutional 
limitation of a right, which makes corrective justice applicable.  
A cursory observation is that a finding that corrective justice is most appropriate means that 
the court need not consider the distributive effect of its order before granting an alternative 
accommodation order. This might make it easier to succeed with a demand for an alternative 
accommodation order, than if distributive justice were applied. Consequently, a finding that 
the different grounds for alternative accommodation orders require the application of 
different forms of justice might cause parties to base their case on the ground that provides 
them with the most favourable remedy. This would create parallel systems of law and legal 
uncertainty. The purpose of this section is to determine which form of justice is more 
appropriate in eviction matters that cause homelessness, whether the appropriate form of 
justice differs depending on the ground for the alternative accommodation order and what the 
effect of these findings is on the justness of alternative accommodation orders. 
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4.1 Establishment of the most appropriate form of justice 
Mbazira argues that, where the court has granted alternative accommodation orders, it applied 
corrective justice.1596 In granting alternative accommodation orders, the court did not consider 
whether other persons within the jurisdiction of the state entity were needier than the 
unlawful occupiers before the court were.1597 This would explain the fact that the court did not 
always find it necessary to ascertain whether the state had the resources to provide the 
alternative accommodation.1598 In addition, it would explain the court’s emphasis on the 
blameworthiness of the state.1599  
Nevertheless, applying this form of justice in eviction matters might not be appropriate. For 
one, it is inconsistent with Constitutional Court jurisprudence. Second, it is inconsistent with 
the nature of eviction matters. These reasons are discussed below.  
4.1.1 Constitutional Court jurisprudence 
The application of distributive justice in matters of constitutional rights violations is in line 
with Constitutional Court jurisprudence. In National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality 
v Minister of Home Affairs,1600 the court found that constitutional litigation “has a wider 
public dimension”.1601 This is reflected in the Constitutional Court’s interpretation of its 
mandate under section 172(1)(b) to grant remedies that are just and equitable in constitutional 
matters. The Constitutional Court interprets section 172(1)(b) to require remedies that 
balance interests, rather than maximise rights.1602 “Interest balancing” allows a court to grant a 
remedy that does not fully correct the violation of a specific right. This deficient correction is 
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justified by the involvement of other factors, such as the interests of others not before the 
court or the availability of resources.1603  
Moreover, in several matters involving the distribution of state resources, the Constitutional 
Court has applied distributive justice, by considering the distributive effects of its 
remedies.1604 In Soobramoney v Minister of Health (Kwazulu-Natal),1605 the court found that it 
could not grant a remedy forcing the state to use its resources to ensure that the claimant 
alone receives renal dialysis. If such a remedy were to be granted, it could not be limited to 
the claimant but would have to extend to others in similar positions.1606  
In Khosa v Minister of Social Development, Mahlaule v Minister of Social Development,1607 
the claimants argued that, as permanent residents, they should benefit from the state’s social 
assistance grants.1608 The court rejected an out-of-court settlement that would have only 
advantaged the parties before the court and granted a remedy to extend the grants to all 
permanent residents.1609  
Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign1610 (hereinafter “TAC”) involved the 
government’s decision not to make Nevirapine available at all public hospitals.1611 The 
Constitutional Court ordered the state to devise and adopt a plan within its available resources 
to make Nevirapine available at all public hospitals and clinics. Hence, the remedy 
considered the interests of all persons in a similar position, that is, all HIV-positive pregnant 
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women.1612 In Grootboom, the Constitutional Court similarly ordered the state to implement a 
programme that would take into account all affected persons.1613  
4.1.2 Nature of eviction matters 
In considering the most appropriate form of justice, it can be argued that distributive justice is 
most appropriate in matters based on the first ground for alternative accommodation and 
corrective justice is most appropriate in matters based on the second ground for alternative 
accommodation orders. This is because the first ground deals with the fulfilment of rights 
(which involves distribution), whereas the second ground deals with the remedying of harm 
caused (which involves correction). Based on this argument, it might be easier to succeed 
with a request for alternative accommodation based on the second ground since the 
distributive effect of the order need not be considered. However, this distinction is superficial 
since the first ground also deals with remedying of harm (corrective justice) and the second 
ground also deals with distribution of resources (distributive justice). The first ground is also 
corrective since it remedies state’s failure to implement a reasonable short-term housing 
programme. The second ground is also distributive since it amounts to the state’s fulfilment 
of its short-term housing duty toward the unlawful occupiers. Moreover, the nature of 
eviction matters requires that distributive justice must be applied regardless of the ground 
relied upon. 
By nature, eviction matters often involve large groups of people.1614 There are numerous 
evictions in each municipality every year.1615 The provision of alternative accommodation to 
all evictees facing homelessness requires considerable resources, of which the state has a 
limited amount. Any resources spent on the provision of alternative accommodation to a 
specific group of evictees cannot be spent on the fulfilment of other needs. 
Based on the nature of evictions, several reasons for finding that distributive justice is the 
most appropriate form of justice in eviction matters can be identified. For one, distributive 
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justice requires that the distributive effect of any remedy be taken into account.1616 This 
involves taking cognisance of the fact that an order for the state to use its resources to assist 
those before the court might prevent it from using its resources to assist others, who might be 
even needier than those before the court are. In contrast, corrective justice does not require 
the consideration of other parties or the distributive effect of the remedy.1617 If the state does 
not have sufficient resources to provide alternative accommodation to all persons facing 
homelessness due to eviction within its jurisdiction, granting an alternative accommodation 
order without considering the distributive effect of such order might amount to queue 
jumping.  
As mentioned, it is often argued that an alternative accommodation order would result in 
queue jumping.1618 Two counterarguments are that, one, it was not the intention of the 
occupiers to jump the queue and,1619 two, the state’s short-term housing duty exists in 
conjunction with the state’s long-term housing duty and that compliance with the one should 
not interfere with the other. Hence, when temporary emergency housing is provided, the 
queue for permanent housing is not jumped.1620  
In terms of the first counterargument, it is unclear why the intention of the occupiers is 
considered since the effect of the unlawful occupation would still be that they are 
prioritised.1621 As for the second counterargument, this assertion carries merit in that the state 
should have an emergency housing programme and budget that is separate from that of 
permanent housing. However, if a municipality cannot resolve all emergency housing 
situations as they occur, ordering it to provide for one emergency and not another, purely 
based on the fact that one group is before the court, would cause the short-term housing 
queue to be jumped. Accordingly, to prevent the short-term housing queue to be jumped the 
court must consider the distributive effect of its orders. This involves considering the interests 
of all affected parties and applying the principles of distributive justice to determine priority. 
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 Weinrib (2002) UTLJ 351-352. 
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 Weinrib (2002) UTLJ 351-352. 
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 See Chapter 2:3.1 and Chapter 3:4. 
1619
 See discussion of PE Municipality in Chapter 2:2.2. 
1620
 Socio-Economic Rights Institute of South Africa Evictions and Alternative Accommodation (2013) 48. 
1621
 Moreover, the priority is usually gained against other persons who live in emergency circumstances.  
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In addition to ensuring that the unlawful occupiers before the court are not prioritised based 
on unjust reasons, such as that they are before the court, distributive justice is the most 
appropriate form of justice since it allows for ways in which the state’s limited resources can 
be maximised. It also allows for ways in which the negative effects of a lack of resources can 
be minimised. For one, distributive justice allows for a delay in the execution of a remedy 
until the state is able to comply with the order, whereas corrective justice does not allow for 
such a delay.1622 Second, distributive justice might allow lower standards of alternative 
accommodation, to ensure that more people are assisted. Similarly, a court may decide to 
deny or delay the eviction and compensate of the landowner for its loss.1623 To limit the 
resources spent, such compensation may be less than the market value of the property.1624 
Compensation below market value is not possible in terms of corrective justice, which 
requires that the victim must be placed in the same position it was in before the violation.1625 
Finally, distributive justice allows for judicial deference. Since a court may not be the 
appropriate branch of government to decide on the distribution of resources, deference to the 
executive branch may be more appropriate. The executive branch is supposed to have more 
information and expertise at its disposal regarding such distributions. Corrective justice does 
not allow for judicial deference.1626 
Another reason for finding that distributive justice is the most appropriate form of justice, in 
eviction matters, is that corrective justice is only appropriate to once-off wrongs with easily 
identifiable victims.1627 If the harm is likely to continue, distributive justice is more 
appropriate.1628 The nature of eviction matters lies there-in that there are several matters 
yearly, even within a single municipality’s jurisdiction.1629 Hence, these are not once-off 
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 Roach (1991) Ariz L Rev 880. 
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1625
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matters with easily identifiable victims. In fact, where the state’s failure to provide alternative 
accommodation is due to official misconduct and comprehensive institutional reform is 
required, corrective justice is not appropriate.1630  
Finally, that the likely remedy under the second ground for alternative accommodation is a 
constitutional remedy,1631 suggests that the application of corrective justice is inappropriate. 
This is because constitutional remedies are not only aimed at correcting past wrongs, it is also 
forward-looking and aimed at preventing future violations.1632 This is characteristic of 
distributive justice and not corrective justice.1633  
4.2 Application of distributive justice in granting alternative 
accommodation orders 
The previous section found that distributive justice is the most appropriate form of justice in 
the context of eviction matters. In this section, the implications of this finding are explored. 
Distributive justice requires a fair distribution of goods amongst members of a specific 
group.1634 A decision regarding the distribution of resources must take into account the 
interests of all members of the group.1635 Hence, before determining the implication for 
applying distributive justice in eviction matters, membership to the group must be 
established. 
4.2.1 Identification of the group 
To determine membership to the group, one can look at the resources to be distributed. The 
group includes everyone for whom the resources are earmarked since they have an interest in 
receiving a just share of the resources.  
                                                 
1630
 Roach (1991) Ariz L Rev 865. See also, Trengove (2004) ESR Review 9, as referred to in Liebenberg 
"Interpretation of socio-economic rights" in CLOSA  33-62 - 33-63. 
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 See Chapter 5:5.2. 
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It is likely that the resources to be distributed would come from the state’s short-term housing 
budget.1636 This seems more obvious when the order is based on the state’s short-term housing 
duty (first ground for alternative accommodation orders)1637 than when it is based on the 
state’s duty to respect and protect human rights (the second ground for alternative 
accommodation orders).1638 However, the state’s short-term housing programme and budget is 
just as much its measure for fulfilling the right of access to adequate housing as it is for 
respecting and protecting this right. This is because it is used to ensure that unlawful 
occupiers, who have access to housing, do not lose access entirely. Even where the 
alternative accommodation order is granted to address the loss of the landowner caused by 
the violation of its right to property, such an order is often actually aimed at respecting, 
protecting and fulfilling the right of access to adequate housing of the unlawful occupiers, 
despite the fact that the housing may be less than adequate.1639 Similarly, evictions are denied 
and landowners compensated to ensure that the unlawful occupiers retain their access to 
housing. If this were not the case, the eviction would be granted without an alternative 
accommodation order. Accordingly, regardless of the ground for the alternative 
accommodation order, the group is likely to comprise those persons who qualify to benefit 
from the municipality’s short-term housing programme.  
There are situations in which membership of the group might not be determined in terms of 
the EHP. This is because the resources to be distributed would not come from the state’s 
short-term housing budget. This includes scenarios where the state does not have a reasonable 
short-term housing budget or where the alternative accommodation order is made to prevent 
social disorder and not the homelessness of unlawful occupiers.1640 In such situations, 
membership of the group might differ since more people’s rights are affected. The following 
section considers membership of the group based on the municipality’s short-term housing 
budget, whereas the subsequent section considers membership of the group in these other 
situations. 
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4.2.1.1 Group in terms of the EHP 
If the municipality’s short-term housing budget is to be used to fund an alternative 
accommodation order, everyone who qualifies to benefit from the municipality’s short-term 
housing programme, within the relevant budget cycle, is included in the group. Hence, not 
only are those included who qualify under the programme at the time the matter is heard, but 
also those who might qualify later on in the budget cycle since the budget needs to cover all 
emergency housing situations within the cycle.1641  
Since the EHP sets national standards for short-term housing programmes,1642 the 
requirements of the EHP are used to determine who would qualify under the municipality’s 
short-term housing programme. In addition to persons facing evictions,1643 the EHP caters for 
a range of persons living in emergency housing situations.1644 These include persons who 
have lost their homes due to a natural or industrial disaster or live in conditions that are prone 
to disasters, like fire or flood.1645 Persons living in the way of established or proposed 
engineering services, such as services for water, power or roads, including property reserved 
for this purpose, are included.1646 Further included are those persons whose homes are 
demolished, as well as those persons who face such fates.1647 Persons who are displaced due 
to civil conflict are also included.1648 Lastly, two broad catchall categories of persons are 
mentioned: those living in conditions that threaten their lives, health or safety and those who 
have an exceptional housing need “that can reasonably be addressed only by resettlement or 
other appropriate assistance, in terms of this Programme”.1649 
From this list, it is evident that the EHP casts the net very wide regarding which persons 
might be considered living in emergency housing situations.1650 Clarity on just how wide this 
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net is cast might be found in case law. Since the EHP was drafted in response to 
Grootboom,1651 it makes sense that persons living in similar conditions, to the group who 
approached the court, in that case, should be considered as living in an emergency housing 
situation under the EHP.1652  
That they had previously been evicted was not what classified the group as living in an 
emergency housing situation. Rather they were considered to be living in emergency based 
on their current living conditions. They were living on a sports field, with scant protection 
against rain because their building materials had been destroyed.1653 If one were to identify to 
which emergency housing situation listed in the EHP this would be designated three 
situations come to mind. One, they were living in dangerous conditions. Two, they were 
living in conditions that threatened their lives, health and safety. Three, their situation fell 
within the broad category of an exceptional housing need.1654  
That the living conditions of the occupiers in Grootboom must be considered an emergency 
housing situation under EHP is indicative of the types of beneficiaries that are catered for by 
the programme. It suggests that the range of situations and beneficiaries is very wide.1655 The 
category of persons who live in situations that threaten their health and safety alone can 
include many different kinds of persons. For example, if the bad-building cases discussed in 
Chapter 2 are used as precedent, all persons who live in such buildings form part of the 
group.  
Moreover, the EHP includes all persons living on dolomitic land since this constitutes a 
dangerous living condition.1656 Dolomite stone dissolves in water and can cause the land to 
subside.1657 Hence, the unlawful occupiers, in Occupiers of Skurweplaas 353 JR v PPC 
Aggregate Quarries (Pty) Ltd,1658 were living in an emergency housing situation regardless of 
whether they faced eviction.1659 Around a quarter of people who live in Gauteng, live on 
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 Socio-Economic Rights Institute of South Africa A Resource Guide to Housing (2011) 44. 
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dolomitic land. This includes informal settlements and indicates a great number of persons 
living in emergency housing situations.1660  
In fact, several, if not all, persons living in informal settlements could be considered as living 
in emergency housing situations.1661 For one, informal settlements are often prone to flooding, 
which is identified as an emergency housing situation in the EHP.1662 Wallacedene, the 
informal settlement from which the persons, in Grootboom, had moved was described as 
permanently flooded during winter.1663 This is not a unique feature of informal settlements.1664 
Two, conditions in informal settlements often create health and safety risks. For example, 
informal settlements are often prone to fires.1665 Three, the occupiers in Grootboom were 
considered to be living in an emergency housing situation and they were living in an informal 
settlement. It is not clear what distinguishes them from persons living in other informal 
settlements, other than the fact that some persons living in other informal settlements might 
have better building materials.1666 
The High Court’s decision in City of Cape Town v Rudolph1667 (hereinafter “Rudolph”) 
confirms that courts recognise that the EHP must cater for situations other than evictions. In 
this case, heard three years after Grootboom, several families had unlawfully erected informal 
housing on a public playground in Valhalla Park.1668 They justified the unlawful occupation 
by arguing that the municipality had not met its housing obligations in terms of section 26(2) 
of the Constitution, as interpreted in Grootboom.1669 Before they occupied the playground, 
they allegedly lived in emergency housing situations. They slept in cars, on the street, on 
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school grounds and in bushes.1670 The municipality failed to prioritise their needs through the 
implementation of a short-term emergency housing programme.1671  
The court found that the municipality had not adopted or implemented a short-term housing 
programme as required by Grootboom.1672 Accordingly, the court found that the municipality 
had failed to fulfil its housing duty.1673 The court rejected the municipality’s argument that the 
unlawful occupiers had not been living in emergency housing situations before their 
occupation of the playground.1674 It found that people, like the unlawful occupiers, who sleep 
wherever they find shelter and do not have anywhere they can lawfully live, live in 
emergency housing situations.1675 As a result, they should be included in the municipality’s 
short-term emergency housing programme. The municipality’s housing programme should 
not only consider the time spent waiting in the housing queue but should give priority to “the 
degree and extent of the need”.1676  
From this, it is clear that, not only persons who are evicted fall under the EHP but also others 
living in dire circumstances.1677 In fact, the implication of Rudolph is that all persons who do 
not have a place to live lawfully must be accommodated under the EHP. However, this was a 
High Court decision. Accordingly, its precedent value is limited to the Western Cape.1678 
Nevertheless, it is indicative of just how wide courts interpret the net to be cast and of whom 
would form part of the group for purposes of distributive justice. 
4.2.1.2 Other groups 
A decision regarding the distribution of resources must take into account the interests of all 
members of the group.1679 To determine membership of the group, one can look at the 
resources to be distributed. The group includes everyone for whom the resources are 
earmarked since they have an interest in receiving a just share of the resources. The previous 
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section considered the membership of the group if the resources came from the 
municipality’s short-term housing budget. This section considers the membership of the 
group if the resources for complying with the alternative accommodation order came from 
elsewhere. 
Two situations can be identified in which resources for complying with an alternative 
accommodation might not come from the state’s short-term housing budget. The first relates 
to where the municipality does not have a reasonable short-term housing budget or is unable 
to assist the unlawful occupiers within its short-term housing budget. In such situations, the 
resources within the provincial authority’s short-term housing budget should be used, failing 
which the national authority’s resources must be used.1680 If this is the case, the group would 
comprise of all the persons within the province (or the country) who qualify for short-term 
housing.1681  
If, as was the case in City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Blue Moonlight 
Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd,1682 the court finds that the municipality must spend its surplus budget 
on the unlawful occupiers,1683 this will affect the membership to the group. The group would 
comprise of all persons within its jurisdiction that qualify under the EHP, as well as all 
persons who might have a claim in respect of that money, such as persons in other types of 
emergencies. A finding that the municipality must reprioritise money allocated to other 
causes, would also affect membership to the group.1684 In this regard, the group would 
comprise of all persons within the municipality’s jurisdiction that qualify under the EHP, as 
well as the group of persons who would have benefited from the money that must be 
reprioritised. 
The second situation in which resources to provide alternative accommodation might come 
from somewhere other than the municipality’s short-term housing budget is where the 
unlawful occupiers do not qualify to benefit under the EHP. Nonetheless, the court grants an 
alternative accommodation order, since, due to the large size of the group, an eviction 
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without alternative accommodation would disturb the social order.1685 In such situations, the 
remedy for the landowner is not to prevent the homelessness of the unlawful occupiers, but to 
prevent social disorder. If the unlawful occupiers do not qualify under the EHP, that budget 
cannot be used to compensate the landowner.1686 This makes identifying the group difficult. If 
the state does not have a separate budget to address such issues relating to social order, it 
would have to repurpose funding meant for other purposes. The group, for distributive justice 
purposes, would then include all persons who would have benefitted from the funding under 
its original purpose.  
Nevertheless, in practice, it is unlikely that a court would refuse to order the eviction without 
alternative accommodation of a large group solely to protect the social order. Instead, a 
combination of the unlawful occupiers’ emergency housing needs and the social order would 
motivate such an order. This is because, for one, with large groups, it is difficult to consider 
the individual circumstances of all unlawful occupiers, to determine if they would qualify 
under the EHP. Two, it is unlikely that, in a large group, none of the unlawful occupiers 
qualifies under the EHP. Since the housing needs of the unlawful occupiers is a consideration 
and because it is unlikely that a decision would be based solely on the protection of social 
order, the municipality’s short-term housing budget would probably still be used in these 
situations. Hence, as with the group identified in the previous section, the group would 
probably be limited to all persons who qualify to benefit under this programme. This means 
that, in drafting its short-term housing budget, the municipality must take into account the 
fact that it would have to fund the safeguarding of social order, in eviction matters, from this 
budget.  
From this, it is evident that the group, whose interests must be considered before granting an 
alternative accommodation order, is likely to include a large number of people. In most 
situations, all persons who qualify for short-term housing under the EHP within the 
municipality would be included. As is clear from the EHP, as well as the jurisprudence, this 
net is cast very wide and is not limited to persons facing evictions. For practical purposes, 
therefore, one can conclude that the group at least encompasses all persons living in 
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emergency housing situations in the jurisdiction of the municipality within the relevant 
budget cycle.  
4.2.2 Application of the principles 
To illustrate how the principles of distributive justice are to be applied to a group, this, more 
practically determined, group is used – those who qualify under the EHP within the 
jurisdiction of the municipality in the relevant budget cycle. For a court to determine whether 
an alternative accommodation order would adhere to distributive justice, it must have 
knowledge of the personal circumstances of all those within the relevant group, as well as the 
available resources of the state. If it finds that the state has the available resources to assist all 
the persons within the group (including the unlawful occupiers before the court) it would be 
just to grant an alternative accommodation order. For example, if the municipality has a 
reasonable short-term housing programme and it is able to accommodate the unlawful 
occupiers, as well as all others within its jurisdiction that qualify under the EHP, the 
alternative accommodation order would be just. 
Accordingly, a critical question is whether the municipality has the means to provide 
accommodation to every person qualifying for assistance under the EHP, within its 
jurisdiction, in the relevant budget cycle. If that is the case, then a court can grant an 
alternative accommodation order without concerning itself further with those not before the 
court. If it is not the case, the principles of distributive justice must be applied to determine 
whether it would be just to prioritise the unlawful occupiers before the court. This means, 
advantaging the neediest in society. If the neediest are too numerous to assist immediately, 
equity considerations, such as effort, might be taken into account. 
Several factors can be considered to determine which persons living in emergency housing 
situations should be given priority based on need. This includes the financial means of the 
persons living in emergency housing situations. Priority must be given to the “poorest of the 
poor”.1687 Another crucial factor is the vulnerability of the persons since this affects their 
ability to secure their own alternative accommodation. Section 4 of the Prevention of Illegal 
Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998 (PIE) lists certain indicators 
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of vulnerability. Woman-headed households, children, disabled persons and elderly persons 
are identified as especially vulnerable.1688  
Despite these distinguishing factors, there might still be too many persons, who should be 
prioritised based on need, to assist immediately. As a result, priority cannot depend solely on 
need. Equity considerations such as how long a person had been waiting in the housing 
queue1689 or whether he is responsible for his unlawful occupation might also be taken into 
account.1690 Care must be taken to determine whether a person can really be blamed for his 
actions and whether he acted solely out of desperation.1691 
Another possible interpretation of using “need” as a principle of distribution is to consider the 
urgency of the emergency housing matters. Compare: (1) a person living on dolomitic land in 
Johannesburg, (2) a group of indigent persons, left homeless after their building burnt down, 
(3) an unlawful occupier occupying another person’s home, and (4) a group of unlawful 
occupiers occupying land earmarked for private development. The need of the persons who 
have been left homeless due to the fire might be greater than the need of the others since there 
is no way to postpone the emergency housing situation. The need of the person living on the 
dolomitic land might be less than that of the other persons if no damage due to the dolomite is 
predicted in the near future. The need of the person who is occupying another’s home is 
greater than the need of those occupying the land to be developed since the eviction in the 
prior situation is more urgent, especially if the developer bought the land, knowing that it was 
unlawfully occupied.  
Moreover, a court can consider the possibility of making the emergency housing situation 
less urgent by ordering the state to compensate the landowner, in the form of constitutional 
damages, and postponing the eviction. In such situations, the compensation of the landowner 
is taken from the available resources of the state. Hence, in terms of distributive justice, the 
distributive effect of the compensation order, on the state’s ability to address emergency 
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housing situations that are more urgent, must be considered. For this reason, the 
compensation might be less than the market value of the property.1692 
Need-based on urgency is in line with the idea that homelessness should not be more 
acceptable for some people than for others since all people have inherent human dignity.1693 
An exception might be that the person is to blame for their homelessness.1694 Vulnerability 
should rather play a role in determining whether a person would be able to secure alternative 
accommodation for themselves.1695 
Should the state not have the available resources to address even the most urgent needs, a 
possible solution could be to lower the standards of the housing provided. If even this 
standard of housing is unaffordable, the persons living in emergency housing situations might 
be prioritised based on their income and their vulnerability. Thereafter, equity considerations 
such as those that have been waiting longest can be considered. 
4.2.3 Difficulties in applying distributive justice in granting alternative 
accommodation orders 
Certain practical problems when applying distributive justice exist. One is that there are often 
factors, other than the principles identified above, that influence the court’s decision 
regarding distribution. The proximity of the potential beneficiaries to the judicial officer 
deciding upon the distribution is an example of such a factor. The unlawful occupiers in a 
specific matter are before the judicial officer, whereas the judicial officer has no contact with 
others in a similar position. A judicial officer might be more likely to distribute resources to 
people in close proximity to him.1696 This might explain why courts have prioritised those 
before it and granted alternative accommodation orders that only benefit them.1697 It might be 
due to their proximity to the judicial officer and the sympathy he feels toward them.  
Another factor that influences the court’s decision regarding distribution is the difficulty of 
determining a just distribution. The court needs to have information regarding all interested 
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persons before it.1698 This is very difficult in eviction matters, where the number of interested 
persons might be extremely high.1699 It might difficult for a court to determine whether there 
are needier persons who are not before it. This could explain why alternative accommodation 
orders require distribution only to the unlawful occupiers in the specific matter.1700  
A solution to the difficulty in determining the distribution lays in the type of remedy the court 
grants. Any remedy that leaves scope for the executive authority to decide how to comply 
with a duty is preferable. The executive authority is the branch of government that should 
have the knowledge and expertise to be able to apply the principles of distribution effectively. 
It is better placed to know the needs of other persons within its jurisdiction.1701  
A declaratory order1702 is an ideal remedy in distributive justice matters since it states the 
rights of the parties,1703 but allows the state to decide how best to implement them.1704 The 
court is not tasked with calculating distributions, something that falls within the functions and 
knowledge of the state.1705 Moreover, a declaratory order is forward-looking and does not aim 
to correct the wrongs suffered in the past, as is the nature of remedies in terms of distributive 
justice.1706 The problem with a declaratory order is that there is no penalty if the order is not 
observed.1707 Hence, if it is evident that the state will not comply with an order, a court can 
order a mandatory interdict instead.1708 In TAC, an interdict was granted instead of a 
declaratory order.1709 Accordingly, it was possible to force the state to comply with the court 
order in TAC but not the order in Grootboom since a declaratory order was granted.1710 Note, 
                                                 
1698
 See the discussion on separation of powers and the court’s lack of technical expertise in Chapter 3:3.1.1. 
1699
 Cook & Hegtvedt (1983) Annu Rev Sociol 226. See discussion on the interested persons in Chapter 6:4.2.1. 
1700
 See cases discussed in Chapter 2:3. 
1701
 See Chapter 5:3.1 
1702
 As was made in Grootboom. See, Chapter 2:2.1. 
1703
 Mbazira Litigating Socio-Economic Rights 156. 
1704
 Rail Commuters Action Group v Transnet Ltd t/a Metrorail 2005 (2) SA 359 (CC) para 107, referred to in 
Mbazira Litigating Socio-Economic Rights 156.  
1705
 See Chapter 5:3.1. 
1706
 A Chayes "The role of the judge in public law litigation" (1976) Harvard Law Review 1281 1298. 
1707
 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights  397; Mbazira Litigating Socio-Economic Rights 160; Swart (2005) 
SAJHR 220; Dugard (2014) CCR 278; Viljoen (2015) SAPR/SAPL 45. 
1708
 Mbazira Litigating Socio-Economic Rights 160-161. This can be in the form of a structural interdict in 
which the court continues to supervise the implementation of the order and the state has to report on its progress 
on a regular basis. See, Swart (2005) SAJHR 226; Liebenberg (2002) Law Democracy & Dev 9-10. 
1709
 See TAC para 135. 
1710
 Mbazira Litigating Socio-Economic Rights 172; Viljoen (2015) SAPR/SAPL 45-46. 
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however, that the content of the order in TAC was similar to that of Grootboom.1711 Both 
orders required the state to adopt and implement a reasonable programme to ensure the 
realisation of rights and left room for the state to decide how to comply with its duty. 
Another solution to the difficulty of courts having to apply the principles of distributive 
justice and to determine a just distribution is to argue that the alternative accommodation 
order should not be seen as a distribution but as a deterrent.1712 Such an order should deter the 
state from further neglecting its duties. Compensation as a deterrent is consistent with the 
characteristics of distributive justice. 1713 However, the court, in Fose v Minister of Safety and 
Security,1714 found that there is no real proof that compensation acts as a deterrent.1715 
Moreover, in matters concerning socio-economic rights, such as housing, ordering the state to 
use its resources in this way is counterproductive since it takes away from the resources the 
state has to fulfil its duties toward others.1716 Instead of spurring the state to fulfil its duties 
toward those in similar positions, such an order may cripple any existing housing programme 
already adopted by the state.1717 Those in similar positions are, in fact, prejudiced.1718 
Hence, another type of order is needed to deter the state from neglecting its duties or to force 
the state to fulfil its duties properly. Such an order might be a structural interdict. The term 
“structural interdict” refers to a mandatory interdict of which adherence to is monitored or 
supervised by the court.1719 Often, structural interdicts require the party bound by the order (in 
this instance the state) to report to the court on its progress periodically.1720 By retaining 
jurisdiction over the matter in this way, the court has more power to ensure that the state 
                                                 
1711
 See TAC para 135; Grootboom para 99. 
1712
 Mbazira Litigating Socio-Economic Rights 144-145. 
1713
 Mbazira Litigating Socio-Economic Rights 144-145. 
1714
 1997 (3) SA 786 (CC). 
1715
 Fose v Minister of Safety and Security. Mbazira Litigating Socio-Economic Rights 150. 
1716
 Fose v Minister of Safety and Security. Mbazira Litigating Socio-Economic Rights 150. Mbazira Litigating 
Socio-Economic Rights 153. 
1717
 Mbazira Litigating Socio-Economic Rights 164. 
1718
 Mbazira Litigating Socio-Economic Rights 150. 
1719
 Kotze Effective Relief 36-37. 
1720
 See, Swart (2005) SAJHR 226; Liebenberg (2002) Law Democracy & Dev 9-10; Kotze Effective Relief 38. 
Kotze also highlights that there are many different forms of structural interdicts. She discusses these forms at 
47-57. 
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complies with the order.1721 This might place a great burden on the court.1722 Instead, other 
measures of ensuring accountability and transparency could be employed.1723 
5 Conclusion 
This chapter considered which form and theory of justice are most appropriate in creating 
remedies in eviction matters where the unlawful occupiers face homelessness. The discussion 
was structured around two forms of justice, distributive justice and corrective justice.1724 On 
the one hand, an alternative accommodation order dictates how the state must distribute its 
resources. Hence, distributive justice might be the most appropriate form of justice.1725 On the 
other hand, where an alternative accommodation order is to remedy the limitation of a right, 
corrective justice might be the most appropriate form of justice.1726  
It was found that distributive justice is the most appropriate form of justice in eviction 
matters. This has certain consequences. In distributing resources, substantive equality must be 
ensured. This includes prioritising persons based, first, on need, and, second, on equity 
factors, such as blameworthiness and time spent waiting in the housing queue. A court must 
consider others, not before the court, and the distributive effect of any remedy on them. Even 
where the remedy is based on the failure of the state to protect the rights of the landowner, 
distributive justice requires the court to take into account the interests of those living in 
emergency housing situations who are not before the court.  
A distribution based on need requires prioritisation of the most urgent emergency housing 
situation. An eviction might be made less urgent by postponing the execution of the eviction 
order. If this amounts to an unconstitutional limitation of the landowner’s right to property, a 
court can require the state to compensate the landowner. In considering this approach, the 
court must take into account the distributive effect of the compensation order. In other words, 
the compensation is seen as part of the state’s fulfilment of its short-term housing duty. If the 
                                                 
1721
 Kotze Effective Relief  38. For a further discussion on structural interdicts, see Viljoen (2015) SAPR/SAPL 
58-61. 
1722
 For an in depth discussion on structural interdicts, see Kotze Effective Relief 28-103.  
1723
 See recommendations regarding this body in Chapter 7:3.1.4.3. 
1724
 These are the two forms of justice identified by Aristotle, see Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics  75. See also, 
Jenkins The American Courts 5; Weinrib (2002) UTLJ349. 
1725
 Mbazira Litigating Socio-Economic Rights  111; Klimchuk (2003) OJLS50. 
1726
 Jenkins The American Courts 10. 
247 
 
state does not have the available resources to address the most urgent emergency housing 
situations, the standards of housing provided might be lowered. If the resources are still too 
little, priority of those living in emergency housing situations might be based on income and 
vulnerability. Thereafter, equity considerations, such as those that have been waiting longest, 
can be considered. 
A judicial officer should be careful not to prioritise those before it because of their proximity 
to him. Moreover, since matters that call for the state to provide accommodation are 
polycentric, it is preferable that the state is allowed to decide how this duty is fulfilled. Where 
the state is uncooperative, an alternative accommodation order might be granted. However, 
the court must ensure that it has all the relevant information before it. If there is a possibility 
that the state would continue to disregard its duties toward people in similar situations, it is 
recommended that an order must be granted to ensure the fulfilment of its duties. Such an 
order could be granted in the alternative to or in addition to an alternative accommodation 
order. It might be in the form of a supervisory order by the court or by another independent 
body. 
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PART THREE: CONCLUSIONS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
This part consists of a single chapter. It summarises the findings of the thesis and provides 
concluding remarks. The primary aim of this chapter is to clarify the conditions under which 
courts should grant alternative accommodation orders in eviction matters. Hence, when 
would alternative accommodation orders adhere to the law, respect the functions of 
government and pursue justice? Some recommendations are also made regarding the key 
issues identified in the granting of alternative accommodation orders.   
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CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUDING REMARKS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
1 Introduction 
In an eviction matter, the court is required to consider all relevant circumstances and grant an 
order that is just and equitable.1727 An important relevant circumstance to be considered is 
whether the unlawful occupiers have alternative accommodation.1728 Courts are reluctant to 
grant an eviction order that would leave the unlawful occupiers homeless.1729 In fact, the 
Constitutional Court has stated that such an order would not be just and equitable.1730 In 
matters where unlawful occupiers are unable to secure their own alternative accommodation, 
courts often look to the state to provide alternative accommodation.1731 This thesis sought to 
determine when an alternative accommodation order as a condition to the eviction of 
unlawful occupiers in terms of PIE would comply with the court’s constitutional mandate.  
Two criteria were identified against which to test whether an alternative accommodation 
order would comply with the court’s constitutional mandate. These criteria are based on 
constitutional principles that dictate, limit and inform the court’s constitutional mandate. The 
criteria are that any alternative accommodation must adhere to the existing legal framework 
and must respect the functions of government. This last criterion can be separated into two 
parts. First, an alternative accommodation order must respect for the functions of the other 
branches of government, the executive and the legislative authority. Second, an alternative 
accommodation order must fulfil its own functions properly, its main function being the 
administration of justice. 
To determine whether an alternative accommodation order adheres to the existing legal 
framework, the legal ground for such an order must be established. A court can only order the 
                                                 
1727
 S 26(3) read with s 172(1)(b) of the Constitution. 
1728
 PE Municipality (hereinafter “PE Municipality”); Olivia Road (hereinafter “Olivia Road”); Joe Slovo 
(hereinafter “Joe Slovo”); Blue Moonlight (hereinafter “Blue Moonlight”); Skurweplaas (hereinafter 
“Skurweplaas”); Changing Tides (hereinafter “Changing Tides”); Hlophe (hereinafter “Hlophe”). See also, 
Muller (2014) SAJHR 42; Strydom & Viljoen (2014) PER/PELJ 1211. 
1729
 PE Municipality para 28. 
1730
 Occupiers of Erven 87 and 88 Berea para 57. 
1731
 PE Municipality; Olivia Road; Blue Moonlight; Skurweplaas; Changing Tides; ”); Hlophe. 
250 
 
state to provide alternative accommodation if there is a valid ground for placing this duty on 
the state.1732 The first Constitutional Court decisions, in which alternative accommodation 
orders were granted, were examined in Chapter 2 to determine the grounds on which the 
courts based the orders. Two possible grounds for holding the state liable were identified. 
Both relate to the state’s constitutional duty to respect, protect, promote and fulfil human 
rights.1733 The first possible ground, discussed in Chapter 3, relates to the state’s duty to fulfil 
the unlawful occupiers’ right of access to adequate housing by implementing reasonable 
short-term housing programmes.1734 A relevant circumstance considered by courts in eviction 
matters is whether the state has a duty to accommodate the unlawful occupiers within its 
short-term housing programme. Since alternative accommodation weighs so heavily, a 
finding that the state has a duty to accommodate the unlawful occupiers immediately is likely 
to lead to an eviction with an order against the state to provide alternative accommodation, 
regardless of the other circumstances.1735  
If the state does not have a duty to accommodate the unlawful occupiers immediately in 
terms of its duty to fulfil human rights, the second possible ground for holding the state liable 
to provide alternative accommodation, discussed in Chapter 4, might be relied on. In terms of 
the second ground, the state’s liability to provide alternative accommodation might be 
founded on its duty to respect and protect human rights.1736 This is because, under some 
circumstances, the granting of an eviction order that results in homelessness might violate the 
rights of the unlawful occupiers, whereas a delay of the eviction might violate the rights of 
the landowner.1737 Placing the duty on the state to prevent or mitigate the violation by 
addressing the loss of the parties could be justified due to the state’s duty to respect and 
protect human rights.1738 Such a loss could be addressed through the creation of a 
constitutional remedy. Constitutional damages in favour of the landowner could be granted or 
a constitutional remedy in the form of alternative accommodation to the unlawful occupiers. 
                                                 
1732
 As per the rule of law as formal protection, see Chapter 1:3.1.1. 
1733
 S 7(2) of the Constitution. See Chapter 2:3.4. 
1734
 As learnt from Grootboom (Chapter 2:2.1). 
1735
 Chapter 2:3.4. 
1736
 S 7(2) of the Constitution. See Chapter 2:3.4. 
1737
 See Chapter 4:5. 
1738
 See Chapter 4:5. 
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These two possible grounds for alternative accommodation orders were analysed to 
determine when alternative accommodation orders based on these grounds would adhere to 
the existing legal framework and respect the functions of the branches of government. From 
the analysis, it can be concluded that the two grounds would likely reach the same outcome 
regarding whether an alternative accommodation order should be granted. In addition, it is 
evident that certain key issues must be revisited and re-imagined to create certainty and 
ensure that the laws are applied justly. One issue is the fact that the state has limited resources 
that must be used to respect, protect, promote and fulfil the human rights of many people in 
need. Another issue is the fact that the court requires a considerable amount of information to 
grant an alternative accommodation and there is uncertainty regarding which entity must 
place this information before the court. The remainder of the chapter, firstly, explains how 
the analysis in this thesis indicates that the two grounds are likely to reach the same outcome. 
Second, it explores how the analysis can address the identified issues and makes 
recommendations in this regard. 
2 Similar outcome of the grounds 
It is evident from the analysis that reliance on either of the two grounds is likely to reach the 
same outcome regarding whether an alternative accommodation order should be granted. In 
other words, if, based on the first ground, the court denies an alternative accommodation 
order it would likely also have denied the order if the case was based on the second ground. 
This section explains why these grounds are likely to have the same outcome and makes 
recommendations based on this conclusion. 
2.1 Reasons for similar outcome 
The reason for concluding that reliance on either of the two grounds is likely to have a similar 
outcome is that the same factors strongly influence the granting of an alternative 
accommodation order in respect of both grounds. These factors are the blameworthiness of 
the unlawful occupiers; the blameworthiness of the state; and the limited resources of the 
state and its duty to realise the rights of others.  
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2.1.1 Blameworthiness of the unlawful occupiers 
Unlawful occupiers are not automatically considered blameworthy since they are not 
necessarily responsible for their unlawful occupation. Hence, the blameworthiness considered 
by the court goes beyond mere unlawful occupation. On the one hand, unlawful occupiers can 
be blameworthy to the extent that they are responsible for the fact that they are facing 
eviction. On the other hand, they can be blameworthy to the extent that they did not attempt 
to procure alternative accommodation for themselves.1739 Both grounds for alternative 
accommodation orders exclude blameworthy unlawful occupiers as beneficiaries. 
The Emergency Housing Programme (EHP)1740 excludes persons as beneficiaries who were 
responsible for their emergency housing situation.1741 This relates to the blameworthiness of 
the unlawful occupiers. If they can be blamed for their situation, then they cannot benefit. 
Since the first ground for alternative accommodation orders involves adherence to the 
EHP,1742 an alternative accommodation order based on this ground cannot be in favour of 
unlawful occupiers that are blameworthy. 
In terms of the second ground, the blameworthiness of the unlawful occupiers as a relevant 
circumstance has also carried considerable weight. Unlawful occupiers have been evicted 
without alternative accommodation due to their blameworthiness.1743 Only where the group 
had been extremely large so that its eviction would disturb the social order, had 
blameworthiness not resulted in an eviction without an alternative accommodation order.1744 
If the recommendations below are followed,1745 this difference would be kept at a minimum.  
The Constitutional Court’s statement, in Occupiers of Erven 87 and 88 Berea, challenges the 
idea that the blameworthiness of the unlawful occupiers might bar an alternative 
accommodation order. In this matter, the court stated that the municipality has a duty to 
provide alternative accommodation where an eviction leaves unlawful occupiers homeless. 
This statement is not qualified to include only unlawful occupiers who are not to blame. It 
                                                 
1739
 For these grounds, see Chapter 3:4. 
1740
 Department of Human Settlements EHP (2009). 
1741
 Department of Human Settlements EHP (2009) Part A 2.3.1. 
1742
 See Chapter 3:2. 
1743
 Chapter 4:3.6. 
1744
 As was the case in Modderklip. See Chapter 4:3.2 and 3.6. 
1745
 See Section 3.1 below. 
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could, however, be argued that a court must consider all relevant circumstances when 
granting an order in eviction matters. Relevant circumstances, such as the blameworthiness of 
the unlawful occupiers might challenge the absoluteness of the court’s statement. 
In light of the court’s statement, blameworthiness as such might not justify refusing an 
alternative accommodation order. The extent of the blameworthiness and the leeway granted 
to correct it must be compelling enough to support an eviction without alternative 
accommodation. In respect of unlawful occupiers that are responsible for their evictions, this 
thesis considered two situations: where someone does something knowing that it jeopardises 
their continued lawful occupation and when someone unlawfully occupies land out of greed.  
The example used, of someone who knowingly jeopardises their continued lawful 
occupation, is that of a person who illegally sells drugs from a rented home, contrary to the 
lease agreement. This, in itself, is blameworthy. However, to justify an eviction without 
alternative accommodation additional measures might be required. This may include giving 
the occupier a reasonable opportunity to cease with their actions;1746 addressing the unlawful 
conduct through other channels, such as through criminal law; and not ascribing the 
blameworthiness of one member of the household to those not involved in the conduct. In the 
Malan case, for example, the municipality was to provide alternative accommodation to the 
innocent mother of the alleged drug dealer.1747  
In respect of someone being responsible for their unlawful occupation since they occupied 
the land out of greed, cognisance must be taken of the fact that the blameworthiness of an 
unlawful occupier might be difficult to determine. A person that unlawfully occupies land 
might be acting out of need rather than greed. This can be described as an “unforced” 
occupation.1748 Since fault cannot be ascribed to the unlawful occupier, he cannot be 
considered blameworthy.1749  
Moreover, even if some greed is involved, an unlawful occupier who cannot secure 
alternative accommodation is needy.1750 If he unlawfully occupied land out of frustration with 
                                                 
1746
 As was done in Daniels para 7. 
1747
 Malan para 15. 
1748
 See Chenwi (2008) Harv L Rev 111. 
1749
 See Chapter 3:4 and Chapter 4:3.6. On fault, see Chapter 4:5.2. 
1750
 Mostert "Landlessness, Housing and the Rule of Law" in Essays  87. 
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the slow progression in housing provision, he was possibly already living in an emergency 
housing situation prior to the unlawful occupation.1751 While unlawful occupation due to 
frustration with the state is not ideal, it is often the only way persons living in emergency 
housing situations can force the municipality to take notice of them.1752 It is submitted that an 
unlawful occupier, however greedy, must be considered needy if he cannot secure alternative 
accommodation. If the matter is dealt with speedily, a person who acted out of greed might be 
able to return to his previous home or secure accommodation elsewhere.  
The second type of blameworthiness on the part of unlawful occupiers relates to the failure of 
attempting to procure alternative accommodation. Unlawful occupiers cannot remain on the 
land indefinitely, under the auspices that they have not been able to secure alternative 
accommodation, if they make no effort to find alternative accommodation. Nevertheless, for 
this type of blameworthiness to bar an alternative accommodation order, they must have a 
reasonable perspective of securing accommodation elsewhere.1753 In addition, a court should 
afford them enough time to secure accommodation prior to the eviction order being executed. 
In some circumstances, a court may postpone the matter to allow the unlawful occupiers to 
secure alternative accommodation. This would ensure that an unlawful occupier, who is not 
blameworthy but uses the time to seek for alternative accommodation in vain, is not evicted 
without alternative accommodation.  
2.1.2 Blameworthiness of the state 
Another factor that influences the granting on an eviction order, regardless of the ground for 
the order, is the blameworthiness of the state. In eviction matters, the state has been found to 
be blameworthy on several grounds. The state can be blameworthy if it did not adopt a 
reasonable short-term housing programme and budget1754 or did not implement it 
reasonably.1755 Failure to assist the landowner in preventing unlawful occupation1756 or to 
                                                 
1751
 In both Modderklip and Skurweplaas, for example, some of the unlawful occupiers had previously been 
evicted from land. See the discussion of Modderklip and Skurweplaas in Chapter  2:2.3 and 3.2 respectively. 
1752
 Since an eviction matter would go to court. 
1753
 This seems to have been the approach in Omar. However, as explained in Chapter 4:3.1, the court did not 
ensure that the accommodation would actually be available. 
1754
 As was the case in Grootboom and Blue Moonlight. See Chapter 2:2.1 and 3.1.1 respectively. 
1755
 As was the case in Skurweplaas. See Chapter 2:3.2. 
1756
 As was the case in Modderklip. See Chapter 2:2.3. 
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respond reasonably to an unlawful occupation1757 indicates blameworthiness on the part of the 
state. Further, the state is blameworthy if it does not co-operate with the court.1758 It is argued 
in Chapters 3 and 4 that both grounds for alternative accommodation orders require 
blameworthiness on the part of the state as a condition for the granting of an alternative 
accommodation order. 
Where the alternative accommodation order is based on the state’s short-term housing duty, a 
court should not grant an alternative accommodation order if the state has adopted and 
implemented a reasonable short-term housing programme and budget. This would violate the 
separation of powers doctrine.1759 Only where the state either did not adopt or implement a 
reasonable short-term housing programme and budget should the court grant an alternative 
accommodation order.1760 The question arises whether the state would always be blameworthy 
if it fails to provide alternative accommodation to persons who qualify under the EHP. Its 
short-term housing duty states that it must assist persons in emergency housing situations. 
However, emergency housing situations must be prioritised based on need.1761 Hence, it might 
have a duty toward the unlawful occupiers, but the duty might not be immediate.  
Similarly, in respect of the second ground, the state can only be held responsible for failing to 
protect the rights of the unlawful occupiers or the landowner if it was blameworthy. Where 
there is no fault on the part of the state, it should not be held responsible.1762 Hence, an 
alternative accommodation order based on the second ground should not be granted against 
the state if it was not blameworthy. 
In respect of both grounds, the separation of powers requires a court to engage in 
constitutional dialogue with the state. If it finds that the state was blameworthy, it should 
allow it to choose how to correct its mistake. Only where the state is blameworthy in not 
participating in the constitutional dialogue should the court grant an alternative 
                                                 
1757
 As was the case in Olivia Road and Skurweplaas. See Chapter  2: 3.1 and 3.2 respectively. 
1758
 As was the case in Blue Moonlight and Hlophe, see Chapter  2:3.1.1 and 3.1.2.2 respectively. See also the 
discussion on constitutional dialogue in Chapter 5:3.1.2. 
1759
 Since this is part of the functions of the executive government and should not be interfered with unless it is 
unconstitutional. The Constitution prescribes that the programme must be reasonable in S 26(2) of the 
Constitution. See Chapter 5:3.2. 
1760
 See Chapter 3:6.3. 
1761
 See Chapter 6. 
1762
 See Chapter 4:5.2. 
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accommodation order.1763 Participation in such a dialogue would involve the state being 
joined to the proceedings and it filing comprehensive reports regarding its ability to provide 
alternative accommodation to the unlawful occupiers.1764 
The conclusion that there must be blameworthiness on the part of the state is in accord with 
the court’s emphasis on the state’s blameworthiness in Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) 
Ltd v Occupiers of Saratoga Avenue1765 (hereinafter “Blue Moonlight”),1766 City of 
Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Hlophe1767 and President of the Republic of South 
Africa v Modderklip Boerdery1768 (hereinafter “Modderklip”).1769 Moreover, it also explains 
why an alternative accommodation order was not granted in Ives v Rajah,1770 where the state 
was found to have acted reasonably.1771  
The finding that the court should not grant an alternative accommodation order if the state 
was not blameworthy does not mean that the court must grant an eviction without alternative 
accommodation. It simply means that the court’s means of solving the problem should not be 
to grant an alternative accommodation order but rather to allow the state to participate in 
finding a solution.  
2.1.3 Limited resources and the rights of others 
The third factor that influences the granting of an alternative accommodation order, 
regardless of the ground on which it is based, is the limited resources of the state and the 
rights of others. Considering the rights of others, within the state’s jurisdiction, means 
recognising that there are other people in a position similar to those before the court. They 
could similarly succeed in proving that the state must provide them with alternative 
accommodation. However, the state has limited resources. The state might not be able to 
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 See Chapter 5:3.1.2 and 3.2. 
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 See Chapter 5:4.5. 
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 2012 (2) SA 104 (CC). 
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 See Chapter 2:3.1.1. 
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 [2015] 2 All SA 251 (SCA). See Chapter 2:3.1.2.2. 
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 2005 (5) SA 3 (CC). 
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 See Chapter 2:2.3. 
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 2012 (2) SA 167 (WCC). 
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 Nevertheless, the size of the group might also have made the difference. See discussion below. 
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assist all the persons in positions similar to those before the court immediately. Hence, a just 
measure for determining priority amongst these persons is needed.1772 
The measure to be used is the need of the persons in a similar position.1773 It is recommended 
that the “need” to be considered is the urgency of the matter. When matters are equally 
urgent, those who are more vulnerable must be prioritised, followed by those who have been 
waiting longest in the short-term housing queue.1774 
That the court must consider the rights of others means that it cannot grant an alternative 
accommodation order if the state has limited resources and there are other, needier (or 
equally needy but more deserving)1775 persons within the state’s jurisdiction on whom the 
state should spend the resources instead. This distributive form of justice is more easily 
attributed to the first ground for alternative accommodation orders (which requires 
compliance with the duty to fulfil socio-economic rights through the distribution of 
resources) than it is to the second (which requires compensation due to the court’s failure to 
respect and protect rights).  
Corrective justice seems to find more appeal with the second ground for alternative 
accommodation orders. Corrective justice concerns the correcting of injustice caused and 
considers only two parties – the one that caused the loss and the one that suffered the loss. 
Hence, it does not to consider others within the state’s jurisdiction. Since the second ground 
for alternative accommodation concerns the correcting of an injustice, corrective justice 
seems most appropriate and it seems unnecessary for the court to consider the plight of others 
if its order is based on the second ground.1776 
Even if corrective justice is to be used in matters based on the second ground, there might be 
several persons within the municipality’s jurisdiction with a similar claim against the state. If 
they all suffered due to a failure on the part of the state, corrective justice would require that 
their claims also be successful. This could place an impossible burden on the resources of the 
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 This relates to distributive justice, see Chapter 6:4.2.2. It also relates to the rule of law as procedural 
safeguard since it takes into account the fact that not all persons in a similar position have access to courts and 
legal representation. On the rule of law as procedural safeguard, see, Chapter 1:3.1.1. 
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 On this principle, see Chapter 6:2. 
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 See Chapter 6:4.2.2. 
1775
 Relating to equity and the time spent waiting for emergency housing. See Chapter 6:4.2.2. 
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 On corrective justice, see Chapter 6:3. 
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state and would affect its ability to fulfil the needs of others within its jurisdiction. For this, 
and other, reasons, it was concluded that distributive justice would be the most appropriate 
form of justice even in matters concerning the second ground for alternative accommodation 
orders.1777 If distributive justice applies also to the second ground, this means that the interests 
of others in a similar position to the unlawful occupiers must be taken into account. Hence, 
the second ground does not justify prioritising evictees since several other persons living in 
emergency housing situations have also lost their existing access to adequate housing.1778  
Another issue concerns what resources are to be distributed. The available resources to be 
considered in terms of the first ground are limited to a reasonable short-term housing budget. 
This is because the state has the duty to budget and the separation of powers doctrine dictates 
that the court should not interfere with this budget unless it is unconstitutional.1779 Moreover, 
as a measure for implementing its housing duty, the reasonableness review standard requires 
the court to accept the measure unless it is unreasonable.1780  
It can be argued that the state’s short-term housing programme and budget also embody its 
plan for complying with its duty to respect and protect the rights of unlawful occupiers and 
landowners in eviction matters, as well as the social order.1781 Hence, if the state has a 
reasonable short-term housing budget, the separation of powers doctrine dictates that the 
court should not interfere with this budget, even if the matter is brought in terms of the 
second ground.1782  
As starting point, the enquiry should be aimed at the municipality’s short-term housing 
programme. If this programme does not exist or the resources are insufficient, the provincial 
or even the national short-term housing budget can be considered. If no provincial or national 
short-term housing budgets exist, surplus revenue or any litigation budget might be used. 
Moreover, the court might expect the state to reprioritise funds from elsewhere in the 
budget.1783 If this is the case, distributive justice requires the court to consider whether such a 
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decision would be just, considering the interests of those who would have benefited from 
these resources.1784 In addition, a court would have to determine what percentage of state 
revenue should go to the respect, protection and fulfilment of these rights and not require the 
state to spend more than this amount.1785 This is a highly polycentric issue and places an 
enormous burden on the court.1786  
A further issue to be considered is whether the court must determine whether the state 
actually has the resources to comply with the order. In other words, even if the court finds 
that it is in line with distributive justice to prioritise the parties before it, must it consider 
whether the state can comply with an order in favour of these parties? It did not seem to 
consider this in Occupiers of Skurweplaas 353 JR v PPC Aggregate Quarries (Pty) Ltd1787 
(hereinafter “Skurweplaas”) before granting the alternative accommodation order.1788 If the 
order is based on the first ground, the Constitution prohibits alternative accommodation 
orders that cannot be complied with due to a lack of resources since it limits the state’s 
housing duty to its available resources.1789 The same conclusion is not as clear in respect of 
the second ground.  
In Jaftha v Schoeman; Van Rooyen v Stoltz,1790 the court found that the negative obligations in 
terms of section 26(1) of the Constitution are not limited by section 26(2) of the Constitution; 
that is, the available resources of the state. This is because “the availability of state resources 
is not an issue”.1791 Even in Jaftha v Schoeman; Van Rooyen v Stoltz, the statement is not 
entirely correct. In this case, the court required judicial oversight in all matters requesting the 
sale in execution of immovable property used as homes.1792 This definitely has resource 
implications. Similarly, even if an alternative accommodation order based on the second 
ground is considered relief for the limitation of the landowner’s rights, the availability of 
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state resources is an issue. This is because the realisation of any right has resource 
implications.1793  
It is impossible to comply with an alternative accommodation order if the state does not have 
the resources to do so. Hence, courts have considered the state’s available resources in 
granting remedies even in matters not concerning section 26(2) of the Constitution.1794 A 
court should not grant orders with which the state could not comply.1795 Accordingly, even if 
an order is based on the second ground, it should still be limited to the state’s available 
resources.  
In summary, regardless of the ground relied upon for alternative accommodation, a court 
should take cognisance of the limited resources of the state and the interests of others, who 
are not before it. A court should not grant an alternative accommodation order without 
considering whether the state has the available resources to comply with the order and 
whether those before the court should be prioritised above others in similar circumstances. 
Prioritisation should be based on the urgency of the matter. An eviction matter might be less 
urgent than an emergency housing situation in which persons were left homeless due to flood. 
An eviction matter can be postponed, thereby removing the threat of imminent 
homelessness.1796  
2.2 Recommendations regarding the choice of grounds 
Since reliance on these grounds is likely to have the same outcome regarding whether an 
alternative accommodation order should be granted, it is recommended that only one ground 
be used. This would create certainty and would prevent parallel systems of law.1797 It is 
recommended that the state’s duty to fulfil the unlawful occupiers’ right of access to adequate 
housing be used as the only ground for alternative accommodation orders. This is because 
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 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights  191. 
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there are already very clear laws and policies regarding compliance with this duty,1798 whereas 
the second ground is not technically sanctioned by the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from 
and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998 (PIE).1799 Moreover, the first ground is the 
main ground relied upon in the cases, discussed in Chapter 2, in which alternative 
accommodation orders were granted.1800 In addition, the provision of alternative 
accommodation as relief for the limitation of the landowner’s rights has the effect of fulfilling 
the unlawful occupiers’ positive right of access to adequate housing, which suggests that the 
law relating to the first ground should apply.1801  
In terms of distributive justice, it is more appropriate that the first ground should be the only 
ground used for requesting alternative accommodation orders since courts are more likely to 
consider the interests of others in similar situations when applying this ground.1802 Moreover, 
allowing two grounds for alternative accommodation orders might frustrate distributive 
justice because it would be difficult to define the group and parties might want to argue that 
they should be considered separately since their arguments are based on different grounds.1803  
Furthermore, if unlawful occupiers qualify for emergency housing assistance, the state has a 
duty towards them. Depending on their need, they might not be prioritised and the state might 
not have a duty to assist them immediately. This calls for a delay of the eviction.1804 The delay 
might unconstitutionally limit the rights of the landowner and call for the compensation of the 
landowner, through constitutional damages. In such matters, whether this route should be 
taken should be based on the first ground for alternative accommodation. That is because it 
amounts to the state providing emergency accommodation to the unlawful occupiers. While 
the first ground is used, compensation to the landowner for the loss of its property should still 
be paid. However, the payment forms part of the available resources and the state’s fulfilment 
of its housing duty. Hence, the laws relating to the first ground must be applied since the 
order for compensation is actually founded on the first ground. 
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Of course, if a case founded on the first (or the second) ground leads to a conclusion that an 
alternative accommodation order against the state cannot be granted, a stalemate situation 
could still exist. In such a situation, a court is not required to grant an eviction order that 
would leave the unlawful occupiers homeless. This idea is bolstered by the Constitutional 
Court decision in Occupiers of Erven 87 and 88 Berea, where the court found that an eviction 
without alternative accommodation would not be just and equitable. Instead, a finding that 
the court cannot grant an alternative accommodation order simply means that the issue cannot 
be solved in this way. The following section makes recommendations to solve, or at least 
minimise such stalemate situations, especially where they are due to the limited resources of 
the state.  
3 Recommendations regarding key issues 
Throughout the analysis, certain issues concerning the granting of alternative accommodation 
orders became apparent. One issue is the fact that the state has limited resources that must be 
used to respect, protect, promote and fulfil the human rights of many people in need. Another 
issue is the fact that the court requires a considerable amount of information to grant an 
alternative accommodation and there is uncertainty regarding which entity must place this 
information before the court. These issues are discussed in the following sections and 
recommendations are made regarding how these issues must be approached.  
3.1 Availability of resources 
One of the main issues with alternative accommodation orders is that they have far-reaching 
budgetary implications. Municipalities have limited resources to be used to respect, protect, 
promote and fulfil the property and housing rights of the many people within their 
jurisdictions. This section considers how this burden on municipalities can be reduced. As is 
evident from the discussion below, reducing the burden on municipalities is consistent with 
the notion of distributive justice since it ensures that more resources are available and that 
resources can be distributed more justly.  
First, this section considers how a different approach to determining whether the unlawful 
occupiers need alternative accommodation might reduce the burden. Second, the section 
considers how the involvement of other spheres of government might reduce the burden on 
263 
 
municipalities. Third, the section examines how changing the standards of emergency 
housing might reduce the burden. Fourth, the section explores how the burden might be 
reduced by granting remedies other than alternative accommodation orders.  
The recommendations made in this section should be followed by courts in deciding whether 
and on what terms to grant an alternative accommodation order. Moreover, these 
recommendations can be used as guidelines for municipalities in drafting their short-term 
housing programmes. In measuring the reasonableness of a municipality’s short-term housing 
programme, these recommendations can also be of use.  
3.1.1 Lack of alternative accommodation 
In Johannesburg Housing Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Unlawful Occupiers, Newtown Urban 
Village,1805 homelessness after an eviction was defined as having no reasonable prospect to 
find alternative accommodation that is of comparable standard, similar rental rate and within 
the reasonable proximity of the property, evicted from, before the date of execution of the 
eviction order.1806 One way of limiting the budgetary effects of alternative accommodation 
orders is to consider if the unlawful occupiers would genuinely become homeless if evicted 
and to require the state to assist only those who cannot secure accommodation elsewhere. 
This approach was followed in City of Johannesburg v Changing Tides 74 (Pty) Ltd1807 
(hereinafter “Changing Tides”), where the unlawful occupiers’ legal representatives were 
required to investigate the individual personal circumstances of the unlawful occupiers and 
report on those who would not be able to access accommodation elsewhere.1808 
Two elements affect the effectiveness of the court’s inquiry into whether unlawful occupiers 
genuinely face homelessness. One is whether the court’s inquiry is done on an individual 
basis. The other is whether factors other than the income of the unlawful occupiers are taken 
into account. Primarily, the evidence used by courts, to determine whether unlawful 
occupiers face homelessness, relates to the employment of the unlawful occupiers and to 
                                                 
1805
 2013 (1) SA 583 (GSJ). 
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whether they have sufficient income to afford alternative accommodation.1809 Not only have 
courts failed to consider other factors; they have also failed to consider the individual 
circumstances of the unlawful occupiers. In Blue Moonlight, for example, the court’s finding 
that the unlawful occupiers faced homelessness was based on the average income of the 
group.1810 Furthermore, in Skurweplaas, the court neither applied any factors nor considered 
the unlawful occupiers separately, but inferred from the circumstances that the eviction 
would leave them homeless.1811  
While a general guesstimate regarding the potential homelessness of the unlawful occupiers 
can indicate whether the state must be joined to the matter, the guesstimate cannot be the end 
of the enquiry.1812 Using such a general guesstimate to determine whether the state ultimately 
has a duty toward the unlawful occupiers might be prejudicial to poor persons living amongst 
people that are more affluent. This is because the average income of the group could indicate 
that the unlawful occupiers can afford alternative accommodation, while some individuals 
might, in fact, face homelessness. Similarly, it might give unjust priority to persons who are 
more affluent than others in a group of unlawful occupiers are.1813 Including such persons 
within an alternative accommodation order would unduly burden the municipality.  
In addition to considering the individual circumstances of the unlawful occupiers to 
determine whether they can afford accommodation elsewhere, other ways of obtaining 
alternative accommodation should also be considered. Such ways include returning whence 
they came1814 and moving in with friends or family. 
In Skurweplaas, one of the families had been renting a backyard dwelling nearby.1815 While 
this suggests that they can afford alternative accommodation, it also indicates that they have a 
place to which to return. These facts seem to lend itself to a conclusion that the unlawful 
                                                 
1809 See, for example, Blue Moonlight HC para 19; SOHCO para 31; Premier of the Province of the Eastern 
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occupiers have alternative accommodation. Their unlawful occupation had not been very long 
and the accommodation they would be returning to would be nearby. In addition, their 
occupation would be with the consent of the landowner.1816 In other cases, the facts might not 
be as conducive to a conclusion that the unlawful occupiers can return whence they came.  
If the previous occupation had been unlawful, a court would be less likely to find that the 
unlawful occupiers should return. Nevertheless, if their previous unlawful occupation was 
peaceful and uncontested, a court might find this to be sufficient temporary alternative 
accommodation, given the state’s limited resources, albeit not necessarily “adequate” long-
term housing.1817 
Moreover, if the previous accommodation was far away that could also hinder a finding that 
they can return whence they came. In MEC for Department of Human Settlements, Gauteng 
Province v Molema,1818 the court pointed out that unlawful occupation near cities could be a 
result of the Apartheid regime. The racial segregation during Apartheid means that many 
black people still grow up in rural areas far away from cities and the employment 
opportunities that they offer. They move to urban areas in search of employment. Forcing 
them to return to the rural areas would perpetuate the discrimination of the Apartheid 
regime.1819 However, this only applies to specific situations and cannot be a blanket defence 
against the argument that persons must return whence they came.  
Nonetheless, the fact that returning would cause them to lose their jobs or any prospect of 
getting a job is a valid argument.1820 This must be proved. Proving that returning whence they 
came would cause them to lose the prospect of getting a job includes showing that the 
unlawful occupier is able to work and is not prevented from doing so due to old age or 
disability. The fact that a child will be far away from his school might not be an unassailable 
hindrance,1821 unless the area he is returning to does not have a school. Moreover, a longer 
commute to work should not be a valid argument since persons from all levels of 
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employment can be expected to commute to work.1822 The distance from employment must be 
shown effectively to prevent continued employment. 
Proof that it would not be possible to return whence they came, would be a valid argument 
against finding that the unlawful occupiers have alternative accommodation. This would 
likely be the case where the unlawful occupiers have occupied the property for a long time1823 
or where they were evicted from their previous occupation.1824 In addition, the fact that their 
previous housing had already been occupied by others would prevent them from returning.1825 
In respect of illegal immigrants, they might have to return to their countries of origin.1826 The 
Immigration Act 13 of 2002 provides that “any illegal foreigner shall be deported”.1827 
Continued occupation would only be allowed if authorised by the Department of Home 
Affairs, on the basis that the illegal immigrants have applied for a status.1828 Applying for a 
status could refer to an application to receive refugee status, to acquire a visa or a permanent 
residence permit.1829 The fact that the EHP only caters for illegal immigrants subject to 
conditions set by the Department of Home Affairs seems to relate to this provision.1830 Hence, 
the condition that the Department of Home Affairs is likely to set for inclusion of illegal 
immigrants under the EHP is that they have applied for a status.  
Nevertheless, it could be argued that health and safety concerns require an urgent eviction 
and that waiting for deportation would not be feasible.1831 However, in terms of the 
Immigration Act, deportation should take no longer than 90 days,1832 which is much shorter 
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than the delay allowed by courts in urgent matters based on health and safety.1833 Moreover, 
illegal immigrants can be kept in detention prior to deportation.1834 
Other than finding that the unlawful occupiers have alternative accommodation since they 
can return whence they came, it can also be argued that they can find alternative 
accommodation through friends or family. In both Omar NO v Omar1835 and Ives v Rajah,1836 
the court found that the unlawful occupiers must be evicted and that they would have to stay 
with family members. Ives was to stay with her sister and the evictees in Omar NO v Omar 
were to stay with their children.1837  
Requiring family members to accommodate each other is morally1838 and often even legally 
sound. A reciprocal common-law duty of support exists between certain family members. 
This includes parents and children; grandparents and children; siblings; and spouses.1839 
However, this duty is limited to the extent that the family member is able to provide such 
support, which, in the context of evictions, would be in the form of accommodation.1840  
What needs to be determined is whether a court can find that the unlawful occupier has 
alternative accommodation through friends or family if no legal obligation to support is 
proved.1841 In other words, would factual evidence that the unlawful occupier can live with 
someone else be enough? If the person is unwilling, factual evidence that such a person is 
able to provide accommodation would probably not be enough.1842 In addition, distance would 
play a role once more. As with finding that the unlawful occupiers can return whence they 
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came, the implication of the distance that the friend or relative lives from the current property 
must be considered. 
With both the argument that the unlawful occupiers can return whence they came and that 
they can live with relatives or friends, the locus of the burden of proof is a critical 
consideration. If the duty falls on the unlawful occupiers, it would be much easier to justify 
an eviction without an alternative accommodation order where the availability of alternative 
accommodation has not been proved.1843 
In addition to reducing the burden on the resources of the state, reimagining what it means 
when unlawful occupiers lack alternative accommodation reduces the circumstances in which 
an alternative accommodation order is granted to protect the social order.1844 This is because 
considering the ability of each unlawful occupier to find alternative accommodation would 
reduce a number of unlawful occupiers and the social impact of the eviction. Obviously, an 
eviction as large as that of Modderklip, with tens of thousands of people, would create 
difficulties. It would be difficult to consider their individual circumstances. It is 
recommended that the state act timeously to prevent large-scale unlawful occupation, by 
engaging with those attempting to occupy land unlawfully and trying to meet their housing 
needs. An urgent large-scale eviction may require the provision of very basic temporary 
alternative accommodation and the subsequent “weeding out” of those who do not qualify for 
alternative accommodation.  
Considering the individual circumstances of unlawful occupiers in a large group might 
require a considerable amount of resources. Nevertheless, the state already has a duty to 
engage meaningfully with the unlawful occupiers to determine their needs. While the court, 
in Joe Slovo, found that the state does not need to engage on an individual basis if the group 
is large, this case has been criticised for departing from the requirements set in Olivia 
Road.1845 Furthermore, some burden of proof may fall on the unlawful occupiers to provide 
information regarding their personal circumstances.1846  
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3.1.2 Involvement of other spheres 
Another way of reducing the burden on municipalities is to involve other spheres of 
government in decisions regarding alternative accommodation. Municipalities are often the 
first and final sphere of government held responsible for providing alternative 
accommodation in eviction matters.1847  
The fact that municipalities are considered the first port of call is in line with the 
Constitution, as well as the Housing Act, the Municipal Systems Act and the EHP.1848 
Municipalities operate closest to the people living in their jurisdictions and are able to better 
gauge their needs.1849 Nevertheless, municipalities should not be the final sphere of 
government held responsible for providing alternative accommodation.1850 
There are three reasons for this. Firstly, revenue is primarily collected and distributed by the 
national government. Municipalities have limited capacity to collect revenue and they, 
therefore, rely on other spheres for funding. Accordingly, if a municipality does not have the 
resources to provide alternative accommodation, its ability to increase its available resources 
is very limited.1851 Instead, it must apply to the provincial authority for additional funds.1852 
Reprioritisation of its existing resources might not be constitutionally sound since it is 
similarly responsible for the fulfilment of the housing and other needs of other people within 
its jurisdiction.1853 
The second reason why municipalities should not be the final port of call in eviction matters 
is that housing falls within the concurrent functions of the national and provincial spheres of 
government.1854 While these spheres might delegate these functions to municipalities, they are 
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ultimately responsible for the fulfilment thereof.1855 This relates to the third reason for 
involving other spheres of government in eviction matters, namely the principle of co-
operative government. This principle requires the national and provincial spheres of 
government to assist and support municipalities. If a municipality cannot or do not fulfil its 
duties, the provincial government must step in and ensure that the duties are fulfilled.1856 
The EHP confirms the fact that other spheres of government must be involved in the 
provision of emergency housing. It stipulates that municipalities should apply to the 
provincial authority if they lack sufficient funds. Should the provincial authority lack 
sufficient resources, it must apply to the national authority. Likewise, if a municipality 
reports that it does not have sufficient resources, a court should order it to apply to the 
provincial authority for funding. A court could even require the provincial authority itself to 
report on its available resources.1857 
It could be argued that there are certain situations in which the court should not involve other 
spheres of government. For one, if the alternative accommodation order based on the second 
ground is seen as relief for the unconstitutional limitation of human rights.1858 At first glance, 
the Housing Act and the EHP do not seem to apply to alternative accommodation orders 
based on the second ground. However, it could be argued that compliance with the order 
would still amount to the provision of housing, which must comply with these instruments.1859 
Moreover, co-operative government is required by the Constitution in all matters.1860  
Another possible argument against involving other spheres concerns situations where the 
municipality had been at fault.1861 However, since the provincial government is required to 
monitor the municipalities’ fulfilment of their duties and ensure that they fulfil them, they are 
likely to be equally at fault for not intervening.1862 The liability of other spheres is even more 
probable if the municipality’s default included a failure to adopt a short-term housing budget. 
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This is because the Constitution requires the provincial authority to intervene and adopt an 
interim budget when the municipality fails to adopt one, for whatever reason.1863  
While the decisions, where alternative accommodation orders were granted against the 
municipality, did not prevent an application for funding from other spheres, it did not require 
other spheres to co-operate. It should not be necessary to order the co-operation of other 
spheres since such co-operation is constitutionally mandated. Nevertheless, the provincial 
authority’s clear reluctance to participate indicates the necessity of such an order.1864 By 
involving other spheres, the burden on municipalities is reduced and more people can be 
assisted. 
3.1.3 Standards of emergency housing 
A further way of reducing the burden on municipalities is to subscribe lower standards for the 
emergency housing to be provided. The higher the standards of housing are, the more 
resources are required to meet the standards, the fewer housing opportunities can be 
provided.1865 This is evident from the decline in permanent housing delivery since the increase 
of the housing standards.1866 It is also clear from the alternative accommodation orders 
granted by the court, which required the provision of emergency housing of standards lower 
than stipulated in the EHP. These orders were made in response to reports from 
municipalities that their resources are insufficient.1867  
In addition to lowering the standards in alternative accommodation orders, lower standards in 
the short-term housing programmes of municipalities than those suggested in the EHP would 
reduce the burden even more. This would allow the accommodation of more people within 
the programme.1868 It must be kept in mind that the EHP is not the measure to be used for the 
provision of long-term or permanent housing. Housing provided in terms of the EHP can be 
of a lower standard than what is required for adequate housing, as defined in international 
law1869 since it is meant to be temporary and to be upgraded at a later stage. The specific 
                                                 
1863
 S 139(4) of the Constitution. 
1864
 For example, the provincial authority in Skurweplaas (4th Resp HoA) para 39.  
1865
 This is inconsistent with the notion of distributive justice, see Chapter 6:2. 
1866
 See Chapter 2:2. 
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 See Chapter 3:5.1. 
1868
 Van Wyk (2007) JS Afr L54-55. See also, Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights  404. 
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 See Chapter 4:5.1.2. 
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standard of housing for alternative accommodation would depend on the state’s available 
resources considering the other urgent emergency housing situations within its jurisdiction. 
Very basic emergency housing for more people would reduce the burden on municipalities. 
However, it would also mean that those within emergency housing would be less patient in 
waiting for their standard of housing to be upgraded. Incremental upgrades could assist in this 
regard. As was concluded, the fact that emergency housing is described as “temporary” often 
only implies that the lower standard is temporary and that the expectation is for the housing 
to be upgraded. Nevertheless, this should only be the case if unlawful occupiers truly face 
homelessness and they qualify in terms of the requirements of the short-term housing 
programme, as well as the requirements of the permanent housing programme.1870  
3.1.4 Other remedies 
This section recommends remedies other than, or in addition to, alternative accommodation 
orders for eviction matters. Alternative accommodation orders might not be the most 
appropriate orders to grant in eviction matters since it is a once-off solution to a potentially 
extensive failure by the state. Moreover, it is an expensive solution and places a great burden 
on the state. 
3.1.4.1 Relief for the landowner 
The provision of alternative accommodation, especially of the standards prescribed by the 
EHP, requires considerable resources. Land might have to be bought and prepared; houses 
built; and services installed.1871 The requisite resources increase along with the size of the 
group of unlawful occupiers. Where the state does not have the available resources to 
accommodate the unlawful occupiers immediately, a delay of the eviction would be in the 
best interests of the unlawful occupiers.1872 Such a delay might be just and equitable if the 
landowner does not need to use the land productively in the near future. If, however, a 
stalemate situation exists, the remedy can either be to provide relief for the landowner or the 
unlawful occupiers.1873 
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 Chapter 3:5.2. 
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 See Chapter 3:6.3. 
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 Or a postponement of the eviction date or a suspension of the eviction order. 
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 See Chapter 4:4.2 and 4.3. 
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It is unlikely that the unlawful occupiers would be entitled to relief from the state for the 
unconstitutional limitation of their negative right of access to adequate housing. Not only 
could it be argued that the eviction would not amount to a limitation of their rights, but such a 
limitation might also be justified in terms of section 36(1) of the Constitution.1874 If, however, 
it can be argued that an eviction would amount to an unconstitutional limitation of the 
unlawful occupiers’ rights, there is bound to be stalemate situation. In other words, an 
eviction would cause an unlawful limitation of the unlawful occupiers’ rights and a delay of 
the eviction would amount to an unconstitutional limitation of the landowner’s right. In such 
a situation, the size of the group should determine which party’s loss should be addressed. 
With a large group, it might be less expensive to address the loss of the landowner than that 
of the unlawful occupiers. This approach was taken by the court in Modderklip.1875  
The Constitutional Court interprets section 172(1)(b) to require remedies that balance 
interests, rather than maximise rights.1876 “Interest balancing” allows a court to grant a remedy 
that does not fully correct the violation of a specific right. This deficient correction is justified 
by the involvement of other factors such as the interests of others or the availability of 
resources.1877 Accordingly, compensation granted to the landowner, in the form of 
constitutional damages, might be less than the market value of the property.1878 In 
Modderklip, the court required that the amount of constitutional damages be calculated in 
terms of the Expropriation Act.1879 Using this finding as a guideline, it is recommended that 
the constitutional factors to be considered in determining just and equitable compensation in 
expropriation matters must be used to determine the amount of constitutional damages. The 
Constitution requires that several factors in addition to market value be considered, such as 
the current use of the property and the purpose of the expropriation.1880  
Considering these factors might result in a finding that the amount of damages should be less 
than market value. It is recommended that the court place a deadline on the state to ensure 
that the unlawful occupation is ceased. The unlawful occupation should not be allowed to 
                                                 
1874
 See Chapter 4:5.1.2. 
1875
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 Bishop "Remedies" in CLOSA  9-59. 
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 Gewirtz (1983) Yale LJ 591, referred to in Bishop "Remedies" in CLOSA  9-59. 
1878
 See Chapter 6:4.2.2. 
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 S 12(1) of the Expropriation Act. See Modderklip para 68. 
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 S 3(a) – (e) of the Constitution. 
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continue indefinitely simply because constitutional damages were paid to the landowner. This 
is because the landowner would continue to carry responsibility for the property as owner 
thereof. Usually, placing a deadline on the state would entail postponing the eviction order 
until the state has the available resources to fulfil any short-term housing duty it has toward 
the unlawful occupiers. The state can fulfil its short-term housing duty either by providing 
those unlawful occupiers who qualify under the EHP with alternative accommodation or by 
expropriating the property. Should the state decide to expropriate the land, any amount of 
constitutional damages must be set off against the compensation for expropriation.1881 Any 
deadline for the provision of alternative accommodation would have to be taken into account 
as a factor in determining the amount of constitutional damages. As with temporary 
expropriation,1882 the compensation would be less than if the landowner lost the use of its 
property permanently. 
In three eviction matters regarding the unlawful settlement known as “Marikana”1883 
(hereinafter “the Marikana cases”),1884 which are currently heard together in the Western Cape 
High Court, two alternative remedies have been sought.1885 These are that the municipality 
should be ordered to purchase the land from the landowners and that the municipality should 
be ordered to expropriate the land.1886  
The matters involve the unlawful1887 occupation of privately owned land by approximately 
60 000 persons.1888 Many of them moved onto the property due to an eviction from elsewhere 
1881
 As was required in Modderklip para 64. 
1882
 S 2(1) of the current Expropriation Act and s 3(2) and 8(3) of the Expropriation Bill 4 of 2015 allow for 
temporary, as well as partial, expropriation of the right to use property. 
1883
 Fischer v Unlawful Occupiers (Appl HoA) para 55.2. 
1884
Fischer v Unlawful Occupiers, Erf 150, Philippi unreported case no: 9443/2014; Stock v The Persons 
Unlawfully Occupying Erven 145, 152, 156, 418, 3107, Philippi & Portion 0 Farm 597 unreported case no: 
11705/15; Coppermoon Trading 203 (Pty) Ltd v The Persons Who Identities are to the Applicant Unknown and 
Who Unlawfully Occupy Remainder Erf 149, Philippi, Cape Town 14422/14. 
1885
 Alternative to an alternative accommodation order and an order for constitutional damages. The demand for 
these remedies is based on the allegation that the landowners’ right to property is infringed. Fischer v Unlawful 
Occupiers (Appl HoA) para 24.3. 
1886
 Fischer v Unlawful Occupiers, Erf 150, Philippi (National and Provincial Government's Head of Argument) 
(9443/14)  para 2; Fischer v Unlawful Occupiers (Appl HoA) para 93-117, 130. 
1887
 Fischer v Unlawful Occupiers (Appl HoA) para 3. 
1888
Ntongana T at GroundUp Marikana Lawyer Calls for State to Expropriate Land (2017) 
http://www.groundup.org.za/article/marikana-lawyer-calls-state-expropriate-land/ 27-02-2017; Socio-Economic 
Rights Institute of South Africa Fischer v Unlawful Occupiers, Erf 150, Philippi (2017) http://www.seri-
sa.org/index.php/19-litigation/case-entries/491-fischer-v-unlawful-occupiers-erf-149-philippi 27-02-2017. 
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or an inability to continue to pay rent.1889 It is accepted that an eviction would leave the 
unlawful occupiers homeless.1890 Nevertheless, their individual circumstances have not been 
considered.1891  
The landowners prefer that their property be purchased by the municipality at market 
value.1892 They do not support an order for expropriation unless compensation for 
expropriation is at market value.1893 This demand is not in line with distributive justice, in 
terms of which full restoration is not required, nor is it in line with the constitutional 
provision regarding the calculation of compensation for expropriation, which requires several 
other factors to be considered.1894 Moreover, the Supreme Court of Appeal, in Ekurhuleni 
Metropolitan Municipality v Dada NO and Others (hereinafter “Dada”),1895 rejected an order 
that the municipality purchase the land as remedy in an eviction matter. It found that an order 
to purchase disregarded the fact that the state’s housing duty need only be fulfilled 
progressively;1896 it violated the separation of powers doctrine;1897 and was not appropriate 
relief.1898  
In respect of the demand to expropriate, the unlawful occupiers support this remedy on the 
basis that the municipality has the discretion to expropriate land for housing purposes in 
terms of s 9(3) of the Housing Act.1899 While the municipality argues that this discretion does 
not place a duty on them to expropriate,1900 the unlawful occupiers argue that discretionary 
power could be forced.1901 However, this is inconsistent with the High Court decision of 
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 Fischer v Unlawful Occupiers, Erf 150, Philippi (Unlawful Occupiers' Head of Argument) (9443/14)  para 
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Dolpire v South African National Roads Agency Ltd,1902 in which the court found that the 
discretion to expropriate cannot be forced by the court.1903  
The unlawful occupiers rely on Modderklip in support of their demand for expropriation.1904 
In Modderklip, the court found that it did not need to consider whether an order for 
expropriation would ever be an appropriate remedy.1905 Hence, it did not rule such a remedy 
out for future cases. However, its doubt regarding the appropriateness of such a remedy is 
evident from its reference to the arguments that such an order would violate the separation of 
powers doctrine.1906 In addition, the court found that the most appropriate order in that matter 
would be an order for constitutional damages based on the amount of compensation that 
would have been payable, were it an expropriation. Should the state decide to expropriate the 
property at a later stage, the court found that the compensation for the expropriation should 
be reduced by the compensation paid in terms of its order.1907  
This order for damages leaves the discretion regarding expropriation in the hands of the 
executive authority.1908 However, from a distributive justice point of view, whether the land is 
expropriated or compensation paid makes no difference. In fact, in situations such as the 
Marikana cases, where the municipality argued that the land is not suitable for long-term 
housing,1909 compensation equal to that payable for expropriation of the property is 
inconsistent with distributive justice. The state is required to pay for the permanent use of the 
property that cannot be upgraded to formal housing.  
Instead, temporary expropriation would be more appropriate. Both the current Expropriation 
Act1910 and the Expropriation Bill1911 allow for temporary, as well as partial, expropriation of 
1902
 Dolpire v South African National Roads Agency Ltd (A464/2011) [2012] ZAWCHC 280. 
1903
 Dolpire v South African National Roads Agency Ltd para 17 in terms of s 41 of South African National 
Roads Agency Limited and National Roads Act 7 of 1998; referred to in Fischer v Unlawful Occupiers, Erf 150, 
Philippi (Municipality's Supplementary Head of Argument) (9443/14)  para 36-39. 
1904
 Fischer v Unlawful Occupiers (UO HoA) para 35. Referring to Modderklip para 64. 
1905
 Modderklip para 63. 
1906
 Modderklip para 62. 
1907
 Modderklip para 64. 
1908
 Modderklip para 64. 
1909
 Fischer v Unlawful Occupiers (Muni HoA) para 37.6. The reasons given are that part of the land is to be 
used by Eskom for powerlines; part of the land is to be used by the municipality for transport infrastructure; the 
land is industrial/agricultural land; the land is not suitable for bulk services; and the land lies within the airport 
noise corridor. 
1910
 S 2(1) of the Expropriation Act. 
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the right to use property. Ideally, the state should temporarily expropriate a landowner who is 
suffering an unreasonable delay in enjoying the use of its property due to unlawful 
occupation. This would make the emergency housing situation less urgent and give the state 
time to assist those who are needier first and prepare alternative accommodation in a more 
suitable area. Since an order for temporary expropriation arguably violates the separation of 
powers doctrine, an order for constitutional damages equal to the cost of temporary 
expropriation might be more appropriate. As explained above, the eviction would then be 
delayed based on the municipality’s estimation of its ability to provide alternative 
accommodation. If during this time, the municipality decides that it wants to use the property 
for housing, it could expropriate the property. The amount already paid should be deducted 
from the compensation payable for complete expropriation.  
While compensation to the landowner, in the form of constitutional damages, for the 
continued occupation of its land fulfils the state’s short-term housing duty toward the 
unlawful occupiers, it should not substitute this fulfilment entirely. Such an approach would 
not consider the unlawful occupiers individually and might amount to an inclusion of persons 
who would not have been included had their personal circumstances been considered.1912 For 
this reason, compensation should be used as a temporary measure to prevent urgency, 
pending the provision of emergency housing. If the landowner’s property is to be used as 
emergency housing, the unlawful occupiers who do not qualify for emergency housing 
assistance, for example, if they can afford alternative accommodation, should still be evicted. 
3.1.4.2 Employment programmes 
Another possible remedy is to order the state to include the unlawful occupiers, capable of 
working, in a programme aimed at skills development and the securing of employment. Such 
a programme could be similar to the Street People programme of the City of Cape Town.1913 
Alternative accommodation can be provided until employment is secured and the unlawful 
occupier can afford his own accommodation.  
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 S 3(2) and 8(3) Expropriation Bill. 
1912
 In the Marikana cases, for example, the highest income is R 4810. Fischer v Unlawful Occupiers (UO HoA) 
para 51.5. 
1913
 See Chapter 3:4. 
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This strategy could be implemented together with an increase in the state’s rental stock.1914 
This could allow the unlawful occupier to rent housing from the state’s rental stock at a low 
rental rate.  
3.1.4.3 Measures to keep state accountable  
One of the requirements for an alternative accommodation order is blameworthiness on the 
part of the state. In terms of either ground, persons living in emergency housing situations or 
facing the loss of their homes should be able to approach the court for an alternative 
accommodation order. If the state was blameworthy, a court would be able to make an 
alternative accommodation order.  
The problem is that it would have to consider all other persons who might have such a claim. 
This would place a heavy burden on the court. Moreover, not all persons would have the 
resources to approach the court. It is more desirable that the state should be deterred from 
neglecting its duties in the first place than to try to remedy the consequences of such neglect. 
Hence, a court could grant a remedy that would prevent the state from neglecting its duties in 
the future. Such a remedy can be in the form of a structural interdict. A structural interdict 
requires the state to report to the court on its progress periodically.1915 This might place a great 
burden on the court.1916 Instead, measures to ensure the state’s fulfilment of its duties and to 
keep the state accountable for fulfilling its duties in eviction and short-term housing matters 
must be taken. 
A short-term housing programme that complies with the notion of distributive justice, as set 
out in Chapter 6, would be complex and would require expertise to develop and implement. 
A database should record all current and potential future emergency housing situations. 
Criteria should be created to determine the urgency of each emergency housing situation. 
Record must also be kept of all resources available for the provision of temporary housing. 
This includes not only the amount budgeted for the programme but also all land and buildings 
owned by the municipality. The municipality would have to calculate what percentage of its 
available resources it could use to address current emergency housing situations and what 
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 Used to provide subsidised rental housing. 
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 See, Swart (2005) SAJHR 226; Liebenberg (2002) Law Democracy & Dev 9-10. 
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 For criticism against structural interdicts, see Pienaar Land Reform  776-780; Kotze Effective Relief 42-47. 
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percentage it must save to be able to address future emergency housing situations. Moreover, 
it must be determined how much of the housing budget should be spent on emergency 
housing and how much should be spent on longer-term housing. Account must be taken of 
the fact that emergency housing should be temporary, especially if it is of a lower standard.  
These calculations are similar to valuations for long-term insurance funds and pension 
funds.1917 In terms of section 16(1) of the Pension Funds Act 24 of 1956, funds must be 
valuated every three years by valuator (usually an actuary).1918 A valuation report must be 
drafted.1919 This report must indicate whether the fund has sufficient assets to be able to meet 
its financial obligations and pay out all claims during the following three years.1920 This 
requires an estimation of future liabilities as informed by actuarial assumptions.1921 Actuarial 
assumptions are based on statistical analyses and experienced judgment.1922 To ensure 
accountability, the reports are submitted to the Registrar of Pension Funds,1923 being the 
executive officer of the Financial Services Board (the FSB).1924 The FSB is an independent 
body created by statute to oversee the non-banking financial services industry of South 
Africa, such as insurance and pension funds.1925 If a report indicates that the fund is not in a 
sound financial condition, the FSB can require the fund to submit a plan setting out how it 
intends to ensure the financial soundness of the plan within a reasonable time.1926 A valuator 
is independent to the extent that it is accountable to a professional body, such as the Actuarial 
Society of South Africa.1927 
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Based on this formula, the Housing Act can require a valuator to draft a valuation report in 
respect of the EHP and the state’s ability to meet its obligations. Reports can be required on 
municipal or provincial level. To ensure a satisfactory report, the municipality or executive 
council would need to employ their own actuaries and draft their short-term housing plan 
according to the calculations of the actuaries. Third-party actuarial firms might also be used 
on a consultancy basis. The Housing Act can require reports to be submitted to the FSB. If a 
report indicates that the housing plan is not in a sound financial condition, the FSB can 
require the state to submit a plan setting out how it intends to ensure the financial soundness 
of the plan within a reasonable time. Moreover, such a report can be used as evidence in court 
of the state’s non-compliance with its duties. 
An obvious issue with this recommendation is that the employment of actuaries would be 
costly. However, it is evident that expertise to devise an effective short-term housing 
programme, as well as a means of ensuring transparency and accountability for the drafting 
and implementing of this programme, is necessary. An accurate and up to date short-term 
housing database would also assist the court in determining whether the state has the 
available resources to provide the unlawful occupiers with alternative accommodation. Based 
on this information, the court could decide whether it would be just to grant an alternative 
accommodation order.  
3.2 Burden of proof 
An issue that runs through this analysis is who must place the information before the court. 
The court needs information regarding the individual circumstances of the unlawful 
occupiers, the reasonableness of the state’s measures and the state’s available resources. 
Generally, the party alleging an infringement of a right must prove its limitation and the party 
responsible for the limitation must prove that the limitation was justified.1928 This section 
considers the effect of this general rule on two contentious issues: proof of lack of alternative 
accommodation and proof regarding the state’s resources and its fulfilment of its duties. 
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3.2.1 Proof of lack of alternative accommodation 
To prove that their rights have been infringed, unlawful occupiers would have to prove that 
they require alternative accommodation. Hence, they would carry the burden of proving that 
they would be homeless if they were to be evicted without an alternative accommodation 
order.1929 This burden of proof is confirmed in Changing Tides, where the court required the 
legal representatives of the unlawful occupiers to report on the personal circumstances of the 
unlawful occupiers and whether they would require alternative accommodation.1930  
In addition, the court in both Ives v Rajah and Omar NO v Omar seemed to place the burden 
to prove that they lacked alternative accommodation on the unlawful occupiers. The court 
granted an eviction without an alternative accommodation order on the basis that the 
unlawful occupiers would not be left homeless once evicted since their family could 
accommodate them. Nonetheless, there was no proof that the relatives of the unlawful 
occupiers had a duty, or were willing, to accommodate them.1931 The court seemed to accept 
that the unlawful occupiers could live with their relatives without such proof.  
A problem arises when the unlawful occupiers fail to provide evidence regarding whether 
they face homelessness. Should they bear the burden of proof, the court would have to accept 
that they would not be left homeless. This would probably result in an eviction without an 
alternative accommodation order. However, if such an eviction does, in fact, leave the 
unlawful occupiers homeless, it might not be just and equitable. To prevent such an outcome, 
a court should ensure that it has knowledge of all the relevant circumstances before granting 
an eviction order.1932 This means requiring the unlawful occupiers to place their personal 
circumstances before the court. Such an outcome could further be prevented by requiring the 
state to engage with the unlawful occupiers and to provide at least prima facie proof that the 
unlawful occupiers would not be left homeless. It would then be up to the unlawful occupiers 
to prove otherwise.1933 
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Some unlawful occupiers might not understand the legal process and the fact that they have 
to prove their lack of alternative accommodation to prevent an eviction that would leave them 
homeless. For this reason, a court should make sure that the unlawful occupiers understand 
their legal position. This may include requiring that they acquire legal representation, which 
may be in the form of legal aid.1934 A court may also choose to accept evidence or statements 
that sufficiently place the state’s reports in doubt, despite it not constituting actual proof of 
the contrary. 
3.2.2 Proof of available resources and fulfilment of the state’s duties  
That the burden of proof regarding their personal circumstances is placed on the unlawful 
occupiers is justified because they are the ones who possess this information.1935 Information 
regarding the programmes and actions of the state and whether they are reasonable, as well as 
the available resources of the state, is usually at the disposal of the state. To prove that the 
state has the available resources, one must prove either that the state has sufficient resources 
to accommodate all persons living in emergency housing situations in the municipality’s 
jurisdiction, including the unlawful occupiers, or that the unlawful occupiers must be 
prioritised based on the measure identified above.1936 Accordingly, information regarding all 
other persons living in emergency housing situation within the municipality’s jurisdiction, as 
well as information regarding the resources of the state, must be placed before the court.1937 
Placing the burden of proof on parties other than the state in these matters can create an 
almost impossible burden since the information is not easily accessible to them.1938  
In respect of the second ground for alternative accommodation orders (that the state did not 
respect and protect certain rights), the enquiry into the available resources of the state forms 
part of the second stage. It relates to the state’s justification for not fulfilling its duty. Hence, 
based on the general rule, the duty is on the state to prove that it lacks the available 
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resources.1939 In respect of the first ground for alternative accommodation orders (that the 
state did not fulfil the right of access to adequate housing), the enquiry into the 
reasonableness of the state’s measures and the availability of resources forms part of the first 
stage. This is because they form part of the internal limitations within the right; the state need 
only fulfil the right by taking reasonable measures within its available resources.1940 Based on 
the general rule, if the first ground for alternative accommodation orders is relied upon the 
duty is on the unlawful occupiers to prove that the state’s measures were unreasonable or that 
the state has the available resources.1941 Had a minimum core for the right of access to 
adequate housing been established, this duty would not fall on the unlawful occupiers in 
respect of minimum core fulfilment of the right.1942  
The general rule regarding the burden of proof (especially in respect of the first ground) has 
not been followed strictly by the courts.1943 In Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various 
Occupiers,1944 the court found that, in eviction matters, a court must ensure that all relevant 
information is before it.1945 This means that the court can disregard the technical rules of onus 
and require all parties to place the information at their disposal before it.1946 In Changing 
Tides, the court interpreted this to mean that the municipality carries a burden of proof 
regarding its ability to provide alternative accommodation1947 since information regarding the 
availability of resources is at the disposal of the state.1948 Further cases, in which the state was 
required to report on its programmes and its available resources, confirm this interpretation 
                                                 
1939
 Chapter 4:5.1. 
1940
 Woolman & Botha "Limitations" in CLOSA  34-33. 
1941
 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights  202; Kruuse (2011) SALJ 628. This is also true for an enquiry into 
whether the landowner’s right in terms of s 25(1) of the Constitution was unconstitutionally limited under the 
second ground for alternative accommodation orders. 
1942
 Chenwi (2008) Harv L Rev 122; Liebenberg "Interpretation of socio-economic rights" in CLOSA  33-31. 
1943
 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights  203; Woolman & Botha "Limitations" in CLOSA  34-33.  
1944
 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC). 
1945
 PE Municipality para 32-33. 
1946
 PE Municipality para 32-33. See also, Woolman & Botha "Limitations" in CLOSA  34-44; Liebenberg 
Socio-Economic Rights  197; Ross v South Peninsula Municipality 2000 (1) SA 589 (C) 595G. 
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Der Berg (2015) SAJHR 353. 
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by the court.1949 That the state has the burden of proof regarding the availability of resources 
is also in line with international law.1950  
An argument against disregarding the general rule on the burden of proof is that the duty to 
consider all relevant circumstances, used to justify this disregard, is part of the court’s duty in 
terms of section 26(3). Whether or not the state has a duty to provide alternative 
accommodation in terms of section 26(2) is a separate inquiry and is not subject to this 
requirement. However, where the inquiry into the state’s short-term housing duty is made as 
part of an eviction matter, the outcome thereof will necessarily be a relevant circumstance, to 
be considered in terms of section 26(3). 
The notion that the court should ensure it has all the relevant information before deciding a 
matter suggests that, where the municipality has not acquitted itself of its task, the court 
cannot make a decision. Instead, it should postpone the matter and order the municipality to 
place the requisite information before it. On the contrary, a court cannot postpone the matter 
indefinitely if the municipality makes no reasonable effort to fulfil its duty. In practice, as 
seen from the cases discussed in Chapter 2, courts allow the municipality some time to prove 
that they do not have the available resources, but they are not willing to postpone the matter 
indefinitely. Instead, they decide the matters based on the information before them.1951  
In the bad-building cases, the unlawful occupiers placed some evidence regarding the state’s 
available resources before the court.1952 It has been argued that the burden of proof should 
shift to the state if the complainant has placed prima facie proof before the court that the 
state’s measures were unreasonable or that the state has the available resources.1953 This is 
                                                 
1949
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unlawful occupier would likely only have to prove that the municipality has the resources to house him 
specifically. The onus would then shift to the municipality to prove that there are other, needier persons within 
its jurisdiction, on whom the resources should rather be spent. This explains the kind of shared onus described 
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consistent with the recommendations regarding the burden of proofing respect of the personal 
circumstances of the unlawful occupiers, as well as the court’s duty to consider all relevant 
circumstances.  
Placing the burden of proof on the state is also consistent with the support for the 
reasonableness review, in matters concerning section 26(2) of the Constitution, that it “places 
a burden of justification or explanation on government”.1954 If this burden of proof is 
accepted, it means that a court must give the state the opportunity to meet its onus. If the onus 
is met, a court should not disregard the information before it. Accordingly, if a municipality 
proves that it does not have the available resources, a court should not grant an alternative 
accommodation order contrary to this information. 
4 Conclusion 
There is no doubt that courts can grant alternative accommodation orders in eviction matters. 
Whether they should do so in every instance, is a matter of contention. When deciding an 
eviction a court must balance the relevant circumstances to determine a just and equitable 
outcome. A finding that the state has a duty to accommodate the unlawful occupiers 
immediately, in terms of its duty to fulfil human rights, is likely to lead to an eviction with an 
order against the state to provide alternative accommodation. Such an order should only be 
made if blameworthiness on the part of the unlawful occupiers does not justify an eviction 
without alternative accommodation; the state was blameworthy; and the state has sufficient 
resources to assist all persons living in emergency housing circumstances within its 
jurisdiction or sufficient justification is provided for prioritising the unlawful occupiers 
before the court.1955  
Priority should be based on the urgency of the emergency housing situation. A court could 
make an eviction less urgent delaying the eviction. If such a postponement unconstitutionally 
limits the rights of the landowner, the court could order the state to compensate the 
landowner, in the form of constitutional damages. In granting a compensation order, the court 
                                                                                                                                                        
above. S Woolman & H Botha "Limitations" in Woolman S and Bishop M (eds) 34 34-33, 34-35. Referring 
specifically to Grootboom. See also, Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights  199. 
1954
 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights  173. 
1955
 Because they are neediest or more deserving. 
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must consider the distributive effect of the order. This is because the compensation forms part 
of the state’s short-term housing duty and reduces the state’s available resources. If the 
municipality is unable to assist in even the most urgent matters, priority should be based on 
the income and vulnerability of those within the emergency housing situations, as well as the 
time spent waiting for assistance. 
Should the state not have a duty to assist the unlawful occupiers in terms of its duty to fulfil 
human rights, it is unlikely to have such a duty within its duty to respect and protect human 
rights. Hence, the outcome of these grounds should be similar. In the interest of certainty and 
justice, it is recommended that only the first ground be relied on for granting alternative 
accommodation orders. 
A finding that the court should not grant an alternative accommodation order with immediate 
effect in a specific situation does not require it to grant an eviction order that would leave the 
unlawful occupiers homeless. Such an order might not be just and equitable. Instead, a 
finding that the court cannot grant an alternative accommodation order simply means that the 
issue cannot be solved in this way. To minimise such stalemate situations the state’s available 
resources should be maximised.  
To maximise the state’s available resources and ensure that the rights of as many people as 
possible are respected, protected, promoted and fulfilled, some recommendations are made. 
For one, only those unlawful occupiers who truly face homelessness if evicted without an 
alternative accommodation order must be assisted. This entails considering the personal 
circumstances of the unlawful occupiers individually. In addition, instead of only focusing on 
the unlawful occupier’s ability to afford alternative accommodation elsewhere, other factors 
such as their ability to return whence they came or to live with family must also be 
considered. With large-scale eviction matters, considering the individual circumstances of the 
unlawful occupiers might prove difficult. For this reason, the state should try to prevent large-
scale unlawful occupations by engaging with persons attempting to occupy land unlawfully. 
An urgent large-scale eviction may require the provision of very basic temporary alternative 
accommodation and the subsequent “weeding out” of those who do not qualify for alternative 
accommodation.  
A second recommendation to maximise the state resources is to involve other spheres of 
government. Courts seem to focus on the available resources of municipalities. However, 
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requiring other spheres to co-operate and assist municipalities might increase the available 
resources.  
The third recommendation is that the standard of emergency housing might be reduced in 
certain circumstances to ensure that the state’s resources reach more needy people. In relation 
to this recommendation, the final recommendation regarding state resources is that other 
remedies, such as compensation for the landowner, might require fewer resources. Where the 
state’s resources are limited, the granting of these other remedies might be preferable to an 
alternative accommodation order. In addition, to prevent further emergency housing issues, it 
is recommended that the state employ the services of experts, such as actuaries, to formulate 
a just short-term housing programme. This programme could be overseen by the FSB. 
To determine whether the state has a duty to fulfil or protect the rights of the parties before 
the court, a considerable amount of information must be placed before the court. This thesis 
recommends that the unlawful occupiers be expected to place information before the court 
regarding their personal circumstances and show that an eviction without an alternative 
accommodation order would leave them homeless. In addition, the state should bear the 
burden of proving that its measures and actions are reasonable or that it lacks sufficient 
resources. This means that the municipality must be joined as a party in eviction matters 
where unlawful occupiers could face homelessness. If the municipality is unable to provide 
alternative accommodation, the provincial and even the national authority could be joined.  
Nonetheless, the court has a duty to consider all relevant circumstances before granting an 
order. Hence, if a party fails to meet its burden of proof, the court needs at least prima facie 
evidence regarding these issues. This evidence can be brought by any of the parties. To 
protect ignorant unlawful occupiers, a court could require that they acquire legal 
representation, which may be in the form of legal aid.1956 A court may also choose to accept 
evidence or statements that sufficiently place the state’s reports in doubt, despite it not 
constituting actual proof of the contrary. 
It is hoped that the conclusions and recommendations made in this thesis will be followed by 
courts in deciding whether and on what terms to grant an alternative accommodation order. 
They could also be used in measuring the reasonableness of a municipality’s short-term 
                                                 
1956
 See Occupiers of Erven 87 and 88 Berea para 25, 47. 
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housing programme. The extent to which these conclusions and recommendations can be 
used to measure the reasonableness of such a programme requires future research. 
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